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Chapter I. Introduction
I
H it le r  was power mad. He d esired  power fo r  Germany and d e ter ­
mined th a t th is  goal could be accom plished b est by th e  a c q u is it io n  o f  
immense personal power. He "did not d is tin g u ish  between h im se lf and 
Germany, he id e n t i f ie d  h im se lf w ith  her. . . . A ustrian  by b ir th , he 
bore Germany an e x c lu s iv e  and p a ssio n a te  love." -1- H it le r 's  b asic  and 
guiding p r in c ip le  centered about the crea tio n  o f  a u n if ie d  German Reich. 
He wanted more than to  scrap the V e r s a ille s  se ttlem en t o f  1919, fo r  
Germany was to  have a dominant p o s it io n  in  European a f f a ir s ,  and a l l  
th r e a ts , whether a c tu a l or  p o te n t ia l ,  were to  be removed.
H it le r  reasoned th a t th e land , needed to  guarantee Germany's 
e x is te n c e , could only be found in  th e expanses o f  e a s t  c en tr a l Europe. 
And so i t  was th a t he urged th a t Germans fo llo w  th e  example o f  th e ir
Teutonic an cestors "to ob ta in  by the German sword sod fo r  th e German
2
plow and d a ily  bread fo r  the N ation ."
Before any such grandiose dream could be r e a liz e d , th e hated  
V e r s a il le s  D ik tat would have to  be e lim in ated . Without s p e c i f ic a l ly  
r e fer r in g  to  th e V e r s a ille s  tr e a ty , H it le r  began to  d isc u ss  the expan­
s io n  o f  German boundaries, and France, ad jacent as i t  was, became aware
^Andre Frangois-P oneet, The F a tefu l Years; Memoirs o f  a French 
Ambassador in  B e r lin , 1931-1938 (New York; 19^9), 292.
^Adolf H it le r ,  Mein Kampf (Boston; 19U3), ll*0. H ereafter c ite d  
as H it le r , Mein Kampf.
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o f  th e th rea t which was contained in  th e message o f  " liv in g  space" fo r  
Germany.
As fa r  as H it le r  was concerned, France had subm itted i t s e l f ,  in  
World War I ,  to  prolonged agony and su ffe r in g  w ith  the o b je c t iv e  o f  
r e a liz in g  the complete d is s o lu t io n  o f  the German n a tio n . In th e  1 9 2 0 's , 
H it le r  ex h ib ited  a fe a r  o f  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  Germany d is in te g r a t in g
■3
in to  a "hodge-podge o f  l i t t l e  s ta te s ."  Germany's w estern boundaries 
were a source o f  con stern ation  fo r  H it le r , because th e ir  len g th  and la ck  
o f  natu ra l b arriers were a l i a b i l i t y  in  a d e fen siv e  r o le .  Even th e  
Rhine did not provide an adequate d efen se , s in c e  i t  flowed through the  
heart o f  in d u s tr ia l Germany. To contem plate waging a general war in  
t h is  area was to  contem plate th e  d estru c tio n  o f  German in d u s tr ia l power.^
France and th e ro le  o f  lead ersh ip  i t  attem pted to  m aintain on the  
con tin en t posed a problem fo r  H it le r . By th e same token a u n if ie d  Ger­
many was always to  be considered  a th rea t to  France. Both powers wished  
to  e lim in a te  each other? H it le r  viewed P aris as a necessary  conquest, 
and th e  Quay-D'Orsay worked to  fr u s tr a te  a u n if ie d  and organized Germany.
H it le r  b e lieved  on ly  two p o s s ib le  courses were open to  Germany.
The f i r s t  c o n s is te d  o f  hold ing to  the d efen siv e  w ith the p o s s ib i l i t y  
th a t a t  some fu tu re  date France would change her p o lic y . The a lte r n a te  
plan  was to  in i t i a t e  a r a d ica l change in  German p o lic y ,  and i t  was ap­
parent th a t th e  l a t t e r  p lan  would p r e v a il .  I t  involved  the expansion  
o f  Germany's ea stern  border, and y e t  H it le r  knew th a t he could not d is ­
regard Germany's western f la n k . T herefore, he was determined th a t
^ H itler , Mein Kampf, 672.
k lb id . ,  673.
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France was to  f a l l  b efore he could proceed w ith  h is  eastern  schemes.
H it le r  was not unaware o f  th e weaknesses o f  France. The chronic 
in s t a b i l i t y  o f French p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  gave him hope as he form ulated h is  
fo re ig n  p o l ic y . I t  a ls o  provided him w ith  much m a ter ia l fo r  speech- 
making and he deplored th e  incompetence o f  a democracy. Because o f  
France's c o lo n ia l hold ings in  A fr ica , H it le r  feared  th a t i t s  p o l i t i c a l  
weaknesses might cause France to  turn fo r  a s s is ta n c e  to  her c o lo n ie s  
r e su lt in g  in  a negroid n a tion  in  Europe.'’ Given H it le r 's  g rea t preoc­
cupation  w ith  th e ethn ic p u r ity  o f  Germany, such a p o s s ib i l i t y  fo r  
France was viewed w ith  sk ep tic ism .
Even in  c u ltu r a l m atters H it le r  portrayed a d is t a s t e  fo r  France. 
While he d isp layed  an adm iration fo r  French a r t  and a rch itec tu re  o f  th e  
p a s t , he showed only  contempt fo r  contemporary French e f f o r t s .  Further­
more, he trea ted  a l l  Germans, who spoke o f  France as a c u ltu r a l n a tio n , 
as i f  th ey  were being d is lo y a l  to  th e ir  own n a tio n a l development and 
cu ltu re .
Even as ea r ly  as the 19*20's ,  H it le r  regarded France as Germany's 
m ortal enemy, and Mein Kampf i s  f i l l e d  w ith  such a s s e r t io n s . Many o f  
h is  ea r ly  speeches a lso  portray France in  t h is  r o le .  However, a f t e r  
H it le r  assumed p o l i t i c a l  power, as ch a n ce llo r  he reconsidered many o f  
h is  e a r l ie r  statem ents on th e  su b jec t o f  France.' I t  may w e ll be th a t  
H it le r  now saw the stren gth  and p o s it io n  o f  France in  a new and more 
balanced p e r sp ec tiv e , fo r  h is  f i r s t  pronouncements on German fo re ig n  
r e la t io n s  emphasised changes through p ea cefu l measures.
^Adolph H it le r , H it le r 's  S ecret Book (New Yorks 1961), 163® 
H ereafter c it e d  as H it le r , S ecret Book.
D if f i c u l t i e s  a r is e  in  surveying H it le r 's  fo r e ig n  p o lic y  because 
many o f  h is  statem ents have an ambiguous q u a lity  in  th a t th ey  la ck  the  
element o f  co n s isten cy . Before H it le r  came to  power, he made many v in ­
d ic t iv e  and q u estion ab le  statem ents concerning fo re ig n  a f f a ir s  fo r  the  
purpose o f  enhancing h is  p o l i t i c a l  p o s it io n . For example, by an in s id ­
ious a tta ck  on the V e r s a ille s  se ttlem en t he hoped to  make th e  p o s it io n  
o f  Stresemann^ and the Weimar Republic u n tenab le . In t h is  regard, H it le r  
s ta te d  th a t , “the day must come when a German government s h a l l  summon 
up the courage to  d ec lare  to  the fo r e ig n  powers £thalQ th e  Treaty o f  
V e r s a ille s  i s  founded on a monstrous l i e . " '  He determined to  whip up 
German im patience by a tta ck in g  the government fo r  n e g le c tin g  n a tio n a l  
in t e r e s t s  in  favor  o f  fo re ig n  p o lic y . These t ir a d e s  aroused co n sid er­
a b le  French d is t r u s t  and consequently c a s t  doubt on the a b i l i t y  o f  the  
Weimar Republic to  speak a u th o r it iv e ly  fo r  th e German n a tio n .
I I
A ll post-w ar German governments were preoccupied w ith  th e m it i ­
gation  o f  th e V e r sa ille s  D ik ta t. From the statesm en o f  the Weimar 
Republic to  H it le r , th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and harsh r e a l i t i e s  imposed by th e
Q
tr e a ty  had to  be considered  as a l l  im portant. In t h is  s e n se , H it le r
'Gustav Stresemann, 1878-1929. German statesm an, C hancellor o f
Germany (1923j), M in ister  o f  fo r e ig n  a f f a ir s  (1923-1929).
^ H itle^ 's  speech a t  Munich, August 1 , 1923. U .S. War Department, 
N azi Conspiracy and A ggression (Washingtons 19U6-19l;8), V, 79. Here­
a f t e r  c ite d  &.CT.A.
®Stresemann, in  h is  memoirs, s ta te s  th a t h is  p o lic y  o f  r e c o n c il­
ia t io n  was ca rr ied  out on ly  to  f o o l  the French. He had no o th er  goal 
than th e com plete repudiation  o f  the V e r s a ille s  tr e a ty .
perpetuated a fundamental German p o lic y , th e  d if fe r e n c e  being th a t h is  
endeavors reaped a much r ich er  su ccess than h is  p red ecesso rs.
H it le r  was hot impressed by th e stren g th  o f  any o p p o sitio n  h is  
p o l ic ie s  were l ik e ly  to  m eet, and he was n o t r e s t r ic t e d  to  the conven­
t io n a l methods o f  diplom acy. He had mastered th e in t r ic a c ie s  o f  d e c e it  
and th e a b i l i t y  to  e x p lo it  th e weaknesses o f  h is  opponents. He knew 
what he wanted and he h e ld  the I n i t ia t iv e ,  w h ile  France and B r ita in  on ly  
knew th a t th ey  did  n o t want war and, th er e fo re , were always on the de­
fe n s iv e .
On October l i t ,  1933, H it le r  announced th a t Germany would no longer  
be an in f e r io r  n a tio n  w ith r e sp ec t to  her armed fo r c e s . This was soon  
fo llow ed  by the announcement th a t Germany was going to  begin rearming 
i t s e l f . ^  On March 1E>, 193£> he denounced Part V o f  th e  V e r sa ille s  
tr e a ty  by r e in s ta t in g  u n iv ersa l m ilita r y  se r v ic e  and expanding the  
German army to  t h ir t y - s ix  divisions.'*-®
The fo llo w in g  year H it le r  ordered the r e m ilita r iz a t io n  o f  the  
Rhineland, and army u n its  were q u ick ly  moved in to  the p rev io u sly  dem il­
i ta r iz e d  zone. H it le r  had taken a ser io u s  r is k  in  in i t ia t in g  th is  
a c t io n , fo r  th e  German array could have given  on ly  weak o p p o sitio n  to  
any d ir e c t  French m ilita r y  a c tio n . However, h is  a c tio n  proved su ccess ­
f u l ,  fo r  France d id  not a c t  and she on ly  jo in ed  B r ita in  in  r e g is te r in g  
a strong v erb a l p r o te s t  a g a in st th e  German a c t io n .
9 James Gantenbein, Documentary Background o f  World War I I  (New 
Yorks 191*8), 617-19 passim . H ereafter c it e d  as Gantenbein, Documents♦
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In March, 1938, H it le r  concluded th e  Anschluss between Germany 
and A u str ia . Again he succeeded beyond a l l  ex p ecta tio n s . The sovereign  
s ta te  o f  A u stria  was incorporated in to  the German Reich, and the w estern  
European powers bestirred them selves on ly  to  make verb a l p r o te s ts .
At a conference on November 5 , 1937, H it le r  again  r e ite r a te d  the 
essen ce  o f  h is  p o l i c ie s  w ith  th e  catch phrases; "the se c u r ity  and the  
p reserv a tio n  o f  the n a tio n . . . . This i s  consequently a problem o f  
s p a c e . H e  expressed again h is  co n v ic tio n  o f  th e in e v i t a b i l i t y  o f  a 
war w ith  the w estern powers. At th e  same time th e German ambassador 
to  France reported th a t even though France had su ffered  a s e r ie s  o f  
dip lom atic setb ack s, she ex h ib ited  a w illin g n e ss  to  come to  an under­
stand ing w ith Germany. France wanted to  bring about a s ta b i l iz a t io n  o f  
r e la t io n s  and th ere fo re  help  to  s e t t l e  i t s  d iso rd er ly  in te r n a l p o l i t i ­
c a l s itu a t io n .
Having obtained A u str ia , H it le r  moved lo g ic a l ly  a g a in st Czecho­
s lo v a k ia . The German d esign s revolved  around the Sudeten Germans in  
w estern C zechoslovakia. On September 12, 1938, H it le r  made a v io le n t  
speech concerning th e treatm ent o f  the Sudeten Germans, which caused a 
major European c r i s i s .  On September 28, Chamberlain^ appealed fo r  a 
m eeting o f  a l l  in ter e sted  p a r tie s  to  re so lv e  th e d isp u te . M u sso lin i^
n N.C.A. ,  I ,  377.
^Germany, Documents and M aterial R ela tin g  to  the Eve o f  th e  
Second World War (New. York; 19533)', I I ,  18.
^ N e v i l le  Chamberlain, 1869-I9k0. B r it ish  statesm an. Succeeded 
Baldwin as prime m in ister  (May 28, 1937). He f a i l e d  to  rece iv e  v o te  o f  
confid en ce from Parliam ent, March, 191*0, and resign ed .
■^Benito M u sso lin i, 1883-191;!?• I ta l ia n  d ic ta to r . Formed min­
i s t r y  1922. Led I t a ly  in to  war 19li0. Deposed Ju ly , 19U3«
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took up th e cause and helped to  p ressure H it le r  in to  accep tin g  the 
B r it ish  proposal. On September 29, the conference convened a t  Munich, 
and w ith in  a sh ort time B r ita in , France, Germany, and I ta ly  agreed to  
a se ttlem en t. The terms were s a t is fa c to r y  to  Germany.
Soon a f t e r  the Munich se ttlem en t, rump Czechoslovakia was p a r t i­
tion ed  by Hungary, Poland, and Germany. In March, Germany esta b lish ed  
th e p ro tec to ra te  o f  Bohemia and Moravia w ith  Hacha1^ as p res id en t. The 
w estern powers expressed shock and concern, although th ey  s t i l l  en ter ­
ta in ed  some hope o f  a v ertin g  a general war. H it le r  encouraged such 
hopes in  a speech in  which he made e x p l ic i t  the fa c t  th a t a l l  d i f f e r ­
ences between France and Germany were reso lv ed . Germany had no more 
demands to make on France, and i t  wanted "nothing from France—nothing  
a t  a l l ." 16
In p r iv a te , H it le r  did  not express such p eacefu l in c lin a t io n s ,  
fo r  he was convinced o f  the in e v i t a b i l i t y  o f  war w ith  the w estern powers. 
The munich conference in d icated  Germany's new stren g th , and H it le r  showed 
a w illin g n e ss  to  u se  t h i s  stren gth  whenever opportune.1  ̂ Equally im­
p ortan t, th e  Munich conference d e liv ered  a f a t a l  blow to  th e French 
a ll ia n c e  w ith  the S o v ie t Union. Russia was an in te r e ste d  party  in  any 
con sid era tio n  o f  th e fu tu re ex isten ce  o f  C zechoslovakia. Therefore,
^ E m il Hacha, 1872-191*5. Czech j u r i s t  and statesm an. Third 
p resid en t o f  Czechoslovakia (193801939). P resid ent o f  the German 
"protectorate  o f  Bohemia and Moravia" (1939-191*5) •
^Germany, Documents on th e O rigin o f  th e  War (B er lin : 1939)»
I I ,  229. H ereafter c i t e d  as Germany, Documents on War.
^ C on versa tion  between M ussolin i and Ribbentrop, October 28,
1939. G aleazze Ciano, C iano's Diplom atic Papers (London: 191*8), 2k2-k3  
passim . H ereafter c it e d  as Ciano, D iplom atic Papers.
when th e  S ov iet Union was not in v ite d  to  th e conference i t  re-ev a lu a ted  
and then refused  to acknowledge i t s  a l l ia n c e  w ith  France*4'' As a r e s u lt  
o f  th is  S o v ie t a c t io n , Germany d id  not have to  worry about waging war 
on two fr o n t s .  The Munich conference placed Germany in  a p o s it io n  o f  
unusual stren gth  by g iv in g  her purpose and u n ity . With th ese  q u a l i t i e s ,  
H it le r  no longer f e l t  th a t France posed any insuperable m ilita r y  th rea t  
to  Germany.
On December 6 , 1938, France concluded an agreement w ith  Germany.
I t  s ta te d  th a t both Germany and France b e liev ed  th a t p ea cefu l r e la t io n s  
c o n s titu te d  a n ecessary  elem ent fo r  the p reservation  o f  p eace. Both - 
p a r t ie s  agreed to  remain in  con tact and reso lv e  any d if fe r e n c e s  by 
consultation.^"® The d ec la ra tio n  contained no s p e c if ic  co n tra c t, and 
i t  d id  not o b lig a te  e ith e r  party  to  any s p e c if ic  arrangement, g iv in g  a 
maximum freedom o f  a c tio n  to  both s id e s .
In the ea r ly  months o f  1939, ten sio n s  between Poland and Germany 
began to  r i s e  a t  an alarming r a te . In March and A p r il, th e western  
powers made strong a s se r t io n s  th a t th ere would be grave consequences i f  
Poland became the o b jec t o f  German aggression . A llie d  p o lic y  had evolved  
in to  tak in g  a strong stand even i f  i t  meant war. German rea c tio n  to  the  
A llie d  pronouncements in d ica ted  th a t eastern  Europe had become a sphere 
o f  German in te r e s t  and i t  would not brook any in ter feren ce  in  the area . 
H itle r  refu sed  to  d isc u ss  the m atter o f German-Polish r e la t io n s  w ith  
the w estern p o w e r s .^  When H it le r  completed h is  pact w ith the S o v ie t
*The Franco-Soviet Pact o f  mutual a s s is ta n c e  sign ed  in  1935.
l8Germany, Documents on War, 230.
■^personal l e t t e r  from Ribbentrop to  Bonnet, French m in ister  fo r  
fo r e ig n  a f f a ir s ,  Ju ly  13 , 1939. Gantenbein, Documents, 695*
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Union, he f e l t  con fid en t th a t the w estern powers would not s ta r t  an a l l -  
out war i f  he marched e a s t ,  and so on August 31 , he gave th e order fo r  
th e in vasion  o f  Poland.
I l l
In the f i r s t  part o f  September, 1939, France and B r ita in  sen t  
ultimatums to  Germany in  which they s ta te d  th e ir  reso lv e  to  come to  the  
a id  o f  beleagured Poland i f  the German a tta ck  did not stop . Germany 
ignored th ese  n o tes  and B r ita in  and France then declared  war on Germany.
Thus began the "phoney war" where a l l  m il ita r y  a c t iv i t y  in  the  
w est was concerned w ith avoid ing ex ten s iv e  combat. The fa i lu r e  o f  
France and B r ita in  to  take a c t iv e  measures to  a s s i s t  Poland gave Ger­
many the necessary  time to  overrun Poland. The same a l l i e d  quiescence  
enabled the German Wehrmacht to  co n so lid a te  the gains made In the ea st  
and then concen trate a l l  fo rces  in  the w est.
I n i t i a l  German p lan s fo r  m ilita r y  op eration s in  th e w est c a lle d  
fo r  a sweep, in  the autumn o f  1939, through th e  Low Countries in to  
northern France. H it le r  faced  in ter n a l o p p o sit io n  to  t h is  tim eta b le . 
Consequently he re len ted  and the planned in vasion  was postponed u n t i l  
the n ext sp r in g , fo r  German m ilita r y  lea d ers  f e l t  th a t France would not 
be a b le  to  w ithstand a German a tta ck  a t  th a t tim e. Furthermore, any 
advance on the French channel c o a s t  would enable Germany to  secure  
s tr a te g ic  bases which could e a s i ly  carry th e war to  the B r it is h  I s ­
lands . ̂
^Germany, Kriegsmarine Oberkomando, Fuehrer Conferences on 
M atters D ealing w ith  the German Havy, 1939-19lt5>» I» W -  H ereafter  
c it e d  as Germany, Fuehrer Haval C onferences.
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During the w in ter months, the German p lan  o f  a ttack  underwent 
ex ten s iv e  r e v is io n , p rim arily  in  th e  hands o f  H a n s te in .^  The a n t ic i ­
pated rush o f  A llie d  fo r c es  in to  th e Low C ountries became th e  con d ition
9 9
fo r  the German change o f  s tr a te g ic  p la n s . The o fte n -s ta te d  French 
Maginot Line complex as a cause fo r  th e i n i t i a l  French d e fea t can only  
be considered as p a r t ia l ly  v a l id .  Perhaps more important was the o ffe n ­
s iv e  s id e  o f  th e A llied  ‘'plan D", fo r  "by pushing in to  Belgium w ith  
th e ir  l e f t  shoulder forward th ey  played in to  th e hands o f  th e ir  enemy, 
and wedged them selves in to  a tra p ." ^  This was a most precarious p o s i­
t io n  because o f  the speed and m o b ility  o f  modem w arfare. The German 
su ccess revolved around A llie d  confu sion  which is o la te d  th e ir  cho ice  
fo r c e s  from the main body.
The b a t t le  fo r  France in  the f i r s t  phase was decided by th e pene­
tr a t io n  power o f  the German panzer d iv is io n s  in  cooperation  w ith  t a c t ic a l  
a ir  power. Q uality was the d ec id in g  fa c to r , fo r  Germany deployed on ly  
ten  armored d iv is io n s  in  the breakthrough in  th e  Ardennes and the sub­
sequent d r iv e  to  the s e a . N ev er th e le ss , t h i s  "small pebble thrown from 
a la rg e  s l in g  . . . paralysed  an opposing army [A llie d  ][ th a t w asinm an- 
s iz e  a G o lia th ." ^
2 lE ric  von M anstein, in f lu e n t ia l  German s t a f f  o f f ic e r  ( 19 iil—i|i|.) *
^ G en era l Gamelin in  h is  memoirs, S e r v ir , s ta te s  th a t the a l l i e s  
moved in to  Belgium because m ilita r y  n e c e s s ity  made i t  im perative th a t ; 
th e  Belgium fo rces  ( te n  d iv is io n s )  be u t i l i z e d .  A lso , th e B r it ish  did  
not want the area occupied by enemy because o f  i t s  proxim ity to  th e  
B r it is h  Is la n d s . The French did not r e l i s h  the thought o f  having th e ir  
northern departments decimated aga in . I f  war was to  come, l e t  i t  be 
waged on fo re ig n  s o i l .  Gamelin, S erv ir , I ,  92.
^ B .  H, L id d e ll Hart, The German Generals Talk (New Yorks 19^8), 
116. H ereafter c it e d  as L id d e ll Hart, Generals Talk.
2^B. H. L id d e ll Hart, R evolution  in  Warfare (New Havens 19l*7), 30.
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As th e  A llie d  fo rces  in  northern France staggered back toward 
th e Channel c o a s t , th e  f i r s t  phase o f  the German o ffe n s iv e  came to  a 
c lo s e .  By d ir e c t iv e  11 , H it le r  h a lted  the German panzer d iv is io n s  in  
p u rsu it o f  the remnants o f  the A llie d  northern arm ies, an a c tio n  th a t  
allow ed th e  m ajority  o f  the B r it ish  Expeditionary Force and some French 
u n its  to  be evacuated a t  Dunkirk.  ̂ His d ir e c t iv e  a ls o  had im p lica tio n s  
fo r  o th er a rea s , fo r  i t  allow ed th e  A l l ie s  the r e s p ite  to  regroup and 
form new d e fen siv e  p o s it io n s .
These new p o s it io n s , th e Weygand L ine, became a s e r ie s  o f  stron g-
p o in ts  supported in  th e  rear  by other s tr o n g -p o in ts , a c a d r illa g e  or
c h e c k e r b o a r d . 26 Even with such fe v e r ish  attem p ts, the A l l ie s  had
n e ith er  the tim e, space, nor m a ter ie l to  mold an adequate d efen se .
Along th e ir  extended l in e s ,  th ey  could muster on ly  6$ d iv is io n s ,  to
27
fa ce  the coordinated a tta ck  o f  121; German d iv is io n s .
When the German o ffe n s iv e  resumed, i t  qu ick ly  penetrated  the  
A llie d  d efen ses and e x p lo ited  th e shallow  depth o f  th e  Weygand L ine, 
and the campaign soon degenerated in to  a s e r ie s  o f  iso la te d  engagements. 
On June 10 , th e French government evacuated P aris and took up temporary 
residen ce in  Bordeaux. Along the e n t ir e  fro n t the German army pushed 
r e le n t le s s ly  forward. Reims f e l l  the 1 1 th , Charl&is- sur-Mame on the  
12th , Le Havre on th e 13th , and on June ll*. the Germans occupied P a r is .
^ T h e A llie d  evacuation began May 26 and ended June h» The 
t o t a l  f ig u r e s  o f  evacuees came to  221;,318 B r it ish  troops and 122,000  
A llie d  tro o p s .
26Edward Spears, Assignment to Catastrophes The F all o f France, 
June, 19l;0 (New Yorks 195J>)7 I I , 63. Hereafter c ite s  as Spears, F all 
of France.
2?Ib id . ,  $0.
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On June 15 , Reynaud^® asked the B r itish  government to  r e le a se  France 
from her m ilita r y  o b lig a tio n s  to  the A l l ie s .  C h u rch ill, the B r itish  
prime m in is te r , u lt im a te ly  r e p lie d  th at B r ita in  gave i t s  consent to  a 
French inq u iry  seek in g  an a r m is tic e  w ith Germany.^ One o f  the major 
b arriers to  a French surrender had been surmounted and th e  l a s t  o b sta c le  
f e l l  on the same day w ith  th e  res ig n a tio n  o f  Paul Reynaud. As soon as 
Reynaud resign ed , P resid en t Lebrun in stru cted  P eta in  to  form a new cab­
in e t .  The members o f  Petain"s cab in et had one common co n v ic tio n s th at  
France had to  seek an a r m is tic e .
The a t t itu d e  o f  the French lead ers had im portant im p lica tio n s fo r  
subsequent ev en ts . Reynaud had been th e  symbol o f  r e s is ta n c e  a g a in st  
the Germans, but a f t e r  June 1 6 , w ith h is  r e s ig n a tio n , he had no fu rth er  
in flu en ce  in  th e  d ir e c t io n  o f the war. P 6ta in , who had entered the  
French government in  May, 19l*0, enjoyed con sid erab le  p op u lar ity  among 
Frenchmen. He was in te n se ly  concerned with the w elfa re  o f  the French 
p eo p le , and th e con tin u ation  o f  u s e le s s  f ig h t in g  could on ly  heighten  
t h e ir  s u f f e r i n g . Furthermore, if an a rm istice  were concluded, a t  
l e a s t  a p o rtio n  o f  France would be spared from German occupation .
28Reynaud, Paul, 1878- . French p o l i t i c ia n .  Premier (191*0);
in terned  by the Vichy government (19l*0); imprisoned by the Germans
(19U3-U*).
^ S p e a r s , F a ll  o f  France, 282. This B r it ish  consent was p ro v i­
s io n a l upon the French sending th e ir  f l e e t  to  B r it ish  harbors pending 
n e g o tia t io n s .
^ G en era l Spears t e l l s  o f  P eta in  showing him a sm all bronze 
s ta tu e . I t  portrayed th e  marshal on horseback bending towards two 
peasant s o ld ie r s .  They were look in g  up with composures o f  complete 
t r u s t  and r e sp e c t . I t  showed the bond between P eta in  and the people'— 
th a t o f  a fa th e r  to  h is  c h ild ren . P lta in  would never lea v e  France.
He had to  adm inister to  th e needs o f  h is  c h ild ren . Spears, F a l l  o f  
France, 89-90 .
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The French naval high command considered  an a rm istice  th e b est  
course to  pursue. A keen s p i r i t  o f  com petition  e x is te d  between the  
French and B r it ish  n a v ie s , and t h is  com petition  o c c a s io n a lly  provided  
f r ic t io n  and resentm ent. The French navy, however, had not been de­
fea ted  by the Germans, and i t  remained in ta c t  and beyond the reach o f  
th e  German war machine, D arlan ,^ - as m in ister  o f  th e navy, showed a 
w illin g n e ss  to  accep t an a r m istic e  i f  the f l e e t  did not c a p itu la te .32
General Weygand a ls o  fig u red  predominantly in  the French d e c is io n  
to  conclude an a r m is tic e . In la t e  May, 191*0, Weygand had assumed com­
mand o f  a l l  A llie d  fo rces  in  France. As the French army su ffered  lo s s  
a f t e r  l o s s ,  Weygand began to  urge fo r  a settlem en t w ith  Germany. He 
had no d e s ir e  to  see  the French array com pletely d efea ted , no m atter how 
h eroic i t s  f a l l ,  fo r  w ithout i t  anarchy would q u ick ly  spread throughout 
France. Moreover, Weygand id e n t if ie d  the th rea t o f  anarchy w ith  the  
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a Communist coup d “e ta t  in  P a r is .3 3  Weygand reasoned  
fu rth er  th a t to  continue th e  f ig h t  from North A fr ica  would prove d is a s ­
trous fo r  th e  French army because German armed fo r c es  would su re ly  
cro ss  through Spain to  Spanish Morocco, and then d ea l th e French the  
coup de gr&ce.
IV
On June 17, th e German government rece iv ed  a French request fo r
3lD arlan, Jean L ou is, 1881-191*2. French naval o f f i c e r  and p o l i ­
t i c ia n .  In  Vichy regimeg adm iral o f  the f l e e t ,  v ice-p rem ier  and then  
m in ister  o f  defense (191*1).
^^Henri P S tain , Le Proems du Marechal P g ta in . (P a r is  g 191*5)» I ,
82 . H ereafter c ite d  as P lta in , Le Proems.
^ S p e a r s , F a l l  o f  France, 193-91*»
lit
an a rm istice  through the good o f f ic e s  o f  Spain. The German fo re ig n  
o f f i c e  imm ediately in stru c ted  i t s  Spanish embassy to  inform France th a t  
H it le r  and M ussolin i would examine th e French proposal to g e th er , and 
then  inform the French government o f  th e ir  common d e c i s i o n .^  The next 
day, H it le r  s ta te d  th a t , w h ile  he was con ferrin g  w ith  M u sso lin i, the  
German army was to  continue i t s  advance through France, tak in g  as many 
o b je c t iv e s  as p o s s ib le .  The most important m ilita r y  goals included a l l  
"former Reich te r r ito r y ,"  th e  w estern French c o a s ta l areas around Cher­
bourg and B rest, and th e Le Creusot armaments c e n te r .35
On June 18 and 19 , H it le r  and M ussolin i met a t  Munich to  con sid er
th e terms to  be imposed on a p ro stra ted  France. At the con feren ce, the
A xis a rm istice  terms became f ix e d  in  p r in c ip le  but n o t w ith out some
d iffe r e n c e s  o f  op in ion , fo r
M usso lin i showed h im se lf to  be q u ite  in tra n sig en t on th e m atter 
o f  the fFrenchT f l e e t .  H it le r  on the o th er  hand, wants to  avoid  
an u p r is in g  o f  th e  French navy in  favor o f  th e B r it is h .  From 
a l l  th a t he says i t  i s  c le a r  th a t he wants to  a c t  q u ick ly  to  
end i t  a l l . 36
H it le r  intended to  avoid  fo r c in g  the French government to  continue th e  
war a g a in st Germany. Furthermore, th e French f l e e t  rece iv ed  a great 
d ea l o f  con sid era tio n  a t  the Munich m eeting. The I ta l ia n s  showed con­
s id era b le  fe a r  o f  th e  French navy because i t  was a com petitor in  the  
M editerranean, and thus wanted to  impose harsh naval terms on France. 
Germany was opposed to  any such p u n itiv e  measure.
3% . S8 S ta te  Department, Documents on German Foreign P o lic y , D, 
(Washington? 1956), IX, 590. H ereafter c i t e d  as D .G .F.P. , D.
3^0rder o f  th e Fuehrer. Ib id . , D, IX, 606.
3% aleazze Ciano, The Ciano D ia r ie s , 1939-19ii3 (lew  Yorks 19ii6), 
265-66. H ereafter c it e d  as Ciano, D ia r ie s .
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I t  Munich, the type ©f n e g o tia t io n s  to  be conducted w ith  France 
were agreed on by the Axis® I t a ly  stro n g ly  favored t r ip a r t i t e  n eg o tia ­
t io n s ,  th a t  i s ,  the th ree  in te r e s te d  p a r t ie s  a t  one table® H it le r , on 
th e  o th er  hand, d id  n o t want to  share h is  triumph w ith  anyone* He 
reasoned th a t Germany had many in t e r e s t s  in  France which d id  not con­
cern I t a ly .  However, he expressed  th e  hope th a t a c lo s e  l i a i s o n  would 
be m aintained between th e  two n e g o tia t in g  c o n v e n t i o n s .3? Furthermore, 
H it le r  f e l t  th a t  th e p o in ts  o f  common in t e r e s t  between Germany and 
I t a ly  could  be adequately handled through sep arate  n e g o tia t io n s , and 
the French could be induced to  accept s im ila r  p rop osa ls by both p a r t ie s .
3^Ciano, Diplom atic Papers» 376.
Chapter I I .  German-French A rm istice o f  June, 191*0* 
N egotia tion s and Terms
I
At the Munich m eeting, th e Axis decided upon the tim e and p la ce
fo r  n eg o tia t io n s  w ith  France. This m eeting a ls o  la id  out the d ir e c t io n s
th e  French d e leg a tio n  would fo llo w  to pass through th e  s t i l l  advancing
German l in e s .  The German army"s advance was to  continue u n t i l  a rm istice
•%
terms were agreed to  and signed with both Germany and I t a ly .
General Charles H untziger headed the French d e le g a tio n . The 
fo r e ig n  o f f i c e  sen t Leon N oel, and V ice-adm iral Le Luc represented  the  
French adm iralty . The o th er  members were general Henri P a r iso t , former 
m ilita r y  a tta ch e  in  Home, and General Jean B ergeret o f  the French a ir  
fo r c e .
Before th e  d e leg a tio n  l e f t  fo r  th e  con feren ce, P ita in  gave 
H untziger h is  f in a l  in s tr u c t io n s . There was, understandably, some con­
fu s io n  concerning the f in a l  course o f  a c t io n  which th e  Germans would 
ta k e . R egardless o f  t h is  area o f  con fu sion , P eta in  gave th e orders th a t  
i f  Germany made any c la im s on the French navy, or i f  i t  in s is t e d  upon
occupying French c o lo n ia l t e r r i t o r y ,  th e n eg o tia t io n s  were to  be ta r ­
's
m inated.
XD .G .F.P. , D, IX, 611*.
^Huntziger, C harles, l880-19i*l. French army o f f i c e r .  Headed 
a rm istice  d e leg a tio n  and fo r  sh ort period French d e le g a tio n  to  German 
A rm istice Commission. He then became Commander-in-Chief o f  th e French 
army.
%eygand, Memoirs, I I I ,  21*6.
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I t  i s  o f  some in t e r e s t  th a t th ere  was con sid erab le  d iffe re n c e  o f  
opin ion  among th e German lea d ers w ith  referen ce to  th e ir  p o l i c ie s  toward 
France. This d iv is io n  o f  op in ion  had a strong in flu en ce  on the f in a l  
terms o f  the a r m is t ic e .
The German naval commander, Raeder,^ ob v iou sly  regarded th e  
French navy w ith deep r e sp e c t. Germany had not captured the French 
navy, and i f  th e l a t t e r  joined the B r it ish  war e f fo r t  German war pro­
gress would be g r e a t ly  hampered. Because o f  French c o lo n ia l p o ssess io n s  
in  A fr ica , the French navy was a v i t a l  connection  between A fr ica  and 
France, and thus France had always m aintained a stron g  naval fo rce  in  
the M editerranean. I t  was obvious th a t to  co n tro l th e French navy was 
to  ex er t great in flu en ce  in  A fr ica . T herefore, Germany was v i t a l l y  
in te r e s te d  in  French naval power fo r  both th ese  reasons sin ce  i t s  own 
navy was inadequate fo r  an e f f e c t iv e  th ru st in  both the w estern A tla n tic  
and M editerranean th e a te r s .£
Raeder expressed deep s a t is f a c t io n  a t  th e German occupation o f  
the French A tla n tic  c o a s t .  I t  opened up new v is t a s  fo r  th e German navy 
which had been somewhat lim ite d  to the co n fin es  o f  the North and B a ltic  
Seas. The German navy's s tr a te g ic  p o s it io n  improved enormously w ith  
t h is  d ir e c t  a ccess  to  the A t la n t ic .^  To Admiral D oen itz ,  ̂ th is  new
^Raeder, E r ic , 1876-1960. German adm iral. Commander-in-Chief, 
navy (1935-2*3).
^Eric Raeder, My L ife  (Annapolis% I9 6 0 ), 366. H ereafter c ite d  
as Raeder, Mjr L ife .
6I b id . t 319.
^Doenitz, K arl, 1891- • German naval commander; in  submarine
se r v ic e  (from 1916); as supreme commander surrendered to  A l l ie s  (May 7, 
191*5).
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p o s it io n  meant th a t German submarines could now r e ly  on a c c e s s ib le  oper­
a t io n a l bases on the A tla n tic  c o a s t . The German navy high command 
regarded the co n tro l o f  the western French seaboard as in d isp en sab le  
in  th e war a g a in st B r ita in .
O
In ea r ly  June, F r ick , German m in ister  o f  in t e r io r ,  o u tlin ed  a 
harsh p o lic y  which was to  be adopted toward France. This p o lic y  had 
many adherents among th e army and a ir  fo rce  le a d ers . France was to  be­
come com pletely  dependent on Germany, and northern France was to  become 
part o f  the German Reich.^ The German m in istry  o f  in te r io r  next e lab or­
ated  on Frick®s proposal o f  extending German in flu en ce  westward. I t  was 
taken fo r  granted th a t French te r r ito r y  would be incorporated in to  the  
German R eich , and th e areas o f  p r in c ip a l in t e r e s t  had a h is t o r ic a l  
German background. In  th ese  ’’u n o f f ic ia l '1 schem es, A lsace and Lorraine 
were to  become German p rov in ces. In a d d itio n , oth er p o rtio n s o f  France
could be added to Germany, in clu d in g  th e land w est to  the Somme r iv e r
10and then north ty Paris to  the Channel c o a s t .
Many m ilita r y  le a d e r s , e sp e c ia lly  from the army, in s is t e d  th a t  
were such terms imposed on France i t  would be the same as a com plete 
v ic to r y , and th erefo re  advocated the com pletion o f  th e  campaign in  
France. General Warlimont and the s t a f f  o f  the German high command
®Frick, Wilhelm, 1877-191*6. German p o lit ic ia n ?  m in ister  o f  in ­
t e r io r  (1933-1*6)? hanged as war cr im in a l.
% .C .A . ,  VI, 868-69.
^®From in terro g a tio n  o f  Globhe, o f  the Reich m in istry  o f  in te r io r .  
T ria l o f  Ma.jor War Crim inals Before the Nuremberg M ilita r y  Tribunals 
(Washingtons 19l*9)'» XXXVII, 220-23 passim . H ereafter c i t e s  as N.M.T.
^W arlim ont, W alter. German o f f i c e r .  Headed S ectio n  L (p lanning  
d iv is io n )  o f  OKW.
19
(OKW) were i n i t i a l l y  assign ed  th e duty o f  forming th e a r m istic e , a pro­
j e c t  fo r  which they were not prepared. The OKW based the a rm istice  
terras on the a rm istice  o f  1918 which the A l l ie s  had imposed on Germany, 
but many o f  i t s  proposals were re jec te d  by H it le r  when he returned from 
h is  m eeting w ith  M ussolin i a t  Brenner. The French now were to  be o ffer ed  
le n ie n t  term's. H it le r  j u s t i f i e d  th is  p o lic y  by proposing th a t h is  de­
mands in  a f in a l  peace tr e a ty  w ith  France would be much h ig h er . In the
17meantime, ca u tion  would be ex erc ised  as a p o l i t i c a l  expediency. Never­
t h e le s s ,  many o f  th e  OKW proposals were u t i l i z e d  and appeared in  the  
f in a l  t e x t  o f  the a r m is tic e .
The German fo re ig n  o f f i c e ’s a t t itu d e  toward th e  proposed a rm istice  
was c o n c il ia to r y  in  ton e, and some thought had been g iven  in  th e fo r e ig n  
m in istry  to  secu rin g  s a t is fa c to r y  s tr a te g ic  gains through a c o n c ilia to r y  
agreement w ith France. W e i z s a e c k e r , ^  the S ta te  Secretary  in  the fo r e ig n  
m in istry  prepared a memorandum o f  proposals to  be considered  in  an armis­
t i c e  w ith  France in  t h is  in terim  p eriod . He d id  not d iscu ss  m ilita r y  
m atters, but proposed th a t Germany and France cooperate in  m aintaining  
the economic power o f  France under German guidance. German economic 
measures were to  reg u la te  F rance's con tact w ith  o th er  fo r e ig n  powers.
In  th e fu tu r e , th e  German government was to  co n tro l the news media in  
F r a n c e .^  The moderation ex h ib ited  in  t h is  proposal in d ica ted  the
I2w alter  Warlimont, In sid e  H it le r ’s Headquarters, 1939-191*5 (New 
York; 1962), 102. H ereafter c ite d  as Warlimont, H it le r ’s Headquarters.
^ W eizsaeck er, E rnst, 1882-1951. German naval o f f ic e r  and 
diplom at. U ndersecretary fo r  fo r e ig n  a f f a ir s  (1938-1*3) S ambassador 
to  th e Vatican (191*3-1*5).
typ .O .F .P , ,  D? IX, 592-93 passim .
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le n ie n t  mood o f  th e fo re ig n  m in istry , although German co n tro l was guar­
anteed over French fo r e ig n  a f f a ir s  and important dom estic q u estio n s .
I t a ly  presented  an unusual problem to  th e Germans. Although 
I t a l ia n  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e war, to  t h is  p o in t , had been r e la t iv e ly  
minor, i t  d id  not seem a t  a l l  r e t ic e n t  in  making demands. M ussolin i 
had grand dreams o f  aggrandizement a t  France’s expense, in clu d in g  the  
I ta l ia n  occupation o f  a l l  France e a st  o f  the Rhfkie, C orsica , and T unisia . 
He a ls o  wanted to occupy any French colony he deemed n ecessary , and e s ­
p e c ia l ly  a t t r a c t iv e  to  him were the French naval bases a t  Oran and 
Casablanca. Furthermore, M ussolin i demanded com plete French demobil­
iz a t io n  and the surrender o f  the French f l e e t .  The Germans were forced  
to  d isregard  the I ta l ia n  cla im s because th e  French would never accept 
such h u m ilia tin g  term s. At Munich, th en , M ussolin i was persuaded to  
d iscard  th ese  schemes and he agreed to  fo llo w  the German l in e  o f  reason­
in g .
I t  i s  apparent th a t H it le r  was caught o f f  guard by the ease w ith  
which France was beaten . In th is  l i g h t ,  he prepared an arm istice  which 
d o u b tle ss ly  he planned to  rep lace soon a f t e r  w ith  a peace tr e a ty . The 
a rm istice  would be c o n c ilia to r y  in  i t s  mood because H it le r  wanted no 
fu rth er  problem from France as he carr ied  the war to  B r ita in . There was 
a ls o  the hope th a t B r ita in  might accep t peace terms i f  i t  could be le d  
to  b e lie v e  th a t  Germany would continue i t s  p o lic y  o f  benign occupation .
He hoped th a t i f  France was handled w ith care "B rita in  would se e  reason  
and come to  term s.
1^ L iddell-H art, Generals Talk, 108.
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Moreover, i f  France re jec te d  th e a rm istice  terras, the French 
f l e e t  would su re ly  s a i l  fo r  B r it ish  p o r ts . With the a d d itio n  o f  the  
French f l e e t ,  B r ita in  could w ithstand grea ter  naval lo s s e s ,  tran sp ort
1 fiimore men and su p p lie s , and crea te  a number o f  new op era tion a l th e a te r s .
On June 20, H it le r  decided th a t the French f l e e t  was to  be in terned  a t  
Toulon and B rest, and i t s  warships disarmed. The German navy assumed 
co n tro l o f  th e needed French bases on the A tla n tic  c o a st fo r  the fu rth er  
prosecu tion  o f  the war,
I I
Compi&gne was s e le c te d  by the Germans as th e lo c a t io n  fo r  th e  
a rm istice  n e g o tia t io n s . Here th e  arm istice  ending World War I  had been 
signed  by the d efea ted  Germans, and furtherm ore, the Germans u t i l i z e d  
th e same r a i l  coach which the n eg o tia to rs  o f  1918 had u sed . These th e ­
a t r ic a l  props were not l o s t  on e ith e r  the French or Germans as a s e t t in g
t e l l in g  the f in a l  o b lite r a t io n  o f  the p a s t .
*] ft
On June 20, K e ite l began the n eg o tia tio n s  by reading th e pre­
amble to  the German a rm istice  term s. He s ta te d  th a t France, although  
beaten  in  b a t t le ,  f e l l  on ly  " a fter  a h ero ic  r e s is t a n c e .1* Furthermore, 
Germany did  not want to  conduct n eg o tia tio n s  which would be "hum iliating  
to  th e regard o f an adversary so b r a v e . A f t e r  he f in ish e d  w ith  the
^ I t a l i a n  s t a f f  rep ort, June 1 8 , 192*0, G razianl Papers. As quoted 
in  W illiam Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York? 192*7), 2*8. H ereafter  
c ite d  as Langer, Vichy Gamble.
17Anthony M artienssen, H it le r  and His Admirals (Londons 192*8), 66 .
^ K e i t e l ,  Wilhelm, 1882-192*6. German f i e l d  m arshal. A fte r  1938, 
H it le r  ex erc ised  h is  a u th o r ity  through th e OKW which was headed by K e ite l ,  
He signed  a c t  o f  m ilita r y  surrender to  th e A l l ie s  (May 9 , 192*5) <•
^Weygand, Memoirs, I I I ,  250.
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preamble, most o f  th e  German p a rty , includ ing H it le r , l e f t .  K e ite l ,
20Schmidt and an array commission then presented the a rm istice  terms to  
the French.
K e ite l and Huntziger then were involved  in  an argument over the  
ex ten t o f  the French d e le g a t io n 's  powers. K e ite l f e l t  th a t i t  had the  
a u th o r ity  to  s ig n  an a r m is t ic e , w hile Huntziger in s is t e d  th a t i t  could  
on ly  d iscu ss  the arm istice  term s. The Frenchman refu sed  to  y ie ld  on 
t h is  p o in t , and K e ite l not too g r a c e fu lly  f in a l ly  dropped the m atter.
The French d e leg a tio n  then r e t ir e d  to  examine the a rm istice  term s. 
When i t  returned, i t  s ta te d  th a t the document had to  be forwarded to  the  
French government fo r  exam ination. To t h is  proposed d e lay  K e ite l  r e ­
sponded! "A bsolutely im p ossib le! You must s ig n  a t  o n c e ."21 Neverthe­
l e s s ,  he was f in a l ly  forced  to  submit to  th e  d e la y .
Before the m eeting adjourned fo r  th e day however, the French 
p ro tested  a g a in st some o f  th e term s. They were d istu rb ed  by th e la rg e  
amount o f  French te r r ito r y  which the Germans were to  occupy. General 
J o d i , ^  tem porarily rep lacin g  K e ite l ,  countered w ith the remark th a t  
most o f  the in d ica ted  occu p ation al zone was a lread y in  German hands, 
and was o f  utmost importance fo r  the contin u ation  o f  th e war. Huntziger 
then expressed an alarm th a t I t a ly  was probably going to  make ex ce ss iv e  
demands on France. Jodi r e p lie d  th a t Germany understood the French 
p o s it io n . He s ta te d , though, th a t the German n eg o tia to rs  had no author­
i t y  to  modify the terms o f  th e  a r m is t ic e , but he h in ted  th a t m od ifica tion s
20Schmidt, Paul. In terp reter  o f German fo r e ig n  m in istry .
21Paul Schmidt, H it le r 's  In terp reter  (New Yorks 1 9 5 1 ), 181.
H ereafter c it e d  as Schmidt, H it le r 's  In te r p r e te r .
^ J o d l ,  A lfred , 1892-191*6. German army o f f i c e r .  Chief o f  s t a f f ,  OKW.
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could be worked out a t  a la t e r  d a te . In rep ly  to  a French inquiry o f  
the nature and au th o r ity  o f  the A rm istice Commission, Jodi s ta te d  th a t  
i t  was to  be th e so le  agency to  implement the " righ ts o f  an occupying  
power." N a tu ra lly , the commission would be c u r ta ile d  by the p ro v is io n s  
o f  the a r m is t ic e .
The two d e leg a tio n s  c la r i f ie d  and d iscu ssed  some minor p o in ts ,  
and then the m eeting adjourned u n t i l  the next day. Baring th e break, 
th e French d e leg a tio n  informed i t s  government o f  what had tr a n s p ir e d .^  
The next day H untsiger began th e  s e s s io n  by rep ortin g  th a t the  
French government wanted a number o f  c la r i f ic a t io n s .  When he announced 
th a t the French would p r e fe r  to  d estro y  th e ir  a ir c r a f t  ra th er  than r e ­
le a s e  any o f  them to  th e Germans, K e ite l  r e g is te r e d  con sid erab le  sur­
p r is e .  He q u ick ly  recovered to  announce th a t any such d e c is io n  was to  
be the p rerogative  o f  th e  A rm istice Commission.
Next H untziger asked fo r  a m o d ifica tio n  o f  A r t ic le  8 so i t  would 
reads "After d em ob iliza tion  and land ing o f  ammunition tinder German and 
I t a l ia n  su p erv isio n , the French warships w i l l  be taken to  French A frican  
p orts w ith  h a lf  o f  th e ir  peacetim e complement." K e ite l responded th a t  
the o r ig in a l  a r t i c l e  was a generous German con cession  and any con sid era­
t io n  fo r  m o d ifica tio n  was the r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  the A rm istice Commission, 
and thus th e French request was denied .
The French d e leg a tio n  then  turned to  d isc u ss in g  A r t ic le  17 . I t  
s t ip u la te d  th a t the French government would not attem pt to  remove any 
economic a s s e t s  from th e occupied te r r it o r y . The French wanted to
2Memorandum o f  f i r s t  day o f  n e g o tia t io n s  prepared by Schmidt. 
D .Q .F.P. .  D, IX, 61i3-?2 passim .
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modify i t  by in se r t in g  the c la u se  enabling France to  tr a n s fe r  from the  
occupied zone th ose  products v i t a l  fo r  the pop u lation  in  the fr e e  zone. 
K e ite l f i n a l ly  agreed, a t  l e a s t  in  p r in c ip le , to  the req uest
H untziger then  p ro te sted  a g a in st th a t p art o f  A r t ic le  19 which 
s ta te d  th a t a l l  Germans r e s id in g  in  France a t  the end o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  
were to  be returned to  Germany. The French ob jected  to  i t  because i t  
disregarded the r ig h t  o f  asylum. K e ite l would not con sid er  any m od ifi­
ca tio n  o f  the a r t i c l e ,  fo r  as fa r  as he was concerned, th ose  Germans who 
had d eserted  th e ir  country were to  pay fo r  t h e ir  tr a ito r o u s  a c t io n s .
The French d e leg a tio n  next asked th a t Germany a llow  th e French 
government to  return  to  P aris  and th a t i t  be connected to  the fr e e  zone 
by some so r t o f  co rr id o r . K e ite l responded th a t such could occur in  
th e  fu tu r e , but i t  depended on fu tu re  p o l i t i c a l  ev en ts . The d ila to r y  
behavior o f  Germany in d ica ted  th a t i t  p referred  to  postpone d isc u ss io n  
on the su b ject u n t i l  n eg o tia t io n s  fo r  a peace tr e a ty  could be arranged.
F in a lly , the French returned to  t h e ir  concern fo r  th e  demands 
I t a ly  might make on France. H untziger r e ite r a te d  th a t although I ta ly  
had declared  war on France i t  had not r e a lly  waged war. Therefore France 
had no reason to  conclude an agreement w ith  I t a ly  as i t  was doing w ith  
Germany. He made i t  c le a r  th a t France “would n o t submit to  c e r ta in  con­
d it io n s  made by I t a ly .  . . , Come what m ight, honor was o f  greater  im­
portance than l i f e . "  The Germans d ec lin ed  any comment ©n the French 
p red ica m en t.^
' M l  testim on y, August 2 , 19k%° P e ta in , Le P r o d s , I ,  1*70.
-̂’Memorandum o f  second day o f  n e g o tia t io n s , June 22. D .G .F.P. .
D‘, H ,  66U-71 passim .
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The r e s t  o f  the afternoon  the d e leg a tio n s  met a number o f  tim es , 
and th e Germans gave lim ite d  con cession s in  A r t ic le s  f> and 17 . A r t ic le  
$ now allow ed France to  r e ta in  i t s  m ilita r y  a ir c r a f t  i f  they  were d is ­
armed and p laced  under German su p erv isio n . In A r t ic le  17, Germany now
26agreed to  con sid er the needs o f  the French population  in  the fr e e  zone.
H untziger con su lted  se v e r a l tim es w ith  th e  French government w ith  
referen ce to  the pending a r m is tic e . Toward even ing, K e ite l became i r r i ­
ta ted  a t  th e d e la y , and he sen t an ultimatum to  th e French th a t ,!i f  we 
cannot reach an agreement w ith in  the hour th e  n e g o tia t io n s  w i l l  be broken 
o f f  and th e  d e leg a tio n  w i l l  be conducted back to  the French l in e s ." 2  ̂
H untziger then rece iv ed  the order to  p lace  h is  signatu re to  th e a r m is t ic e . 
As the s ig n in g  ceremony took p la c e , H untziger was moved to  comment, "as 
a s o ld ie r  you [K e ite l}  w i l l  w e ll  understand the onerous moment th a t has 
come to  me«n K e ite l r e p lie d , 111 acknowledge your d e c la ra tio n . . . .  I  
can only rep ly  th a t i t  i s  honorable fo r  th e  v ic to r  to  honor th e van­
qu ish ed ."28
Since th e German-French a rm istice  was to  come in to  e f f e c t  when 
France concluded a s im ila r  agreement w ith  I t a ly ,  th e  French d e leg a tio n  
l e f t  fo r  Rome, where i t  soon a f te r  sign ed  an a rm istice  w ith  I t a ly .  The 
m ilita r y  terms d ea lin g  w ith the French armed fo r c e s  were id e n t ic a l  to  
th ose  o f  the German-French a r m is tic e . The terras concerned w ith  th e oc­
cupied p o rtio n s o f  France were q u ite  lim ite d  in  scop e. I t  a lso  s e t  up
26Ib id . , D, DC, 669.
2?Schmidt, H it le r ’s In te r p r e te r , 183. 
28"A rm istice,"  Time, July 1 , 191*0.
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an I ta l ia n  A rm istice Commission to  regu la te  th e a rm istic e  term s. S ix  
hours a f t e r  th e F ra n co -Ita lia n  a rm istice  was signed a l l  h o s t i l i t i e s  
ceased .
I l l
At f i r s t ,  th e  a rm istice  governed a l l  r e la t io n s  between Germany 
and France. I t s  shadow loomed over a l l  n e g o tia t io n s  between the two 
s t a t e s ,  and a l l  i n i t i a l  d isc u ss io n s  d e a lt  w ith  the a rm istice  and the  
m o d ifica tio n  o f  i t s  terras. I t  permeated Germany“s fo r e ig n  p o lic y  toward 
France and in flu en ced  every fa c e t  o f  French l i f e .
A r t ic le  1 d e a lt  w ith the c e s sa t io n  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s .  I t  s t ip u la te d  
th a t the French government was to  order i t s  armed fo rces  to  stop  a l l  
m ilita r y  a c t io n , and a l l  French array u n its  trapped or en c irc le d  were to  
c a p itu la te .
A r t ic le  2 o u tlin ed  the ex ten t o f  French te r r ito r y  to  be occupied  
by Germany, alm ost th r e e - f i f t h s  o f  m etropolitan  F r a n c e .^
A r t ic le  3 s t ip u la te d  th a t , in  occupied France, Germany had " a ll  
the r ig h ts  o f  the occupying power." The vagueness o f  t h i s  terra provided  
th e bases fo r  lon g  and p ro tracted  arguments, not on ly  between B erlin  and 
Vichy but a ls o  between a number o f  com p etitive  German a g e n c ie s . The 
a r t ic l e  a ls o  demanded th a t the proper French a u th o r it ie s  cooperate w ith  
th e German m ilita r y  commanders in  the occupied zone, insuring th e  suc­
c e ss  o f  the German occupation . I t  f in a l ly  gave th e  French th e r ig h t to  
return th e ir  government to  P a r is . Germany promised th a t i f  such occurred
^ M etro p o lita n  France i s  th a t p o rtion  o f  France lo ca ted  in  co n tin ­
e n ta l Europe to  separate i t  from oth er areas considered  p art o f  the  
French s t a t e ,  as A lg ie r s .
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i t  would provide th e French government w ith  th e  necessary  f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  
adm in istering a l l  o f  France. The French expressed  an in ten se  in te r e s t  
in  th is  s e c t io n  o f  A r t ic le  3.
A r t ic le  ij. provided fo r  the dem ob iliza tion  and disarm ing o f  a l l  
French armed fo r c e s . This a c tio n  was to  take p la c e  w ith in  a tim e span 
to  be s e t  by the German A rm istice Commission. In  p r in c ip le , i t  granted  
the Vichy regime a m ilita r y  fo rce  la r g e  enough to  m aintain in ter n a l s e ­
c u r ity  in  th e fr e e  zone, but th e s iz e  o f  th is  fo rce  was to  be decided  
by the A rm istice Commission. The a r t i c l e  s ta te d  th a t a l l  French arngr 
u n its  were to  be s ta tio n ed  in  unoccupied France. A ll French m ilita r y  
u n its  s t i l l  in  the occupied zone were to  r e t ir e  to  southern France, but 
before th ese  u n its  began th e ir  southern tr e k , they were to  surrender a l l  
th e ir  weapons to  the Germans.
A r t ic le  £ contained  a French guarantee th a t i t  would, on demand, 
surrender a l l  war m a ter ie l d esired  by Germany. This m ater ie l not on ly  
included heavy equipment and la rg e  c a lib e r  weapons but a lso  sm all arms 
and ammunition. French m ilita r y  a ir c r a f t  were exempted from t h is  a r t i c l e ,  
provided they were disarmed and placed under German su p erv isio n .
Under A r t ic le  6 , a l l  French war m a ter ie l was to  be s t o c k p i l e d .
The French were to  surrender th is  m a ter ie l to  c e n tr a liz e d  lo c a t io n s  where 
i t  was to  be in terned  fo r  the du ration  o f  th e  a r m is tic e . The a r t ic le  
fu rth er  s t ip u la te d  th a t th e  s to c k p ile s  were to  be supervised  by Axis 
co n tro l com m issions. F in a lly , a l l  French in d u s tr ie s  o f  war were to  cease  
production.
A r t ic le  8 was concerned w ith the French f l e e t .  A ll French naval 
u n it s ,  except fo r  th ose  needed to  p ro tec t French c o lo n ia l  in t e r e s t s ,  were
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to  be assembled in  th e ir  peace-tim e home p o r ts . Then th ey  were to  be 
dem obilized and disarmed under Axis su p erv is io n . France was assured  
th a t i t s  f l e e t  would remain in ta c t  and under French sovere ign ty  and th a t  
Germany had no u lt e r io r  d esign s on any p art o f  th e French navy.
By A r t ic le  11 , a l l  French merchant sh ip s were to  be in tern ed  in  
French p o r ts . France was to  r e c a l l  a l l  i t s  sh ipping to  e ith e r  home or  
n eu tra l p o r ts , and Germany assumed the r ig h t to  reg u la te  a l l  fu ture  
French merchant sh ipp ing .
Germany was to  co n tro l a l l  French a ir  f l i g h t s  by A r tic le  12 . 
Furthermore, a l l  French a ir f ie ld s  and ground in s t a l la t io n s  were p laced  
tinder th e su p erv isio n  o f  German co n tro l com m issions, and th ey  could  de­
mand th a t any French in s t a l la t io n  be c lo se d .
A r tic le  13 contained a French guarantee th a t French m ilita r y  
equipment in  the occupied zone would be turned over to  the German army. 
Furthermore, a l l  p ort f a c i l i t i e s ,  sh ipyards, and in d u str ie s  in  the oc­
cupied zone were to  be safeguarded from sabotage by th e French govern­
ment. This same p ro v is io n  ap p lied  to French ra ilw a y s, highways, commun­
ic a t io n  f a c i l i t i e s ,  and n av iga tion  a id s .
By A r tic le  17 , France was to  see  th a t a l l  economic a s se ts  in  th e  
occupied zone remained in ta c t ,  and no attem pt was to  be made by France 
to  tr a n s fe r  them to  the fr e e  zone. Hie n e s t  a r t i c l e  provided th a t  
France was to  pay fo r  the c o s t s  o f  the German occu pation . The s p e c if ic  
amount was to  be decided by th e  A rm istice Commission a t  a la t e r  d a te .
A r tic le  19 gave Germany th e  r ig h t to  claim  a l l  German n a tio n a ls  
r e s id in g  in  France and i t s  c o lo n ie s . French p o lic e  were to  provide  
German a u th o r it ie s  w ith a l l  th e a s s is ta n c e  needed to  f u l f i l l  th is  a r t i c l e .
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A r tic le  20 s t ip u la te d  th a t a l l  French p r ison ers o f  war were to  
remain p r iso n ers  u n t i l  Germany and France concluded a peace tr e a ty .
A German A rm istice Commission was crea ted  by A r t ic le  23. I t  was 
to  reg u la te  and su perv ise  the execu tion  o f  the a r m is tic e , and i t  was to  
be under th e  e x c lu s iv e  au th o r ity  o f  the OKW. I t  was a ls o  to  m aintain  
th e proper conform ity between t h is  a rm istice  and th e F ra n co -Ita lia n  
a r m is t ic e . The a r t i c l e  a ls o  provided th a t th e  French government was to  
send a d e leg a tio n  to  th e  German A rm istice Commission from whom i t  was 
"to r e c e iv e  the ex ecu tiv e  orders o f  th a t c o m m i s s i o n . "30
IV
The a rm istice  provided fo r  the temporary suspension  o f  armed 
h o s t i l i t i e s  between Germany and France. I t  d id  n ot rep resen t, in  any 
way, a r e s to r a tio n  o f  normal r e la t io n s  between th e two s t a t e s ,  fo r  the  
a rm istice  d id  not in d ica te  the le g a l  term ination  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s .  There­
fo r e , Germany and France remained, t e c h n ic a lly , in  a s ta te  o f  war. The 
German-French a rm istice  o f  191*0 resembled in  many ways the " ca p itu la tio n  
arm istice '1 sign ed  between Germany and the a l l i e d  powers in  1 9 1 8 . I t  
was a c a p itu la t io n  a rm istic e  in  the sen se  th a t , by subm itting to  i t s  
term s, France could not hope to  resume h o s t i l i t i e s  fo r  th e French army 
had a maximum contingency o f  on ly  100,000 men, and th e French navy and 
a ir  fo r c e  were disarmed and dem obilized .
The wording o f  the a rm istice  was p laced  in  a gen era l co n tex t from 
which s p e c if ic  arrangements could  la t e r  be a p p lied . A p r in c ip a l reason
3°D .Q .F .P . ,  D, IX, 671-76 .
33-Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations (New York: 1 9 6 5 ), 575=
30
fo r  th e general character o f  the a rm istice  was due to  th e o p tim is t ic  
outlook o f  many German lea d ers  th a t the war would be q u ick ly  ended.
This p r e v a ilin g  hope made i t  seem th a t an a rm istice  w ith s p e c if ic  terms 
was com pletely  unnecessary, fo r  the n e g o tia t io n s  o f  a f in a l  peace tr e a ty  
w ith France would soon begin .
As a lread y mentioned, the German A rm istice Commission was to  
reg u la te  the terms o f  the a r m is tic e , but i t s  ju r is d ic t io n  was soon cur­
t a i le d  in  the occupied zone. The occupied zone included northern France 
and th e P as-d e-C ala is and i t  extended from th e  eastern  fr o n t ie r  o f  
France along the channel c o a s t , then southward to  the L oire r iv e r , and 
fo llo w in g  th is  water course eastward to  th e Swiss border. Germany a lso  
e s ta b lish e d  a p r o h ib it iv e  zone in  France which extended along th e  French
A tla n tic  co a st to  th e  Spanish f r o n t ie r ,  and w ith in  t h i s  area Germany
•ap
placed  very  s tr in g e n t co n tro ls  over the French p op u la tion . J
As mentioned b efore , A r tic le  3 gave the Germans tsthe e x e r c ise  o f  
the r ig h ts  o f the occupying power in  the occupied p art o f  th e  French 
p o p u la tion . u This was confirm ed to  a German general w ith  th e  t i t l e  o f  
c h ie f  o f  m ilita r y  a d m in istra tion . At the s ign in g  o f  the a rm istice  th is  
fu n c tio n  was ex erc ised  by General Johannes B laskow itz. The Nord and 
P as-d e-C ala is were p laced  under th e ju r is d ic t io n  o f  the m ilita r y  comman­
der o f  B ru sse ls , General Alexander Falkenhausen, w h ile  A lsace and Lorraine  
were p laced  under a German c i v i l  a d m in is tr a t io n .^
32I t a ly  assumed th e  r ig h t o f  occupying power over th e  Mentone d is ­
t r i c t  in  south eastern  France, They e s ta b lish e d  c i v i l  commissioners to  
adm inister th e r ig h ts  o f occupation . Even s o , the French adm in istration  
o f  the area continued to  fu n ctio n  w ith  l i t t l e  in ter fe r en ce  from the I t a l ia n s .
^O rder o f  OKH, June 19 , 191*0. France, Commission C on su lta tive  des 
Dommages e t  des R eparations, Pommages su b is  par l a  France e t  1 2Union > -
On June 26 , th e  German army high command (OKH) ordered General
A lfred  S trecc iu s  to  a c t  a s  c h ie f  o f  the c i v i l  a d m in istra tion  in  France,
The order went on to  s ta te  th a t
th e m iss io n  o f  th e  m ilita r y  ad m in istra tion  i s  to  e s ta b lis h  calm  
and order in  th e  French occupied t e r r it o r y  and o f  u t i l i z i n g  the  
resources o f  th e  country fo r  the needs o f  the Wehrmacht and the  
economy o f  the German war.,31*
fra n p a ise  du f a i t  de l a  guerre e t  de l 1occu pation  ennemie, 1939~19ii5»
I ,  1 1 1 ; .H e r e a f te r  c i t e d  France, Pommages su b is  par la. France,
A jb id .
Chapter III. July-December 191*0
I n i t i a l l y  th e A rm istice Commission was regarded as the on ly  avenue
through which m o d ifica tion s in  th e  a rm istice  could be ca rr ied  o u t. These
m o d ifica tio n s  were made in  the planning s e c t io n  o f  th e OKW, and then
passed on to  th e French government through th e com m ission. As already
m entioned, the commission was resp o n sib le  s o le ly  to  the OKW. I t s  f i r s t
chairman was General S tu elp n agel.^  The commission resid ed  a t  Wiesbaden,
2and i t  was d iv id ed  in to  e ig h t subcom m ittees. These subcommittees sup­
p lie d  th e  chairman w ith  inform ation on a l l  a sp ects  o f  the a r m is t ic e , and 
th ey  a ls o  worked out the d e t a i l s  o f  programs and d e c is io n s  on the arm is­
t i c e .
The French con tin gen t sen t to  Wiesbaden c o n s is te d  o f  a chairman, 
General H untziger,^  and a s t a f f  o f  th ir ty -se v e n  m ilita r y  personnel and 
tw enty-seven  c iv i l ia n s .^  The French d e leg a tio n  rece iv ed  in s tr u c tio n s  
from the A rm istice Commission in  two ways: through m eetings o f  the Ger­
man and French chairmen and through th e  German subcom m ittees.
^Stu elp n agel, O tto , 1880-191*8. German army o f f ic e r ;  chairman, 
German A rm istice Commission (191*0); commander o f  occupied France (191*0-
1*1* f f . ) »
These subcommittees were d iv id ed  in to  th e fo llo w in g  s e c t io n s :  
array, navy, a ir  fo r c e , tra n sm issio n s , war p r iso n e rs , war in d u s tr ie s ,  
fo r e ig n  a f f a ir s ,  and the p r e ss .
^Huntziger, C harles, 1880-191*1. French army o f f ic e r ;  headed 
d e le g a tio n  th a t signed th e a rm istice  (Ju ly  22, 19l*0); Commander-in- 
C h ief, army (191*1).
^France, D elegation  fra n g a ise  aupres de la  commission allemande 
d 'a r m ist ic e  ( P a r is: 191*7-19^9), ! ,  v . H ereafter c it e d  D.F.C.A.A.
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On June 29, Germany and I t a ly  concluded an agreement on th e  en­
forcem ent o f  th e ir  r e sp ec tiv e  a rm istices  w ith  France. In  t h is  agreement, 
the German A rm istice Commission assumed co n tro l o f  a l l  French p orts on 
the A t la n t ic . The I t a l ia n  A rm istice Commission, r es id in g  a t  Turin, 
undertook the r e s p o n s ib il ity  f o r  provid ing  adequate c o n tr o ls  a t  a l l  
French p o rts  on the M editerranean. The next day, th e  German A rm istice  
Commission informed th e  French d e le g a tio n  o f  t h i s  d iv is io n  o f  spheres 
o f  in te r e s t  w ith  regard to  the French navy. France, in  the fu tu re , had 
to  r e c e iv e  th e  approval o f  th e  I t a l ia n  A rm istice Commission fo r  any pro­
je c t s  i t  w ished to  i n i t i a t e  in  the M editerranean, Red Sea, and the Gulf 
o f  Aden.-*
At th is  m eeting,- th e A rm istice Commission made a number o f  minor 
m o d ifica tio n s in  A r t ic le  8 o f  the a r m is t ic e . The commission allow ed  
a l l  French warships to  be dem obilized , w ith  h a lf  crew s, a t  Toulon and
Z
North A frican p o r ts . I t  a lso  made arrangements w ith  the French which 
strengthened th e l in e s  o f  communication between th e  French government 
and i t s  naval bases in  th e  c o lo n ie s . Germany m aintained co n tro l over  
the French navy by in se r t in g  th e  p ro v is io n  th a t a l l  such communication 
had to  be apprbved by the A rm istice Commission.^
This a c t iv i t y  o f  th e  A rm istice Commission was d isrupted  a t  the
S. S ta te  Department, Documents on German Foreign  P o l ic y . 
19l8-19itS>, D, IX (Washington? 19^ 0), £73« H ereafter c i t e d  a s  D0G.F«,P0, D.
6paul Auphan, The French Navy in  World War I I  (Annapolis? 1959), 
120 . H ereafter c it e d  as Auphan, Freneh Navy.
'fo.F.C.AoA,,. I ,  26 -27 .
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beginning o f  July by a s e r ie s  o f ex tern a l ev en ts . The f i r s t  centered  
around th ose French sh ip s s t i l l  in  B r it ish  p o r ts . On July 1 , th e Armis­
t i c e  Commission demanded th a t France comply w ith A r t ic le  1 by ordering  
a l l  French sh ip s to  return to  th e ir  home p o r ts , but the French govern­
ment made no rep ly  to  t h is  demand. T herefore, on July 3 , th e  commission 
drew up an ultimatum th a t th e fu tu re  e x isten ce  o f  the a rm istice  was in  
jeopardy u n less  th e French government ordered a l l  o f  i t s  sh ip s to  return
O
to  France. At th e  same tim e, th e B r it is h  government began in tern in g  
French sh ip s found in  B r it ish  w aters.?
The main B r it ish  a c t io n , however, occurred a t  the French p ort o f  
M ers-el-K abir, A lg er ia , and th e  B r it ish  naval base a t  A lexandria , Egypt. 
On July 3> a B r it ish  squadron d e liv ered  an ultimatum to  the French naval 
fo r c es  a t  M ers-el-K abir. The French were given  the a lte r n a t iv e  o f  e ith e r  
surrendering, accep tin g  internm ent in  th e  United S ta te s , or o f  f ig h t in g 0 
The French chose to  f i g h t ,  and th e  B r it is h  squadron attack ed  th e  French 
sh ip s in  th e harbor. From th is  “new Copenhagen,11̂ ® o n ly  one French cap­
i t a l  sh ip  was ab le  to  escape unscathed. The same day, a French naval 
squadron a t  A lexandria rece iv ed  an id e n t ic a l  B r it is h  mandate, but the  
French and B r it ish  commanders agreed to  a lo c a l  gentlem an's agreement.
As a r e s u l t ,  the French naval squadron was in tern ed  a t  Alexandria fo r  
th e duration  o f  the war.
8Auphan, French Navy, 121.
^The B r it is h  op eration  'C a tip u lt' q u ick ly  rounded-up the fo llo w in g  
French naval ships? 2 o ld  b a t t le s h ip s , 2 d e str o y er s , 8 d estroyer  e s c o r ts ,
7 subm arines, and a wide assortm ent o f  a u x il ia r y  c r a f t .  I b id . , 116.
^ R efer r in g  to  the B r it is h  a tta ck  on the n eu tra l Danish f l e e t  in  
1802. A s u c c e s s fu l a c t io n  to  e lim in a te  the th rea t o f  Napoleon I  u t i l i z ­
in g  the Danish f l e e t .
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The French government reacted  im m ediately to  th ese  B r it ish  a ttack s  
on i t s  w arships. The same day as  the a tta ck  on M ers-el-K abir, H untsiger  
informed th e  A rm istice Commission th a t th e  French government viewed the  
B r it ish  a c tio n  as a grave in c id en t and, con seq u ently , i t  d e s ired  exten ­
s iv e  m o d ifica tio n s in  the naval terms o f  the a r m is t ic e . France asked  
fo r  adequate con cession s to  provide fo r  th e s e c u r ity  o f  i t s  overseas  
p o sse ss io n s . At th e  tim e, S tuelp nagel was on ly  ab le  to  express h is  con­
d o len ces , and he was not ab le  to  make any d e c is io n s  on th e  French request
11u n t i l  he rece ived  fu rth er  in s tr u c tio n s  from h is  government.
The fo llo w in g  day, the commission informed the French th a t H it le r
understood the French p o s it io n  and approved th e  m ilita r y  measures a l -
12ready taken in  response to  the B r it ish  a tta c k s . Furthermore, the  
commission was suspending the a p p lic a tio n  o f  A r t ic le  8 u n t i l  th e  " situ a ­
t io n  was c la r i f i e d .  "•*■3 T his m o d ifica tio n  d id  not mean th a t Germany 
relin q u ish ed  a l l  c o n tro l over th e French navy, fo r  the A rm istice  Com­
m issio n  q u ick ly  drew up a "zone o f  action"  which confined  a l l  French 
naval u n its  to  an area extending a long the co a st o f  Morocco and North 
A f r ic a .^
Through th e  fo llo w in g  week, the French d e le g a tio n  continued to  
ask fo r  more German coop eration  on naval q u es tio n s . On July 9 , H it le r
H-D.F.C.A.A. ,  I ,  39-1*0 passim .
^A dm iral D arlan, m in ister  o f  French navy, is su ed  orders th a t  
a l l  B r it is h  sh ip s a t  sea were to  be a tta ck ed . The n ext day, he m odified  
t h i s  order to  apply on ly  to  th ose  B r it ish  sh ip s found w ith in  twenty  
m iles  o f  France.
13D .G .F ,P ., D, X, 121*.
^ D .F .C .A .A . ,  I ,  k3-hk.
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re p lie d  th a t the con cession s already granted were to  remain in  fo r c e ,  
but he was not going to  make any binding commitment on the French navy 
fo r  he "wanted fu rth er  tim e to  th ink  i t  o y e r ." ^  On July 11 , Admiral 
Raeder advised  the Fuehrer th a t  French p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e war a g a in st  
B rita in  by defending i t s  c o lo n ie s  and bases would be welcome, but the  
French should not be allow ed to operate in  th e A tla n t ic . These proposals  
rece ived  H it le r 's  com plete agreem en t.^
Up to  the middle o f  September, the French government made repeated  
req u ests to  th e  commission fo r  a d d itio n a l r e le a s e s  o f  French naval fo r c e s .  
I t  in d ica ted  th a t i f  th e  Germans continued to  fo llo w  a moderate p o lic y  
toward th e French navy, i t  was w i l l in g  to  undertake ta lk s  o u tsid e  the  
realm o f  the A rm istice C o m m i s s i o n . A t  t h i s  tim e, though, the German 
government m aintained the p o s it io n  th a t i t  p referred  to  work w ith in  the  
stru ctu re  o f  con cession s a lread y g r a n t e d . T h i s  rather harsh p o s it io n  
was m odified  by an a tta ck  on the French empire.
On September 23, th e Free French, in  conjunction  w ith the B r it is h  
navy, a ttack ed  th e  French naval base a t Dakar, West A fr ica . The a tta ck  
was a com plete f a i lu r e ,  but i t  had important consequences, fo r  i t  fu r­
thered  the cause o f  th ose  in  the Vichy government who advocated c lo s e r  
co lla b o r a tio n  w ith  the A x is . This French d es ire  fo r  more cooperation  
was accented  by the d e fe c t io n  o f  the French c o lo n ie s  o f  Chad, Cameroon, 
and E quatorial A fr ica  to  th e  Free French. The French d e leg a tio n  imme-
V II, 291-92 passim .
•̂̂ Fuehrer Naval C onferences, I ,  69.
1 7D.F.C.A.A«, I ,  221*. 
l 8H.C.A. t V II, 292.
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d la t e ly  requested th a t th e  A rm istice Commission l i f t  the s a i l in g  ban on
the French f l e e t  a t  Toulon, so th a t th e b a tt le sh ip  Strasbourg, th ree
c r u is e r s , and an u n sp ec ified  number o f  d estroyers could  b o ls te r  the
French d efen ses in  West A fr ica . The commission refu sed  to  a llow  any
French naval sh ip s to  lea v e  fo r  the c o lo n ie s , and the s a i l in g  ban r e -
19mained in  e f f e c t  a t  Toulon,
The German m ilita r y  command regarded French r ea c tio n  to  the a t ­
tack  on Dakar as an opportunity to  e n l i s t  th e  a c t iv e  a id  o f  the French 
navy a g a in st B r ita in . Naval operations in  the M editerranean o ffe re d  a 
number o f  unique problems to  the German naval le a d e r s . The German sur­
fa c e  f l e e t  cou ld  o f f e r  i t s  I ta l ia n  counterpart very  l i t t l e  a s s is ta n c e  
beeause o f the d is ta n ces  in volved  and th e  B r it ish  co n tro l o f  th e access  
to  the M editerranean. The German submarine f l e e t  a ls o  could o f f e r  
l i t t l e  a id  to  I t a ly  because o f  the B r it is h  co n tro l o f th e G ib ra l ta r  
S tr a it s  and th e currents flow in g  through the s t r a i t s  in to  th e M editer­
ranean. Once in  th e  M editerranean, German submarines never became
20a v a ila b le  fo r  op eration s in  any o th er  th ea ter . However, H it le r  ap­
proached any such naval p o lic y  change w ith  ca u tio n , fo r  i t  im plied  
p o l i t i c a l  agreements beyond the a r m is tic e .
The Fuehrer, by excluding the French naval fo rce s  a t  Toulon from 
tak ing p art in  th e  d efen se o f  Dakar, expressed h is  d is tr u s t  of French 
in te n t io n s . N ev erth e less , he gradually  began to  change h is  mind toward 
th e f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  e n l is t in g  a c t iv e  French a id  to  the German war e f f o r t .
^ D .Q .F .P . ,  B. XI, 165.
Admiral D oen itz , Memoirs % Ten Years and Twenty Days (Londons 
1959), 161.
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Admiral Baeder was a staunch advocate o f  c o lla b o r a tio n  w ith  France, he 
hoped to  see  th e French navy jo in  w ith the German, and he b e liev ed  such 
a c tio n  would prove b e n e f ic ia l  in  the war a g a in st Britain*. Consequently, 
he advocated th a t l ib e r a l  con cession s be g iven  to  th e  French navy*,
H it le r ,  on the o th er hand, was q u ite  h e s ita n t  to  accep t th ese  p rop osa ls , 
fo r  he in s is te d  th a t any se ttle m en t w ith  France must in clu de a p o l i t i c a l  
a g reem en t.^
pp
On October 1*, H it le r  met w ith M u sso lin i, and H it le r ’s main 
theme was th a t he wanted to  m ob ilize  French fo r c e s  a g a in st B r ita in  in  
the Mediterranean*, He adm itted th a t B r ita in  was fa r  from beaten and 
th a t Germany was going to  need a l l  the resources i t  could muster to  in ­
sure a v ic to r y  over th e B r i t i s h .2^
As already m entioned, H it le r  f e l t  th a t any p o lic y  change toward 
th e French involved  p o l i t i c a l  agreements beyond th e  a r m is tic e . German 
s tr a te g ic  and p o l i t i c a l  th in k in g  had undergone con sid erab le  change, for 
the German goal now was to  go beyond the a rm istice  to  e s ta b lis h  a modus 
operand! fo r  expanded co lla b o r a tio n  w ith France. The A rm istice Commis­
s io n  d id  not take part in  th ese  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and i t s  s o le  fu n ctio n  was 
to  produce an atmosphere th a t was conducive to  th e  su ccess  o f  the p o l i ­
t i c a l  n e g o t ia t io n s .
On October 2k, H it le r  met P eta in  a t  M ontoire. The con versation  
was conducted in  general term s, H it le r  made no s p e c if ic  o f f e r ,  and the
^W arlim ont, In s id e  H it le r ’s Headquarters, 122.
22They met a t  Brenner, a v i l la g e  and customs s ta t io n  a t  the I ta l ia n  
end o f  Brenner Pass} scene o f  a number o f  conferen ces between H it le r  and 
M ussolin i (19hO -19Ul).
2^Schmidt, H it le r ’s In te r p r e te r , 192.
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French were u n w illin g  to  make any ser io u s  commitment. The conference  
produced a proces verb a l which, l ik e  th e  m eeting, was put in  very  gen eral 
term s. Throughout the conversations H it le r  hoped to  form a grand c o a l i ­
t io n  a g a in st B r ita in . However, H it ler , as soon as the m eeting was over, 
seemed profoundly d isappointed  a t  the r e s u lt s  o f  h is  e f f o r t s .  This 
disappointm ent would continue to  grow as time went on.2k
As la t e  as November 12 , H it le r  considered  th e p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  
e n l is t in g  the a c t iv e  a id  o f  France. This would mean th a t fo r  th e  tim e 
being Germany was to  regard France as a ’’n o n b e llig eren t power" which 
would have to  to le r a te  German m ilita r y  measures a f f e c t in g  i t  and provide  
fo r  i t s  own means o f  d e fen se . This meant the French had to  defend th e ir  
own A frican  em pire, and from " th is  task  th e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  France in  
th e  war a g a in st England would develop in  f u l l  f o r c e ."2^ The same day, 
th e A rm istice Commission was in stru c ted  to  grant minor co n cession s to  
th e French. These grants provided very l im ite d  reinforcem ents to  th e  
French c o lo n ia l  armed fo r c e s . Other than t h is  minor a c t io n , i t  was to  
take a noncommittal stan d . ^
A s e r ie s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  d isc u ss io n s  were conducted between November 
12 and December 13 w ith  th e in ten tio n  o f  acq u irin g  some s o r t  o f  p o s it iv e  
r e s u lt  from th e Montoire m eeting. These con versation s were attem pts by 
H it le r  to  i n i t i a t e  a r e c o n c ilia t io n  w ith  the French fo r  m ilita r y  reasons. 
North A frica  and the M editerranean began to  have a strong appeal as an 
a lte r n a t iv e  to  the German in a b i l i t y  to  invade B r ita in . With the change
2iiSchmidt, H it le r 's  In te r p r e te r , 199°
^ H i t l e r ’s d ir e c t iv e  no. 18 , N .C .A ., I I I ,  1*03-01*° 
^ D .G .F .P . ,  D, XI, 026.
1*0
in  emphasis, H it le r  hoped to  acquire French a s s is ta n c e , and because o f
such a co n sid era tio n  he refra in ed  from tak ing a hard stand toward
France. On th e  o th er hand, he d id  not decide in  favor o f  a le n ie n t
27p o lic y , fo r  when Laval was d iscu ss in g  w ith Ribbentrop th e  p o s s i b i l i ­
t i e s  o f  a broad c o lla b o r a tio n , H it le r  issu ed  d ir e c t iv e  19« This d ir e c ­
t i v e ,  op eration  nA t t i l a ,“ la id  down th e  procedure fo r  the occupation  o f  
a l l  France and th e capturing o f  th e French f l e e t  a t  Toulon. The opera­
t io n  was to  come in to  e f f e c t  i f  in  th e  fu tu re  any p art o f  the French
pO
empire r ev o lted  a g a in st the Vichy regim e«
On December 20 , th e A rm istice Commission rece iv ed  in s tr u c tio n s
to  conduct i t s  fu tu re  a c t i v i t i e s  in  accordance w ith  th e p ro v is io n s  s e t
up in  op eration  " A ttila " . Moreover, the s a i l in g  ban on th e French navy
29a t  Toulon was to  remain in  e f f e c t .
I I
The German-French a rm istic e  d e a lt  w ith th e French a ir  fo r c e  in  
much the same manner as w ith  the French navy. By A r t ic le  a l l  French 
m ilita r y  a ir c r a f t  in  the fr e e  zone were to  be disarmed and p laced  under 
German su p erv is io n . A r t ic le  6 s t ip u la te d  th a t a l l  o th er m a ter ie l o f  th e  
French a ir  fo r c e  was to  be p laced  in  stock -p iles  under German su p erv isio n ^ 0
^ L a v a l, P ie r r e , l883-19l*E><. French lawyer and p o li t ic ia n ?  premier 
and m in is ter  o f  fo r e ig n  a f f a ir s  (1931-32); v ice-p rem ier  in  Vichy govern­
ment ( July-Dee ember, 191*0); prem ier (from A p r il, 191*2).
^ H i t l e r 8s d ir e c t iv e  no. 19 . Margaret C a r ly le , Documents on 
In tern a tio n a l A ffa ir s  (London, 1951*), I I ,  128-29°
^ E x tr a c t  from war d iary  o f  Wehrmacht operation s s t a f f .  D0G0F0P.
D, XI, 918.
3°DaG0F .P . ,  D, Xs 672-73.
On July $ , the A m is t ic e  Commission re lea sed  the French govern­
ment from the p ro v is io n s  o f  A r t ic le  At th e same tim e, the commission 
granted the French th e r ig h t to  use a n t i -a ir c r a f t  guns in  the unoccupied  
zone and suspended the p ro h ib itio n  a g a in st French p lan es from tak ing o f f  
in  the fr e e  zone. These German con cession s were intended only to  
f a c i l i t a t e  the French d efen ses aga in st B r it ish  a tta c k s , fo r  in  granting  
th ese  con cession s Germany p laced  d e f in ite  l im it s  on th e freedom o f  
a c tio n  France could take w ith i t s  a ir  fo r c e .
The German l im ita t io n s  were p a r t ic u la r ly  concerned w ith  the s iz e  
and a c t iv i t y  o f  the French a ir  fo rce  in  unoccupied France. On July 8 ,
the A rm istice Commission ex tracted  from the French d e leg a tio n  the accep­
tan ce o f  c e n tr a l lo c a tio n s  fo r  the disarmament o f  the French a ir  fo r c e .  
These were lo c a te d  a t  Clermont-Ferrand, OhSteauroux, and Lyon.-^ The 
fo llo w in g  week, th e  A rm istice Commission began sending co n tro l commis­
s io n s  in to  the fr e e  zone to supervise  th e  disarmament o f  th e French a ir  
fo r c e . Germany fo llow ed  a p o lic y  o f  a llow in g  the French to  r e ta in  some 
minor a ir  u n its  in  th e fr e e  zone “fo r  o p era tio n a l use a g a in st England.
. . . While disarmament o f  the remainder o f  th e A ir Force in  France was
in  p r o g r e ss ."33
The A rm istice Commission allow ed the French to  m aintain some a ir
fo rce  u n its  in  th e French c o lo n ie s . At th e beginning o f  J u ly , the French
c o lo n ia l a ir  fo rce  c o n s isted  prim arily  o f  what the French had removed 
from m etropolitan  France before the arm istice  came in to  e f f e c t .  The
3 1 lb id .,  D, XI, 127.
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B r it ish  a tta ck s on the French navy, on July 3 , r esu lted  in  a German re ­
le a s e  o f  lim ite d  a ir  fo r c e  reinforcem ents fo r  duty in  North A fr ica .
The commission made i t  e x p l ic i t  to  the French th a t North A fr ica  was the  
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  I t a ly  and th a t I t a l ia n  approval was a p r e re q u is ite  
fo r  a l l  French a ir  op eration s in  th a t a rea .
West A fr ic a , on the o th er  hand, was w ith in  the area which the  
Germans regarded as th e ir  sphere o f  in te r e s t  in  reg u la tin g  the s iz e  and 
a c t iv i t y  o f  a l l  French armed fo r c e s . On September 26 , in  response to  
the A ll ie d  a tta ck  on Dakar, th e commission re lea sed  a d d itio n a l French 
a ir  fo r c e  u n its  fo r  defense o f  West A frica  and a t  the same tim e to  b o l­
s te r  the Vichy co n tro l o f  E quatorial A fr ica .
Through th e  f a l l  o f  19l*0, the A rm istice Commission took l i t t l e  
in t e r e s t  in  the French a ir  fo r c e . The French, n e v e r th e le s s , made a 
number o f  req u ests fo r  fu r th er  r e le a se s  o f  a ir c r a f t  to  be used in  th e  
French empire. The commission complied in  a lim ite d  fa sh io n  by a llow in g  
the French to  r e ta in  a few more tran sp ort p la n e s . ^
Throughout th e  p er iod , Germany showed a w illin g n e ss  to  grant th e  
Vichy regime lim ite d  con cession s in  th ose a rm istice  terms a f f e c t in g  the  
French a ir  fo r c e , but on ly  when i t  was to  be used  in  d efen se  o f  the  
French em pire. The A rm istice Commission made i t  q u ite  c le a r  th a t a l ­
though i t  had conceded to  th e French a number o f  r e le a se s  fo r  th e ir  a ir  
fo r c e , th e ll!disarmament o f  th e  . . . A ir Force w i l l  be m aintained.
The German a t t itu d e  toward th e  ex ecu tion  o f  the a rm istice  terms r e la t iv e
i
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to  th e French a ir  forca . depended upon th e French a b i l i t y  and a c tio n  i t  
took to  q u e ll  the r e v o lt s  in  the French empire.
I l l
The German A rm istice Commission ex h ib ited  a con stan t u n easin ess  
toward the French army. In  A r t ic le  2* o f  the a r m is t ic e , a l l  French armed 
fo r c es  in  the occupied zone were to  withdraw im m ediately to  the fr e e  
z o n e , and throughout the p er iod , th e  commission made i t  c le a r  th a t the  
occupied zone was s t r i c t l y  o f f - l im i t s  to  a l l  French m ilita r y  p e r s o n n e l . 3®
Soon a f t e r  the A rm istice  Commission convened, the French brought 
forward a s e r ie s  o f  q u estion s concerning the dem arcation l in e  d iv id in g  
France. On July 17 , th e  commission in d ica ted  th a t th e  l in e  was not in ­
tended to  d iv id e  the c i v i l  ad m in istra tion  o f  France. Rather, i t  was 
meant to  e s ta b lis h  a m ilita r y  l in e  to  e lim in a te  a l l  French m ilita r y  
personnel from p assin g  in to  the occupied z o n e . 39 From t h is  p o in t on, 
the commission seldom d iscu ssed  th e demarcation l i n e .  I t  g en era lly  re ­
ferred  problems concerning th e l in e  e ith e r  to  the German m ilita r y  com­
mander in  France, th e Economic Commission, or to  A betz, the German 
ambassador in  P a r is .
A r t ic le  2* fu rth er  provided fo r  th e  disarm ing and dem obilizing  o f  
th e  French army, w ith  the excep tion  o f  th ose u n its  needed fo r  the in te r ­
n a l s e c u r ity  o f  France. The German and I ta l ia n  A rm istice Commissions 
were g iven  the r e s p o n s ib il ity  o f  d ecid in g  on the s iz e  and organ ization
37I b id . ,  D, X, 672.
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o f  th e French array.^
By Jane 30, the German A rm istice Commission had decided th a t the  
maximum s iz e  fo r  a l l  French armed fo r c e s  was not to  exceed 100,000 men. 
Daring the n ext two weeks, the French d e leg a tio n  made repeated req uests  
fo r  con cession s in  the s iz e  and o rg a n iza tio n  o f  the French m etropolitan  
array, and in  response th e A rm istice Commission allow ed France to  main­
ta in  a 100,000 man army in  the unoccupied zone. France asked th a t the  
fr e e  zone be d iv id ed  in to  n ine m ilita r y  reg io n s, each con ta in in g  one 
army d iv is io n . The commission refu sed  to  accept th e French p rop osa l, 
and demanded th a t the French government accep t i t s  p lan  fo r  th e  fu tu re  
s tru c tu re  o f  the French m ilita r y  d i s t r i c t s ,  th a t o f  e ig h t m ilita r y  
reg ion s each con ta in in g  one array d i v i s i o n .^
Through July and August, th e  A rm istice Commission continued  
sending in s tr u c tio n s  to  the French government concerning th e fu tu re  
lo c a t io n  and o rg an iza tion  o f  each d iv is io n . On August l i t ,  the commis­
s io n  refu sed  to  r e tr a c t  i t s  d e c is io n s  on th e number o f  troops the French 
army could r e ta in . At th is  tim e, the French d e le g a tio n  requested the  
r e le a se  o f  some m unitions and equipment from th e  stoek-p iles under German 
c o n tr o l, but th e commission refu sed  to  con sid er  the French request on 
th e b a s is  th a t th e  French army had more than enough equipment a t  i t s  
d is p o s a l.
On September 26, soon a f t e r  the a l l i e d  a tta ck  on Dakar, the com­
m ission  demanded th a t the French f i x  a d ate  fo r  com pletion o f  th e  
o rg an iza tion  and co n stru c tio n  o f  th e  French army. The commission
h$
proposed th a t by November 1 a l l  org a n iza tio n  be com pleted, although i t  
was w i l l in g  to  accept November 15 as the f in a l  d a te . Furthermore, the  
commission demanded th a t by November 1 a l l  war m a ter ie l the French army 
s t i l l  reta in ed  was to  be stock-p iled  a t  s p e c if ie d  c e n te r s . T his being  
accom plished, th e French were to  seg rega te  th e  m a ter ie l d estin ed  fo r  
use by the French army, and the so r tin g  of m a ter ie l was to  be done under 
the w atchful eye o f  German co n tro l com m issions. At th is  tim e, the com­
m ission  demanded th a t the French government provide the co n tro l commis­
s io n s  already in  th e unoccupied zone w ith d e ta ile d  inform ation on the  
stru c tu re  o f  command in  th e French m etropolitan  arrny.^
The French had accepted the German demand, by October 20, fo r  
d iv id in g  the French army. During the fo llo w in g  week, the French d e le ­
g a tio n , tak ing  advantage o f  the p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv i t y  a t  M ontoire, made a 
s e r ie s  o f  req u ests fo r  co n cession s in  the s iz e  and org a n iza tio n  o f the  
French army. I t s  e f fo r t s  were w asted , fo r  Stuelpnagel f irm ly  refused  
to  d iscu ss  any proposals u n t i l  th e r e s u lt s  o f  Montoire were transm itted  
to  W i e s b a d e n . T h is, fo r  a l l  p r a c t ic a l  purposes, was th e l a s t  d isc u s ­
s io n  in  191*0 over th e  o rg an iza tion  o f  the French m etropolitan  army. The 
com m ission's in t e r e s t  in  the French army d id  not extend to  former per­
sonnel who were now p r ison ers o f war.
A r t ic le  20 o f  the a rm istice  s t ip u la te d  th a t a l l  members o f  the  
French armed fo r c es  who were p r iso n ers  o f  war in  German co n tro l were to  
remain as such u n t i l  th e co n c lu sio n  o f  a peace t r e a t y .^  This was one
kgD .F .0 .A .A . ,  I ,  377. 
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o f  the few a r t i c l e s  o f  the a r m istic e  which appeared to  be p r e c ise  in  
wording and con ten t, bat i t  soon underwent con sid erab le  m o d ifica tio n .
At the con clu sion  o f  the a r m is tic e , approxim ately 3 ,000 ,000  
Frenchmen were in terned  by th e Germans as p r ison ers o f  war. The French 
government expressed  a deep concern fo r  th e German p o lic y  o f  hold ing  
French m ilita r y  person n el. I t  deprived France o f  a la r g e  segment o f  
i t s  lab or fo r c e , e s p e c ia lly  a t  a tim e when th e h arvest season was soon 
to  b e g in .^  The French made req uests to  th e  commission fo r  th e r e le a se  
o f  a t  l e a s t  some o f  the French p risoners o f  war. On July 1*, th e com­
m ission  divorced i t s e l f  from much o f  the r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  concerning the  
p riso n ers  o f  war. I t  d id  so because th e French agency concerned w ith  
p rison ers o f  war d ir e c ted  most o f  th e ir  q u estion s and n eg o tia t io n s  to  
the c i v i l  ad m in istra tion  department attach ed  to  th e German m ilita r y  
command in  occupied France. The A rm istice Commission, however, reserved  
th e r ig h t  to  con sid er  any q u estio n  on French p rison ers o f  war in  the  
fu tu re  i f  ordered to  do so by th e OKW.^
In la t e  August, the French government began d ir e e t  n eg o tia t io n s  
w ith Germar^y fo r  the r e le a se  o f  p r ison ers o f  war. As a r e s u lt  o f  the  
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h is  French m ission  to  Germany over one m il l io n  Frenchmen 
were allow ed to  return to  France . ^7 From th e appointment o f  the French
^ S ta tem en t by R. Moreau, com m issioner-general fo r  rep a tr ia ted  
p r iso n e r s . France During th e German Occupation, 191*0-191*1*8 A C o lle c t io n  
o f  292 Statem ents on th e Government o f  Marechal P§tain  and P ierre  Laval 
S t a n fo r d 8 19 5 7 ), I ,  213. H ereafter c it e d  as France During th e  Occupa­
t io n .
k6D0F0C0A.A. , I ,  36-37 passim .
^?The German p o lic y  was to  a ss ig n  to  France th e  duty o f  p r o te c t­
in g  i t s  own p r iso n e rs . In oth er words, France became th e  "protecting  
power'’ fo r  th e  re lea sed  French p r iso n ers  o f  war.
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n e g o tia t in g  m ission  to  B er lin  and th e  estab lishm ent o f  th e  French c i v i l  
d e le g a tio n  attach ed  to  th e German a u th o r it ie s  in  occupied France, the  
A rm istice Commission had l i t t l e  to  do w ith French p r iso n e rs .
In A r t ic le  6 o f  the a r m is t ic e , a l l  French sto ck s o f  m ilita r y  
equipment and m unitions in  th e  unoccupied zone were d ir e c ted  to  stock ­
p i l e s  under Axis supervision .^®  Through July and August, the French 
army, on i t s  own i n i t i a t i v e ,  attem pted to  conceal as much m ilita r y  equip­
ment as p o s s ib le  in  the fr e e  zone.^9 The commission had some knowledge 
o f  th ese  French a c t i v i t i e s ,  and i t  c o n tin u a lly  demanded d e ta ile d  inform­
a tio n  on the amount and lo c a t io n  o f  a l l  Freneh m ilita r y  equipment* The 
French attem pts to  conceal m a ter ie l from th e Germans was never su c ce ss ­
f u l ,  fo r  the German co n tro l com m issions, under the d ir e c t io n  o f  the  
A rm istice Commission, soon fe r r e te d  out most o f  the camouflaged mater­
i e l .
A r t ic le  Ij o f  the a rm istice  provided fo r  the d em ob iliza tion  and 
disarm ing o f  the French army in  unoccupied France. The A rm istice Com­
m ission  was to  ach ieve  t h is  ta sk  by sending co n tro l commissions in to  
unoccupied France. By A r t ic le  6 , th ese  co n tro l commissions were a lso  
to  reg u la te  and su p erv ise  th e  s to c k -p i lin g  o f  Freneh m ilita r y  equipment. 
On June 29, th e  German and I t a l ia n  A rm istice Commissions agreed to  th e  
c re a tio n  o f  sep arate spheres o f  in te r e s t  in  unoccupied France. In  th is
k8D .G .F.P*» D, X, 673.
^ S ta tem en t by General Revere. France Daring th e  Occupation, I I ,  
752. C f. Weygand, M lmoires? RappelI au s e r v ic e , I I I ,  322*
^T estim ony o f General Picuendar. P e ta in , Le Proces du Mareehal 
P eta in , I I ,  636-37 passim . H ereafter c i t e d  as P e ta in , Le Proems*
^ •D.G.F.P. .  D, X, 673.
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agreement, the German co n tro l commissions confined  th e ir  a c t iv i t y  to  a 
zone extending from the Rhdne w est to  the A t la n t ic .^  By th e  middle o f  
J u ly , the A rm istice  Gornmission had sen t a number o f  co n tro l commissions 
in to  the fr e e  zone, and w ith in  a month they were fu n ction in g  throughout 
France.
In th e  G erm an-Italian agreement o f  June 29 , the French empire was 
a lso  d iv id ed  in to  separate areas o f  c o n tr o l. I ta ly  was to  determine the  
s iz e  and stren g th  o f  the French armed fo r c e s  in  Morocco, A lg er ia , T u n isia , 
and S y r ia . While th e Germans had th e r e s p o n s ib il ity  o f  reg u la tin g  the  
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the French in  Indochina, the West In d ie s , and French Equa­
t o r ia l  A fr ic a . These Axis c o n tr o ls  were lim ite d  to  governing th e a c t iv ­
i t i e s  o f  th e  French armed fo r c e s , e s p e c ia lly  th e  army.
Germany regarded the in te r e s t s  o f  I t a ly  as being o f much more 
importance in  the French A frican  p o ssess io n s  than i t s  own. The I t a l ia n  
A rm istice Commission, however, had a d i f f i c u l t  time forc in g  the French 
in  North A fr ica  to  comply w ith th e a r m is t ic e . The I ta l ia n s  proved q u ite  
in ep t a t  d ir e c t in g  th e a c t iv i t y  o f  the French North A frican array, and 
th e French pursued a su c c e ss fu l p o lic y  o f  h id ing  m a ter ie l and m unitions 
from the I t a l ia n  co n tro l c o m m i s s i o n s . ^
The 100,000 men assign ed  as th e maximum l im it  fo r  th e French 
a rm istice  army d id  not in c lu d e  the s iz e  o f  the French c o lo n ia l  army.
In  North A fr ic a , the German A rm istice Commission did  not concern i t s e l f  
w ith any q u estio n s d ea lin g  w ith  the French army in  th ose areas under 
I ta l ia n  c o n tr o l. However, i t  d id  s t ip u la te  th at th e French army be
52Ib id . t d , X, $$.
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la r g e  enough to  provide fo r  th e  defense o f  th e ir  French p o s se s s io n s . At 
th e  beginning o f  Ju ly , the I t a l ia n  A rm istice Commission proposed th a t  
th e French array in  North A frica  be reduced to  30,000 men, and the German 
A rm istice Commission gave i t s  com plete agreement to  th e p r o p o s a l .^
This p ro v is io n a l s iz e  fo r  the French North A frican  array was qu ick ly  
changed a f t e r  the B r it ish  naval a c tio n s  in  J u ly . The German A rm istice  
Commission agreed to  th e I t a l ia n  proposal th a t  the s iz e  o f  th e  French 
army in  North A fr ica  be expanded to  100,000 tro o p s , and over 20,000 un­
armed a u x il ia r y  w o r k e r s .^
U n til September, th e  r o le  o f  th e German A rm istice Commission in  
th e  French empire was l im ite d  s t r i c t l y  to  provid ing fo r  the te c h n ic a l  
su p erv isio n  o f  the French com pliance w ith the a r m is t ic e . The p o s s ib i l i t y  
th a t French E quatoria l A fr ica  might d e fe c t  to  th e Free French somewhat 
concerned the Germans, and t h is  German fe a r  increased  as the Vichy con­
t r o l  over the eo lony continued to  d e t e r io r a t e .^
In th e  f i r s t  two weeks o f  September, th e  French d e le g a tio n  re ­
quested th a t France be granted more freedom o f  a c t io n  in  th e defense o f  
i t s  p o s se s s io n s . The A rm istice Commission refu sed  to  make a d e c is io n  on 
th e b a s is  th a t i t  was no lon ger purely  a m atter o f  in ter p r e tin g  the 
a r m is tic e . The problem had become a p o l i t i c a l  is su e  and, th e r e fo r e , any
such program as the French v is u a liz e d  had to  have th e approval o f  the
57German fo r e ig n  m in istry .
^ S tatem en t o f  General Revers. France During the Occupation, I I ,
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On September 11 , the A rm istice Commission informed France th a t  
the OKW, in  conjunction  w ith the Foreign M in istry , expected the Vichy 
government to e lim in a te  a l l  r e b e llio n s  in  th e  French c o lo n ie s , e s p e c ia lly  
E quatorial A fr ica . Furthermore, i t  was to  provide Germany w ith th e a s ­
surances th a t such a s itu a t io n  was n ot to  occur again  in  any p art o f  the  
French empire. The commission a lso  fu rn ish ed  th e  French d e leg a tio n  w ith  
th e inform ation th a t fu rth er  reinforcem ents from m etropolitan  France 
cou ld , i f  n ecessa ry , be sen t to  the empire. I f  sueh an event occurred, 
France s t i l l  was to  channel a l l  requests through the A rm istice Commis­
sion.^® This p o s it io n  in d ica ted  th a t Germany regarded developments in  
A frica  as having evolved in to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  realm although i t  was, as 
y e t ,  u n w illin g  to  work o u tsid e  the s tru c tu re  o f  th e  A rm istice Commission.
F ie ld  Marshal B ra u ch itsch ,^  commander o f  the German army, met 
w ith  H untaiger, now commander o f th e French a rm istice  army, on September 
26. H untaiger s ta te d  th a t France was a c tu a lly  f ig h t in g  a g a in s t a common 
enemy—th a t i s ,  B r ita in . He requested  th a t the A rm istice Commission 
a llow  the French army some f l e x i b i l i t y  in  North A frica  to  f a c i l i t a t e  
th e d efen se  o f  th e Frexieh empire. Brauehitseh took a non-com m ittal 
stand , fo r  he f e l t  th a t the French request was p o l i t i c a l  in  nature. He 
sa id  th a t th e  French view  was most in te r e s t in g  and th a t i t  was sure to  
be d iscu ssed  w ith “th e competent a u t h o r i t y . T h i s  “competent a u th o r ity 0 
or H it le r , had by th is  time come to  regard th e  p o ss ib le  p o l i t i c a l  advantages
^8 D.FaCaA.Aa9  I ,  215-16 .
^ B ra u eh itseh , H einrich A lfred , l8 8 l-1 9 i;8 . German army o ff ic e r ?  
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o f  an a l l ia n c e  w ith Franee as being o f  much more b e n e fit  to  th e  German 
war e f f o r t  than what the a rm istice  provided. As a consequence, the  
A rm istice Commission was in stru c ted  to  avoid any u n p leasan tr ies  fo r  the  
time b ein g . 63- On October 6 , S tu elpn agel rece ived  fu rth er  in s tr u c tio n s  
from th e  OKW th a t he was not to  accep t any French requests' fo r  r e in ­
forcem ents, fo r  th e  whole r o le  France was to p lay  in  th e  war was to  be 
d iscu ssed  on th e  p o l i t i c a l  l e v e l  in  th e near fu tu r e . Added to  th ese  
in s tr u c tio n s  was the comment? “th e d e c is io n  w i l l  turn out to  be fa v o r-  
a b le  fo r  th e  French."
By the end o f  September, Germany v is u a liz e d  the French c o lo n ia l  
army as being a n ecessary  elem ent fo r  the defense o f  the French empire 
and as a consequence a p ro tec to r  o f  German in te r e s t s  in  the area . H it le r  
had f in a l ly  accepted th e  view  o f  th e  OKW as to  what Franee could c o n tr i­
bute to  th e German war e f f o r t .  This p o s s ib le  French co n tr ib u tio n  tra n s­
cended th e  a r m is t ic e , and th e r e fo r e , i t  im plied a p o l i t i c a l  agreement, 
concluded o u tsid e  th e  co n sid era tio n  o f the A rm istice Commission. In  ̂
t h is  scheme, France was to  cooperate f u l ly  w ith Germany, and i t  was to  
accep t German m ilita r y  measures a f f e c t in g  th e  French A frican  c o lo n ie s .  
From t h is  i n i t i a l  ta sk , "France’s p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e war a g a in st Eng­
land could develop f u l l y . I n  provid ing fo r  such a program, the  
A rm istice Commission performed a very modest r o le .  I t  was in stru c ted  
to  conduet i t s  m eetings in  a c o n c ilia to r y  manner, making sure th a t noth- 
was done to  o ffen d  the French government.61*
63*I b id . , 267. 62ib id .
6 3 H it le r 's  d ir e c t iv e  no. 1 8 , N.C.A. . I l l ,  1*03-01;.
6 k(jonferenee o f  G oering, October 1 , Ib id . , V II, 51*3°
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These in s tr u c tio n s  to  th e commission to  use a degree o f  moderation  
in d ica ted  th a t Germany was now s e r io u s ly  con sid erin g  p lacin g  more empha­
s i s  on the M editerranean. The moderation was a lso  to provide fo r  a 
congen ia l atmosphere fo r  th e  m eeting o f  the two p o l i t i c a l  heads o f  s ta te  
a t  Montoire on October 21*. As a lread y  m entioned, a t  M ontoire H it le r  
made an obvious attem pt to  e n l i s t  th e  a id  o f  France, and t h is  a id  was 
to  be concentrated  in  A fr ic a .
At M ontoire, the A rm istice Commission was assign ed  th e s p e c if ic  
duty o f  in i t ia t in g  a l l  r e le a se s  to  the French in  A fr ic a , but th is  never  
came about. Soon a f t e r  the M ontoire con feren ce , Laval went to  P aris  
where he conferred w ith  A betz. They form ulated a p lan  fo r  the reconquer­
ing o f  French E quatorial A fr ica  which had gone over to  th e  Free French. 
This p lan  was in i t ia t e d  o u tsid e  th e  A rm istice Commission.
By th e end o f  November, th e  A rm istice Commission and i t s  machinery 
were again  ignored , t h is  tim e by the OKW. Warlimont was sen t to  P aris  
to  meet w ith H untaiger, D arlan, and Laval on November 29. At th e meet­
in g , Warlimont o ffered  the Freneh increased  r e le a s e s  to  i t s  armed fo r c e s ,  
e s p e c ia lly  th ose  in  northwest A fr ica . This area appeared to  be the most 
important o b je c tiv e  o f any m ilita r y  cooperation  w ith  F r a n c e .^  Warlimont 
conducted a second m eeting on December 10 in  which the p r in c ip a l was 
esta b lish e d  th a t the French alone could adequately p ro tect th e ir  own 
A frican p o s se s s io n s . When Warlimont made h is  report o f  th e  second meet­
in g  to  H it le r , th e  la t t e r  became u p set over the u n r e l ia b i l i t y  o f th e  
French North A frican army. H it le r  regarded the rep ort and th e meeting 
as being next to  u s e le s s ,  and thus th e proposals fo r  c lo s e  m ilita r y
^W arlim ont, In s id e  H it le r 9s Headquarters, 123.
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c o lla b o r a tio n  between Germany and France, never very r e a l i s t i c  to  begin  
w ith , were d iscard ed .
This a t t i tu d e , combined w ith  L ava l's  d ism issa l on December 13, 
produced a f e e l in g  in  B er lin  th a t th ere was l i t t l e  hope o f  k n it t in g  the  
in t e r e s t s  o f  the two co u n tr ie s  to g eth er  in  any m ilita r y  adventure, and 
so th e  A rm istice Commission again  became th e  agency through which a l l  
m ilita r y  q u estion s were answered.
I?
Germany, soon a f t e r  s ig n in g  th e a r m istic e  w ith  France, began to  
e x p lo it  the w ealth o f France in  order to  f a c i l i t a t e  th e German war e f f o r t .  
The A rm istice Commission i n i t i a l l y  was to  conduct such a program through 
i t s  execu tiv e  d e c is io n s  on the a r m is tic e .
Germany claim ed variou s economic r ig h ts  in  occupied zone based on 
A r tic le s  3 , 17 , and 21 o f  the a r m is t ic e . By A r t ic le  3 , Germany had a l l  
the r ig h ts  o f  an occupying power. Germany in terp reted  th ese  r ig h ts  to  
mean th a t i t  could make any cla im  on th e French economy th a t was con sid ­
ered n ecessary  fo r  th e war e f f o r t  a g a in st B r ita in , and th e se  claim s  
exceeded th e  r ig h ts  granted to  an occupying power by in ter n a tio n a l law £ 6  
By A r t ic le  17 , Germany cla im  th e  r ig h t to  safeguard a l l  economic a s s e t s  
and su p p lie s  in  the occupied zone. A r t ic le  21 sim ply guaranteed the  
im plem entation o f  the o th er  two a r t i c l e s . 67
The German e x p lo ita t io n  phase in  occupied France la s te d  through
6 6 i n referen ce  to  the Hague Rules o f  Land Warfare formed a t  the  
fou rth  Hague convention  o f  1907.
67oiroular of commissioner of Four Tear P lan, Ju ly  5» D.G .F.P. ,
D, X, 128.
a
September, 19U0. The task  o f  a l l  German agen cies in  France was to  c o l ­
l e c t  booty, fo r  the German goal " is  (s ic ]  to  g e t out o f  France, through 
se iz u r e  or purchase a t  in f in ite s im a l p r ic e s  th e m ater ia ls  o f  use fo r  the  
German armament."^®
69Since th e co n c lu sio n  o f  th e  a r m is t ic e , G oering, as m in ister  o f  
th e  German Four Year P lan , advocated th a t an Economic D elegation  be s e t  
up p a r a lle l in g  th e A rm istice Commission in  a u th o r ity  but w ith  the func­
t io n  o f  d ea lin g  w ith a l l  a sp ects  o f  the French e c o n o m y . O n  July h,  
Hemmen?  ̂ was appointed chairman o f  th e  Economic D elegation  and was in ­
stru cted  to  perform two primary fu n ctio n s in  France. He was to  implement 
th e economic terms o f  the a rm istice  and, a ls o ,  to  conduct n e g o tia t io n s  
with the French government o u ts id e  the realm o f  th e a r m is t ic e . The 
Economic D e leg a tio n 's  goal was "to e x p lo it  the economic p o te n t ia l o f  the  
unoecupied t e r r ito r y  in  the se r v ic e  o f  th e German war economy
The c r e a tio n  o f  th e  Economic D elegation  l e f t  on ly  one segment o f  
the French economy under th e  co n tro l o f  th e A rm istice  Commission-“the
^®From h is to r y  o f  War Economy and Armament S t a f f  in  France.
K.O.A-.. V II, 1*82 =
^Go e r i n g ,  Hermann, 1893-191*6. German p o l i t i c ia n .  M in ister  o f  
a ir  fo rce  and m in ister  o f  in te r io r  (1933); commissar fo r  Four Year Plan  
( 1 9 3 6 ) |  f i e l d  marshal ( 1 9 3 8 ); p resid en t o f  c o u n c il fo r  war economy (191*0).
^ H aid er , P riva te  War Journal, IV, 101*.
TlHemmen, Hans Richard. Chairman o f  the S p ecia l Commission on 
Economic Q uestions w ith  the German A rm istice Commission.
^ C ir c u la r  fo r  Four Year P lan, Ju ly  £ . B .G .F .P , a D, X, 129«
The Economic D elegation  rece iv ed  i t s  in s tr u c tio n s  from various sou rces, 
fo r  both Ribbentrop and Goering claim ed au th o r ity  over Hemmen. When 
Hemmen was named chairman, Ribbentrop a c t iv e ly  attack ed  t h is  d e c is io n ,  
because Goering claim ed the r ig h t o f g iv in g  orders to  Hemmen. This 
q u estio n  o f  competence was f in a l ly  regu la ted  to  the advantage o f  Rib­
bentrop .
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French war in d u s tr ie s . Germany d efin ed  war in d u str ie s  as th e production  
o f  any commodity which had a d e f in i t e  va lu e  to  th e German war e f f o r t .
The .Armistice Commission d e a lt  w ith  the French war in d u s tr ie s  on 
two l e v e l s ,  one fo r  the occupied zone, and another fo r  the fr e e  zone.
In th e occupied zone, i t  fo llo w ed  a p o lic y  o f  moderation in  comparison 
to  o th er German a g en c ies . On July It, th e OKW in str u c te d  the commission 
to  m ob ilize  th e French in d u s tr ie s  in  an in d ir e c t  fa sh io n  o n l y , and 
h e r e a fte r , i t  demanded on ly  the French production o f  a r t i c l e s  which were 
u rg en tly  needed fo r  Germany's war e f f o r t .  This moderate approach was 
soon superseded by oth er German agen cies which began to  g iv e  d ir e c t io n s  
to  the m ilita r y  ad m in istra tion  in  occupied France fo r  the ex ten siv e  
m o b iliza tio n  o f  French in d u s tr ie s . On August 26 , Goering r e le a sed  a 
general order th a t the economies o f  a l l  occupied w estern t e r r i t o r ie s  
were to  be sy ste m a tic a lly  e x p lo ited  fo r  the b e n e fit  o f  the German econ­
omy. This d ir e c t iv e  provided f o r  the w idespread r e q u is it io n in g  o f  the  
French economy, both o f  f in ish e d  products and raw m a te r ia ls .
The French government q u ick ly  p ro tested  t h is  economic p o lic y  to  
th e A rm istice Commission. On September 2 , th e commission exp la ined  th at  
German req u ests fo r  French war products in  th e occupied zone depended 
upon the fu tu re  development o f  th e war. Furthermore, Germany reserved  
th e r ig h t to  make any c la im , w ith in  reason , on the French economy.?5 
These German cla im s soon proved to  be q u ite  e x te n s iv e , so e x te n s iv e  th a t  
by October la r g e  q u a n tit ie s  o f  French raw m ater ia ls  and f in ish e d  goods
7 3p ,G .F .P . .  D, X, 118.
% .C .A . .  V II, 608-09 passim .
^ L e t te r  from Stuelpnagel to  H untziger, D .F.C.A.A. .  I ,  215»
were shipped e ith e r  d ir e c t ly  to  Germany or  d isp ersed  to  the German armed 
fo r c es  s ta tio n ed  in  France, Ely the end o f  19li0, occupied France c o n tr i­
buted n early  f iv e  m il l io n  to n s o f  iron  to  the German war economy. This 
German plundering was a ls o  extended to  include th e  French tra n sp orta tion  
in d u str ie s  in  th e occupied zone, in  which a la rg e  number o f  ra ilro a d  
fr e ig h t  c a rs , tru ck s, and o th er  v e h ic le s  were sen t to  Germ any,^ The 
r o le  o f  the A rm istice Commission in  th is  German a c t iv i t y  was p rim arily  
th a t o f  inform ing the French o f  the reasons fo r  t h is  economic p o lic y  in  
the occupied gone.
On q u estion s concerning the French war in d u str ie s  in  the fr e e  zone,
th e  A rm istice Commission had a more p o s it iv e  and c le a r  r o le  than in
occupied Franee, Throughout Ju ly  and August, a l l  German orders fo r
French m ilita r y  products in  th e  fr e e  zone were channeled through the
commission, Germany fo llow ed  a very  moderate commercial p o lic y  and th e
commission based a l l  economic tra n sa ctio n s on fr e e  exchange, in  which
purchases could  be made only in  the normal fa sh io n  o f  commercial exchange
77between the two c o u n t r ie s .’ ' On September 2 , the commission informed 
th e French th a t in  th e fu tu re  a l l  orders fo r  commercial exchange between 
German and French firm s were to  be conducted on a p r iv a te  b a s is ,  bypas-
• e Q
s in g  the commission.
By A r tic le  6  o f  the a r m is t ic e , a l l  manufacturing o f war m a ter ie l 
in  th e  unoccupied zone was to  be stoppedi The ban was soon l i f t e d ,  but
^^Meraorandum o f  General Thomas, Freneh m ilita r y  command. NoMoT.o 
XIII, 795. ~
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th e commission reta in ed  the r ig h t to  su p erv ise  the production  o f war 
m a ter ie l, and i t  sen t co n tro l commissions in to  the fr e e  zone to  super­
v is e  th e  in d u str ie s  as they were re lea sed  from the a rm istice  r e s t r ic t io n s .
Through 19l*0, the A rm istice Commission took l i t t l e  in t e r e s t  in  
th e  economy o f  the French empire, fo r  Germany regarded the economic po­
t e n t ia l  o f  th ese  areas as being o f s l ig h t  importance. Germany a lso  had 
concluded an agreement w ith  I ta ly  in  which German economic in t e r e s t s  
were l im ite d  to  the w est c o a st o f  A fr ica , E quatoria l A fr ica , and Indo­
ch in a . 79 F in a lly , the Germans were q u ite  ignorant o f  th e amounts o f  
m a ter ie l the French had concealed  in  th e ir  overseas p o s se s s io n s . The 
Germans had no coherent economic p o lic y  to  apply to  the French empire5 
to  the Germans " it  i s  £ s i c j  not q u ite  c le a r  what we r e a lly  want th e r e .18®®
7
The German-French a rm istice  placed d e f in it e  l im it s  on the ex ten t  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  in te r a c t io n  th a t cou ld  be in i t ia t e d  between the two s t a t e s ,  
and i n i t i a l l y ,  the A rm istice Commission was the only communication l in k  
between Germany and France. As already m entioned, by Ju ly  the German 
m ilita r y  ad m in istra tion  in  the occupied zone was p laced  o u ts id e  the con­
t r o l  o f  the commission. I t s  d u tie s  in  th e occupied zone became th ose  o f  
exp la in in g  German p o l i c ie s  to  the Vichy regim e, and when n ecessary  assum­
ing the ro le  o f n e g o tia to r  d ea lin g  w ith s p e c if ic  p o in ts  o f  the German 
ad m in istra tion  in  th e occupied zone.
On August 5» the French d e leg a tio n  presented  a note to  the
70German-Italian agreement, August 17. D .G .F.P. ,  B, X, 503.
®^Halder, P riva te  War Journal» IV, 101*.
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A rm istice Commission p r o te s tin g  German p o l ic ie s  in  A lsace and Lorraine.®^  
The commission rece iv ed  in s tr u c tio n s  to  tr e a t  the French note in  a 
" d ila to ry  m a n n e r . B y  the middle o f  November, Germany had assumed 
complete c o n tr o l over th e ad m in istration  o f  A lsace and Lorraine. I t  
began an exp u lsion  p o lic y  o f  un d esirab le  e lem en ts, and by December over 
fo r ty -o n e  tra in lo a d s  o f  deportees were shipped to  unoccupied France. 83
The French made repeated p r o te s ts  to  th e  commission over th is  a c t io n , 
but they were met with stubborn s i le n c e  by the commission.
A r tic le  3 o f  the a rm istice  provided fo r  the even tu al return  o f  
the French government to  P a r is . Through the summer, th e  Vichy regime 
rep ea ted ly  expressed th e  d e s ir e  to  see  t h is  c la u se  f u l f i l l e d .  The 
A rm istice Commission rep eated ly  responded th a t w h ile  in  p r in c ip le  Ger­
many had no o b jec tio n s  to  the French government returning to  P a r is , such 
a c tio n  could  not be in i t ia t e d  through th e  commission, fo r  i t  lacked  th e  
te c h n ic a l orders to  au th orise  such an a c t . 8^
The commission made i t  c le a r  th a t i t  had on ly  the a u th o r ity  to  
d isc u ss  q u estion s in v o lv in g  the r e la t io n s  between Germany and Vichy 
France. However, i t s  au th o r ity  was soon subordinated as France and 
Germany found o th er  avenues to  approach each o th er  in  the p o l i t i c a l  
f i e l d .  By e a r ly  J u ly , the French m in ister  o f  in t e r io r  had e s ta b lish e d  
co n ta cts  w ith  the German m ilita r y  command in  occupied France. On July
®̂ -By the middle o f  Ju ly , a German c i v i l  ad m in istra tion  was 
introduced in  A lsace and L orraine, On July 2k,  they were included  in  
the German custom union.
8 2 D.Q .F.P. t D, X, U99.
8 3 D.F«0»AaA. ,  I I ,  35U.
% b id . , I ,  108-09.
27 , r ep resen ta tiv e s  o f  the French m in istry  o f  in t e r io r  and German secur­
i t y  p o lic e  in  France met a t  P aris and formed a l i a i s o n  between th e  German 
occupation  aone and Vichy F r a n c e , T h i s  l ia i s o n  was to  be performed by 
Otto Abeta, who s in ce  Ju ly  3 had attach ed  h im se lf to  the m ilita r y  oc­
cupation  commander o f  P aris as a rep resen ta tiv e  o f  th e German fo re ig n  
m in istry ,
Abeta had always attem pted to  e s ta b lish  p o l i t i c a l  co n ta cts  w ith  
the Vichy government. The Vichy regime proved r e c e p tiv e , fo r  i t  had fo r  
some time attem pted to  e s ta b lis h  o th er  means o f  p o l i t i c a l  con ta ct w ith  
Germany, than th a t provided by the A rm istice Commission, At the end o f  
Ju ly , Abetz was r e c a lle d  to  Germany, where the t i t l e  o f  ambassador in  
Franee was conferred to  him. He was placed  in  a curious p o s it io n  s in ce  
Franee and Germany were s t i l l  t e c h n ic a lly  a t  war, a s i tu a t io n  which pre­
cluded any d ir e c t  exchange o f  d ip lom atic a g en ts . N ev er th e less , Abetz 
was to  bear
th e  s o le  r e s p o n s ib il ity  fo r  d ea lin g  w ith  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  ques­
t io n s  in  occupied and unoccupied France. In so fa r  as h is  
fu n ctio n s a f f e c t  m ilita r y  in t e r e s t s ,  Ambassador Abetz w i l l  
a c t  in  conju nction  with the m ilita r y  commander in  France.
From th is  p o in t , the A rm istice Commission d id  not concern i t s e l f  w ith
p o l i t i c a l  m atters, o th er than in  in sta n ces  ©f d e c is io n s  in  m ilita r y
m atters a f fe c t in g  th e p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere between Germany and Franee.
As p o l i t i c a l  q u estion s assumed more importance in  the f a l l  o f
8 & .G .F .P . ,  D, I ,  3li2.
®^Abetz, O tto , 1903-195>8. German propagandist and o f f i c i a l .  
Appointed (August, 19^0) ambassador to  Vichy and h igh  commissioner o f  
occupied Franee.
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19ii0, A betz1 s  o f f i c e  was fa r th er  strengthened , l i s  o f f ic e  was g iven  the  
d esig n a tio n  "German Embassy in  P a r is ,"  and i t  was assign ed  to  keep in  
con stan t touch with th e  Vichy regim e . 8 8
Abetz, a proud and va in  man, m s  q u ite  je a lo u s  o f  h is  new-found 
p o s it io n  and he c o n tin u a lly  attem pted to  co n so lid a te  h is  own p o s it io n  
w ith resp ec t to  competing a g e n c ie s , one o f  which was th e  A rm istice Com­
m issio n . Whan Laval was d ism issed  from the Vichy government on December 
1 3 , Abetz attem pted to  r e in s ta te  him. He took t h is  a c tio n  on h is  own 
i n i t i a t i v e  fo r  he feared  th a t w ithout Laval th e  channel from th e  Armis­
t i c e  Commission to  Vichy would be reopened and th ere fo re  weaken h is  own
p o s it io n .
8 8 I b id . . D, XL, 638.
^H ubert C ole, L aval, a Biography (lew  Yorks 19 6 3 ), 159.
Chapter IV. January - December, 19U1
Soon a f t e r  the d ism issa l o f  Laval from th e  Vichy government, 
Flandin^ assumed the key p o s it io n s  o f  v ice-p rem ier  and m in ister  o f  
fo r e ig n  a f f a i r s .  He attem pted to  r e ta in  some t i e s  between Franee and 
Germany, but the Germans were su sp ic io u s  and approached France w ith  
ca u tio n . This a t t itu d e  d id  not mean th a t a l l  r e la t io n s  were broken, 
fo r  the problems o f  the occupation  were d iscu ssed  d a ily  in  the A rm istice  
Commission as w e ll as on a lo c a l  l e v e l  through the German m ilita r y  gov­
ernment and the German embassy in  P a r is . At Wiesbaden, th e A rm istice  
Commission continued to  d isc u ss  the s i z e ,  o rg a n iza tio n , and armament o f  
the French armed fo r c es  a t  home and o v erseas. But th ere was a n o t ic e ­
ab le  change in  the tone o f  th ese  d iscu ssio n s  fo r  th e Germans assumed a
w ait-an d -see  a t t itu d e . H it le r  d id  not intend to  be made a fo o l  by the
ou n se ttled  p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n  in  France.
The Germans were very  troub led  in  the ea r ly  months o f  191*1 over 
t h e ir  p o s it io n  in  the M editerranean. By th e  middle o f  January, th e  
B r it ish  had con so lid a ted  th e ir  p o s it io n  in  the Middle East and North 
A fr ica , la r g e ly  a t  th e expense o f the I t a l ia n s .  The B r it ish  navy had 
scored im pressive v ic t o r ie s ,  and the I ta l ia n  army a ls o  had rece iv ed  a 
s e r ie s  o f  h u m ilia tin g  d e fe a ts  in  A fr ica . On January 20, H it le r  concluded  
th a t G ib ra lter  was th e  key to  su ccess in  th e M editerranean. He reasoned
•4?landin, P ierre , 1889-1958. French statesm an and p o l i t i c ia n .  
Premier o f  France (193U-35); m in ister  o f  fo re ig n  a f f a ir s  (1936j 191*0-2*1 
in  Vichy regim e).
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th a t w ith  i t  the Germans could e s ta b lis h  a fo o th o ld  in  North A fr ica  and 
"thus put an end to  Weygand“s b la ck m a il.u3
On February 8 , th e  A rm istice Commission rece ived  a s e r ie s  o f  
d ir e c t iv e s  from th e  OKW. These orders s ta te d  th a t the Laval c r i s i s  o f  
December 13 had destroyed  a l l  hope o f  c o lla b o r a tio n  between Germany and 
Franee, and th a t th e  reestab lishm en t o f  con gen ia l t i e s  had to  be in i t ia t e d  
by Franee. U n til  such occurred, th e  a rm istice  terms were to  be th e so le  
foundation o f German-French r e la t io n s ,  although th e  con cession s in  the  
a rm istice  already g iven  were to  remain in  f o r c e T h e  d ir e c t iv e s  s o l id ­
i f i e d  the commission’ s p o lic y  in to  a harsh p o s it io n , and covered a l l  
a sp eets  o f  i t s  r e s p o n s ib il ity  except fo r  th e  French navy. No mention 
o f  th e navy was made throughout th e  len gth y  rep ort, although i t  im plied  
th a t the s t r i c t  s a i l in g  ban on th e main French f l e e t  a t  Toulon was to  
remain in  fo r c e .
From th e  beginning o f February, Barlan^ began s o l i c i t in g  c o lla b o r ­
a tio n  w ith  Germany, a co lla b o r a tio n  th a t went fa r  beyond th e terms o f  
th e a r m is tic e .^  The French appeasement attem pts soon became evident 
even in  th e a c t iv i t y  o f  the French d e leg a tio n  a t  Wiesbaden where a t  th e
% .GaA»<, 71 , 9k2-k3o This was in  referen ce  to  Whygand's c o o l  
a tt itu d e  toward any form o f  c o lla b o r a tio n  o th er  than what was provided  
by a s t r i c t  in te r p r e ta tio n  o f  the a r m is tic e . Weygand was by now th e  
commander o f  the French North A frican  army.
^Memorandum o f  P o l i t i c a l  D iv is io n , February l i t .  DoG0F»P0 <, D, X II, 
9 8 - 9 9  passim .
^In ea r ly  February, Darlan assumed th e fu n ctio n s in  Viehy o f  v ic e -  
prem ier, m in ister  fo r  fo r e ig n  a f f a ir s ,  m in ister  o f  navy, and m in ister  o f  
th e  in t e r io r .
^Foreign E ola tion s o f  U .S .; D iplom atic Papers, Annual Report,
I I ,  1927 H ereafter c i t e d  as Foreign B ela tio n s o f  U .S.
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end o f  A p r il, i t  agreed to  provide Rommel's A frika Korps^ w ith  su p p lie s . 
This German fo r c e  was in  desp erate  need o f  p ro v is io n s  because o f  the  
precarious p o s it io n  o f  the A xis supply l in e s  in  th e M editerranean.
The p r in c ip a l reason fo r  th e  German p o lic y  change toward France 
was not because o f  th e  French a t t i tu d e , although i t  no doubt prepared  
th e  way fo r  what fo llow ed . The immediate reason fo r  the change was due 
to  d istu rb ances in  th e  Middle E ast.
O
Toward the end o f  March, Rasid A li a l-G aylan i le d  a r e v o lt  
a g a in st th e p r o -B r itish  regent in  Iraq . Rasid A l i ,  w ith  the support o f  
a group o f Iraq ian  generals known as the “golden square," qu iek ly  became 
a fa c to r  the A xis hoped to  e x p lo it .  He appealed fo r  German a id , and i t  
was forthcom ing on a lim ite d  s c a le .  This a c tio n  t ie d  in  with some un­
o f f i c i a l  ta lk  o f  coord in atin g  German p en etra tio n  in  the Middle East w ith  
th e  p o s s ib le  a tta ck  on R ussia . German support fo r  the Iraqian r e b e ls ,  
w ith Rommel's fo rce  on th e  w estern Egyptian border, would provide the  
southern p o rtio n  o f  th e  grand p in cer  th a t would squeeze the B r it is h  out 
o f  the Middle E ast.^
^Rommel, Erwin, l891-19U i. German general? commander o f  German 
fo r c es  in  A fr ica  (19JU.X—1*3) I h e ld  defense p o sts  in  w estern Europe a t  time 
o f  A llie d  in v a sio n  o f  Normandy (June, 19l*U) .
In  view  o f  th e  c r i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n  o f  th e  I ta l ia n s  in  A fr ica , 
Rommel, on February 6 , 191*1, was ordered to  prepare th e ground fo r  the  
sending o f  two German d iv is io n s —one l ig h t  and one panzer—to  Libya. 
Rommel was to  command th is  fo r c e , which became known as th e  A frika Korps. 
He was i n i t i a l l y  subordinate to  Marshal G razian i, the I t a l ia n  commander 
in  A fr ica . German troops began to  en ter  the scene by the m iddle o f  
February and by A p ril the co n stra c tio n  o f  th is  fo rce  was com pleted.
8 Rasid A li a l-G a y la n i. Iraq m in ister  p resid en t (A p ril-Ju ne,
191*1); subsequently in  e x i le  in  Iran .
^Warlimont, In s id e  H it le r 's  Headquarters, 132.
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To provide th e Iraqian r eb e ls  w ith  a id , Germany had to  acquire  
the r ig h t o f  t r a n s it  through th e French mandate o f S y r ia , fo r  Vichy ap­
proval was necessary  fo r  the use o f  the Syrian a ir f i e ld s  by Germanya 
Therefore, the Germans became recep tiv e  to  high le v e l  p o l i t i c a l  nego­
t ia t io n s  w ith th e  French. Agreements were signed  on May $ and 6  which 
gave Germany the r ig h t to  u t i l i z e  Syrian a ir f i e ld s  fo r  r e - fu e lin g  pur­
p o ses . Furthermore, Germany could demand the French surrender o f some 
war m a ter ie l s to c k -p ile d  in  th e French mandate fo r  tr a n s fe r  to  the 
Iraq ian  rebels.^®
Darlan was not s a t i s f i e d  w ith th e se  lim ite d  agreements fo r  he
wanted th e n e g o tia t io n s  to  mature more f u l l y .  Developments in  th e  Middle
East made such ta lk s  p o s s ib le , fo r  B rita in " s p o s it io n  was becoming more
and more p reca r io u s. Rommel’s Afrika Korps had driven  to  the edge o f
Egypt, and B r ita in ’ s p r e s t ig e  had stiffened considerab ly  from the Greek
campaign and i t s  evacuation  o f  C r e te .^  Darlan concluded th a t th e  only
course fo r  France to  fo llo w  was c lo s e r  co lla b o ra tio n  w ith Germany, fo r
12i t  appeared th a t the l a t t e r  was soon to  win the war.
Soon a f t e r  the agreement o f  May 6 , Darlan was in v ite d  to  see  
H it le r  in  Germany, but th e only s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  m eeting was to  pro­
v id e  a foundation fo r  fu rth er  t a lk s .  New n e g o tia t io n s  were imm ediately
1 0 D.G .F.P.o D, X II, 7 ll0-iil passim .
^O n October 2k,  19^0, I ta ly  invaded Albania and G reece. The 
I ta l ia n s  soon ran in to  s t i f f  Greek r e s is ta n c e . B r ita in  sen t array u n its  
in to  G reece. Germany came to  the a s s is ta n c e  o f  the I t a l ia n s ,  and 
q u ick ly  overran the Greek and B r it is h  d e fen ses . Soon a f t e r ,  Germany 
invaded Crete and d e sp ite  a brave B r it is h  r e s is ta n c e  i t  occupied  the  
is la n d .
12Report o f A betz, May 5 . D.Q.F.P. ,  D, X II, 720.
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undertaken in  P a r is . During th e s e , the a c t iv i t y  o f  th e  A rm istice Com­
m ission  was reduced to  d isc u ss in g  on ly  minor d e t a i l s  o f  th e  German 
occupation  in  m etropolitan  F r a n c e T h e  n e g o tia t io n s  r e su lte d , on May 
28, in  the P aris p ro to co l which was d iv id ed  in to  th ree  s e c t io n s , each 
d ea lin g  w ith  a separate segment o f  the French empire. The f i r s t  part 
confirmed th e e a r l ie r  agreement on S yria . The second s e c t io n  allow ed  
the Germans to  use the port o f  B izer te  to  unload su p p lie s  fo r  German 
troops in  A fr ica . The French fu rth er  agreed to  r e le a se  s p e c if ie d  amounts 
o f  war m a ter ie l in  North A fr ica  to  the A frika Korps. In compensation, 
lim ite d  con cession s were granted to  the French North A frican  armed fo r c e s .  
The th ir d  part o f  th e  p ro to co l was concerned w ith  West A fr ica  where Ger­
man submarines were to  operate from Dakar, and in  return  France was 
allow ed to  b o ls te r  th e land d efen ses o f  West A fr ica .
The th ir d  s e c t io n  o f  th e p ro to co l was t ie d  to  a complementary 
p ro to co l. I t  s ta te d  th a t th e  use o f  Dakar by th e  German navy produced 
th e  danger o f  a strong B r it is h  r ea c tio n , and th ere fo re  th e terms could  
not be implemented u n t i l  adequate reinforcem ents were sen t to  West 
A fr ica . Furthermore, th e  complementary p ro to co l s ta te d  th a t Germany 
was to  provide France w ith a s e r ie s  o f  economic and p o l i t i c a l  conces­
s io n s  which were to j u s t i f y  the French government’s s ig n in g  o f  the main 
p r o t o c o l .^
The complementary p ro to co l was an escape c la u se  fo r  th e  French.
The Yichy regime adopted the view  th a t any compliance w ith the m ilita r y  
terms o f  th e  main p ro to co l was to  be preceded by German p o l i t i c a l  and
13D.F.C.A.A. .  IV, h$l*
^ P a r is  p ro to co l. D .G .F.P. ,  D, X II, 892-900 passim .
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economic co n cess io n s . Germany, on the oth er hand, in s is t e d  th a t the 
m ilita r y  terms were to  be tr e a ted  com pletely  sep arate  from th e  con sid er­
a tio n  o f p o l i t i c a l  and economic co n cess io n s .
As seen above, B er lin  and Vichy were p o le s  apart in  th e ir  in te r ­
p re ta tio n  o f  the Baris p r o to c o l. These d ivergen t view s were to lead  to  
long  and heated d is c u s s io n s , many o f  which were channeled through the  
A rm istice Commission.
Soon a f t e r  th e  s ig n in g  o f  the P aris p r o to c o l, Germany's r e la t io n s  
w ith France underwent e x te n s iv e  change, and th is  was caused by two ex­
te r n a l even ts . On June 8 , B r it ish  and Free French fo r c es  a ttack ed  Syria .
1*5The Vichy fo r c e s , le d  by General Dent®,  ̂ put up an en erg etic  d efen se , 
but th e French Levant army and navy were too  ill-e q u ip p e d  and weak to  
support any prolonged d e fen se . Although the German A rm istice Commission, 
did  o f f e r  some a s s is ta n c e  i t  came too la t e  to  be o f  any v a lu e . There­
fo r e , on Ju ly  l i t ,  Dentz signed  the a rm istice  o f S a in t Jean-d'Acre w ith  
B r ita in . By i t s  term s, Syria  and Lebanon were occupied by the "Allies'® 
and a l l  French m a ter ie l and in s ta l la t io n s  were tra n sferred  to  th e  
B r i t i s h .^  The most important event a f f e c t in g  German-French r e la t io n s ,  
however, was the German in v a sio n  of R ussia (O peration B arbarossa).
Through the ea r ly  part o f  June, Germany was preoccupied w ith  i t s  prepar­
a tio n s  fo r  O peration Barbarossa. This preoccupation was e s p e c ia l ly  f e l t  
in  the A rm istice Commission where, in  th e week fo llo w in g  th e German 
in v a sio n  o f  R ussia , nothing o f  s ig n if ic a n c e  was d isc u sse d . The Russian
^ D en tz , H enri. High commissioner in  Syria  and Lebanon, and 
com m ander-in-ehief o f  French fo r c es  in  the Levant to  J u ly , 191*1.
■^Text o f  S a in t Jean-d'Acre accord. D.F.C.A.A. .  IV, 627-29 passim .
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a f f a ir  “dominated a l l  th e a c t iv i t y  ©f the Reichj i t  . . .  . e c lip se d  the  
a f f a ir  ©f Syria  and perhaps even the famous p r o je c t o f  th e a tta ck  on the  
SU©2S„“17
Bp to  t h is  tim e, th e German a c tio n  in  North A fr ica  and in  th e  
Balkans had been d irec ted  e s s e n t ia l ly  a g a in st B r ita in - Now th ese  oper­
a tio n s  were com pletely  overshadowed by the Russian campaign, an! conse­
qu en tly  a l l  German a c t iv i t y  in  the M editerranean was p laced  on the
1 A
d efen s iv e - H it le r  reasoned th a t a l l  Russian r e s is ta n c e  would be 
smashed w ith in  a few months, and then Germany would be ab le to  turn i t s  
a tte n t io n  again  to  the Middle East- He f e l t  th a t once Russia was de­
fe a te d  th e  B r it ish  p o s it io n  in  th e  M editerranean could  be a ssa u lte d  by 
a two-pronged a tta ck  from Libya through Egypt, and from Bulgaria through 
T u r k e y - H i t l e r  contem plated a la rg e  s c a le  o f fe n s iv e  in  North A fr ica  
in  th e  autumn o f 191*1, w ith the u ltim a te  o b je c t iv e  o f  crush ing a l l  B r it­
ish  r e s is ta n c e -
Ry th e  end o f August, H it le r  reasoned th a t France was to  b® sub­
ordinated  to  a secondary p o s it io n  u n t i l  a l l  Russian r e s is ta n c e  was
2 0crashed. Furthermore, he began to  regard the French w ith  d is tr u s t -  
T herefore, th e  German campaign in  R ussia broadened the s c a le  o f  the war 
and produced a gradual decrease in  th e importance o f  France- The Ger­
mans began to  regard France s o le ly  in  terms o f  how much could be ex­
tr a c te d  from i t  fo r  the German war e f f o r t -
17B.F.C.A.A. .  17 , 551*-
l8 ¥arlim on t, In sid e  H itler" s  Headquarters, 129-
^ H i t l e r ' s  d ir e c t iv e  no . 32- Ib id - , 132-
20Conversation between H it le r  and M u sso lin i, August 25, 19ltl- 
D-G.FoP.-  D, X III, 386-
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The German su sp ic io n  o f  French d u p lic ity , in  e a r ly  19U1, was 
ev id en t in  th e A rm istice Commossion's co n sid era tio n  o f th e French navy* 
While th e  co n cession s already granted to  th e  French were m aintained, th e  
commission gave no fa r th er  naval grants to  the French* In  th e  ea r ly  
months o f  1 9 ltl, th ere  was the p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t the p o l i t i c a l  s itu a t io n  
in  France would n e c e s s ita te  German in terv en tio n  in  th e  unoccupied zone* 
I f  such a c tio n  occurred, the Germans wanted the assurance th a t th e  
French f l e e t  a t  Toulon would not be able to  escape* On January 9 ,
H it le r  s ta te d  “i f  France became troublesom e she w i l l  be crushed com­
p le t e ly .  Under no circum stances must th e French f l e e t  be allow ed to
PIg e t away from usj i t  must e ith e r  be captured or d estroyed . 11
More important than the p o s s ib le  capture o f  th e  French f l e e t  was 
th e German hope o f  e je c t in g  th e B r it is h  from th e M editerranean. In  t h is  
scheme, the French f l e e t  was ignored o th er  than what i t  could provide  
fo r  the p r o te c tio n  o f  the French empire. T herefore, the A rm istice  Com­
m ission  took l i t t l e  in t e r e s t  in  the French navy, although i t  was c lo s e ly  
watched by German co n tro l com m issions. This same su p erv isio n  was ex­
tended to  the French naval in d u s tr ie s ,  and the commission made i t  c le a r
th a t i t s  approval was n ecessary  fo r  a l l  manufacturing o f  naval equip-
22ment,
Vogl sen t a l e t t e r  to  Doyen, on A p ril 9 , in  which he explained  
th a t Germany and I t a ly  had ju s t  p rev io u sly  concluded an agreement fo r
^ F u eh rer  Naval C onferences, I ,  3°
2 2 D.F.C.A.A. ,  IV, 168-69 passim .
69
th e c o n tro l o f  French marine t r a f f i c  in  the M editerranean l i t t o r a l .
Germany was to  co n tro l a l l  t r a f f i c  from the Pyrenees f r o n t ie r  to  th e
mouth o f  the RhSne. M a rse ille  was governed by a mixed G erm an-Italian
commission. An I ta l ia n  co n tro l commission assumed r e s p o n s ib il ity  fo r
23
t r a f f i c  co n tro l from the RhSne to  the F ren ch -Ita lia n  border.
From now u n t i l  th e end o f  191*1? the A rm istice Commission alm ost 
com pletely  ignored the French navy, fo r  the German p o lic y  was to  exclude  
i t  from any con cession s granted to  V ichy,
I I
As in  naval m atters, th e A rm istice Commission d id  n o t d e lib er a te  
to  any great ex ten t on th e  French a ir  fo rce  through 191*1. By th e end 
o f  191*0, th e  major q u estion s on th e fu tu re  o f  th e French a ir  fo rce  were 
answered, although the Freneh s t i l l  made repeated req uests fo r  the ex­
pansion o f  t h e ir  m etropolitan  a ir  d e fe n se s . The A rm istice Commission 
referred  the req u ests to  the OKW, and i t  im m ediately rece iv ed  in stru c ­
t io n s  to  deny them. The OKW did  not consid er  the danger of B r it ish  
a tta ck s  as s u f f ic ie n t  to  warrant any in crease  in  the French a ir  fo r c e . 
The commission was a lso  in stru cted  to  step  up the p rocess o f  shipping
French a ir c r a f t  m ater ie l to  Germany and to  continue i t s  search fo r
2iim a ter ie l th e  French had hidden.
Through the w in ter and spring o f  191*1, the French a ir  fo r c e  was
23 j,e tter  Vogl to  Doyen, A p ril 9° Ib id . , IV, 300-02 . General 
Paul Doyen was French general and chairman o f  French d e le g a tio n  a t  
Wiesbaden from September 19l*0 to  Ju ly  191*1. He la t e r  commanded Freneh 
fo r c e s  a g a in st Axis in  sou th eastern  France, 191*1*. General Vogl was 
German general and p resid en t o f  the A rm istice Commission from February 
191*1 to  December 191*2.
\ f . C . U 8 III, 1*53-51*.
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n ot d iscu ssed  by the commission. I t  regarded th e  con cession s a lread y
granted to  th e French as s u f f i c ie n t  fo r  th e a ir  d efen se  o f  France.
The P aris p ro toco l in jec te d  a new co n d itio n  to  be considered  by
th e commission, fo r  i t  provided Germany w ith  the r ig h t to  u t i l i z e  th e
a ir  f a c i l i t i e s  in  S y r ia . On June 11, the commission pressured the French
government in to  a llow in g  the L uftw affe to  land in  Syria  and u se  Freneh
2 ?f u e l  sto ck s in  the area . v The French agreed in  p r in c ip le  to  th e demand,
but they attem pted to  l im it  the volume o f German a ir  t r a f f i c  to  S yr ia .
They complained th a t to  a s s i s t  the Luftwaffe would provide B r ita in  w ith
the exeuse to  take m ilita r y  a c tio n  a g a in st F ran ce .2^
In 19^1> the A rm istice Commission refu sed  to  r e le a se  any more
Freneh a ir c r a f t  to  the French empire. N everth eless  by November, th e
French had accumulated in  A frica  e ig h t p u rsu it groups ( group -  fou rteen
p la n e s ) , f iv e  reconnaissance groups, th ir te e n  bomber groups, and two
tran sp ort groups? making a t o t a l  o f  tw en ty -e ig h t groups w ith  1*00 p la n es .
The Freneh navy had a t o t a l  o f  seventeen  groups w ith  more than 100 
27p la n es .
I l l
At the beginning o f  X9Ul> th e A rm istice Commission allow ed the
French to  organize a n a tio n a l guard u n it .  Soon a f t e r ,  th e commission
assumed an uncompromising a t t itu d e  and through th e r e s t  o f  the year i t
28denied a l l  Freneh req u ests fo r  expansion o f  the m etropolitan  army.
2 * Ib id . ,  IV. 51*3-
2 6 Ibdd.
2 F̂rance During th e O ccupation, I I ,  766-67.
2 8 D.F.C.A.A. ,  I l l ,  382.
I t  in s is te d  th a t the French army in  the fr e e  zone be kept a t  a minimum.
In January, the A rm istice Commission showed a con sid erab le  in te r ­
e s t  in  the Freneh s to e k -p i le s  o f  war m a te r ie l. On January 13, the  
commission assumed the r ig h t  to  d e leg a te  th e  fu tu re  use o f a l l  m ilita r y  
su p p lie s  found in  the occupied zone, and th is  amount was to  be d e te r ­
mined by the needs o f th e German war e f f o r t . ^
The commission n ext turned i t s  a tte n t io n  to  th e French sto ek -  
p i le s  in  the fr e e  zone. The Germans were e s p e c ia l ly  in te r e s te d  in  
acquirin g 75mm cannons and chem ical products. The commission requested  
th a t France re lea se  t h i s  m ater ie l but the Freneh handled the German 
proposals in  a d ila to r y  manner. ^ 0  Nothing fa r th e r  was d iscu ssed  on the  
su b jec t u n t i l  October when the commission concluded a se c r e t  agreement 
w ith  France in  which the la t t e r  re lea sed  c e r ta in  moveable m a ter ie l from 
the s to e k -p i le s .
By I 9 I4I ,  th e A rm istice Commission had sen t a la rg e  number o f  
co n tro l commissions in to  th e fr e e  zone. The French a tt itu d e  toward the  
co n tro l commissions was one o f  to le r a t io n . The commissions could not 
be ignored , but a l l  the same th e  French o ffer ed  them l i t t l e  h o s p it a l i t y .  
This a t t itu d e  com pelled S tu elp n agel to  warn the French d e le g a tio n  th a t  
i f  th ese  in c id en ts  a g a in st th e  commissions continued Germany was going  
to  i n i t i a t e  grave r e p r is a ls ,  and he demanded th a t the French o b stru ctio n  
t a c t ic s  be stopped. F in a lly , he in s is te d  on c la r i fy in g  c e r ta in  "ques­
t io n s  o f  p r in c ip le ."  F ir s t ,  th e co n tro l commissions had the r ig h t to
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en ter a l l  French m ilita r y  in s t a l la t io n s ,  and secon d ly , th e members o f  
the commissions enjoyed e x tr a te r r ito r ia l  r i g h t s .^
These co n tro l commissions had ev o lv ed , by A p r il, in to  something 
q u ite  d if fe r e n t  than o r ig in a l ly  contem plated by the French. They im­
posed a s t r i c t  su p erv ision  over a l l  French m ilita r y  a c t iv i t y  in  France, 
and th ey  r e f le c te d  the German p o lic y  o f  demanding th a t th e French 
s t r i c t l y  comply w ith  the a rm istice  terms in  m etrop olitan  France. ESy
33A p r il, over th ir t y  co n tro l commissions were operating  in  the fr e e  zone. 
From now u n t i l  th e end o f  191*1, the A rm istice Commission's a t te n t io n  was 
d is tr a c te d  by developments in  the French empire, and th erefo re  d is r e ­
garded th ese  com m issions.
At th e beginning o f  191*1, German and I t a l ia n  co n tro ls  in  French 
A frica  were lim ite d  to  two c iv i l ia n  d e leg a tes  o f  th e A rm istice Commission 
a t  Casablanca, and a lim ite d  number o f I ta l ia n  co n tro l personnel in  North 
A fr ica . The French p laced  f a ir ly  s t r i c t  l im ita t io n s  on the a c t iv i t y  o f  
th ese  co n tro l com m issions, and wherever th ey  went a French o f f i c i a l  ac­
companied them. The French e s p e c ia lly  held  th e  I t a l ia n  d e leg a tes  in  
high contempt, and Weygand c o n tin u a lly  referred  to  them as th ose  from 
"that execrab le  n a tio n . "31*
-^ D.F.Q.A.A. , I? , 125-29 passim . E x tr a te r r ito r ia l r ig h ts  i s  the  
p a r t ia l  s e t t in g  a s id e  o f  th e  dom estic ju r is d ic t io n  o f  a s ta te  in  favor  
o f  fo r e ig n  c i t iz e n s  and p ro p er tie s  found in  the t e r r ito r y  o f  th is  s t a t e .  
In oth er words, based on custom and/or t r e a t i e s ,  c e r ta in  in d iv id u a ls  or 
p ro p er tie s  are regarded as being beyond th e  ju r is d ic t io n  o f  th e s ta te  
in  whose te r r ito r y  they happen to  be lo c a te d .
33lb id . , IV, 198.
3^M inister in  Portugal to  U .S . Secretary  o f  S ta te , January, 191*1. 
Foreign R elations o f  U .S . 9 191*1, I I ,  209.
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This s ta te  o f  a f f a ir s  was in to le r a b le , fo r  Germany f e l t  th a t  
a c tio n  had to  be taken to  block th e  B r it ish  attem pts to  co n so lid a te  
th e ir  p o s it io n  in  th e Mediterranean® The f i r s t  step  was to  guarantee 
th e continued tr a n q u ility  o f  the French p o s se s s io n s , and thus secure  
one fla n k  o f  the A xis p o s it io n  in  the Mediterranean® On January 15>, 
the A rm istice Commission informed the French th a t i t  was in s t a l l in g  a 
m ilita r y  co n tro l commission a t  Casablanca®3^ Stuelpnagel exp lained  
th a t i t  was to  a s s i s t  the I t a l ia n s ,  but he a ls o  im plied th a t the French 
a tt itu d e  in  North A fr ica  was the primary reason fo r  German in ter v e n tio n .  
The French a tt itu d e  o f stubborn r e s is ta n c e  and snobbishness had caused  
con sid erab le  apprehension, and the German co n tro l commission was to  
guarantee the French compliance w ith  th e arm istice® 3^
As already mentioned, by February th e  German p o lic y  toward France 
had become q u ite  harsh and a l l  in te r a c tio n  between the two s ta te s  was 
again  governed by the arm istice® The commission c a r e fu lly  watched th e  
s iz e  and a c t iv i t y  o f  the French North A frican  army fo r  i t  feared  th a t  
th e  m ilita r y  con cession s Germany had granted the Freneh would one day 
be employed a g a in st i t s  a l l i e s ,  and th ere fo re  a lso  a g a in st Germany® By 
t h i s  tim e, the I ta l ia n s  had proved them selves com pletely  unable to  pro­
v id e  fo r  c lo se  su p erv ision  o f  the French empire® In  the l ig h t  o f  t h is  
th e A rm istice Commission arranged fo r  th e  assumption o f  "German m ilita r y  
contro l"  over Morocco„3?
3%*F®G2A*A®, I I I ,  1*1*7®
36Ib id . ,  I l l ,  khB.
3?0KW d ir e c t iv e ,  February 11*, 191*1® D .G .F.P. ,  D, I I I ,  98-99 .
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E|7  the end o f March, th e  German con tro l commission was com fort­
ab ly  e s ta b lish e d  in  Morocco, and c o n s is te d  o f  over 200 personnel under 
th e command o f  General S c h u lth e s is s »3® In the n ext few months, the  
French d e leg a tio n  made repeated  e f fo r t s  to  l im i t  th e scope o f  th e  con­
t r o l  com m ission’s powers, but i t  soon beeame apparent th a t th e  Germans 
were going to  c u r ta il  many o f  the French ‘’i l l e g a l 11 a c t i v i t i e s  o On A pril 
1 8 , General Vogl informed the French government th a t the North A frican  
co n tro l commission had powers id e n t ic a l  to  th ose  in  m etropolitan  
France
As the co n gen ia l r e la t io n s  between Germany and France began to  
wane in  th e summer o f  19Ul> Germany in ser ted  s t r ic t e r  co n tro ls  in  French 
North A fr ic a a German in te r e s t  now centered  on th e estab lishm ent o f  con­
s u la te s  in  North A frica,, The German d e s ire  to  implant co n su la tes  th ere  
was p r im arily  in  response to  th e  expansion o f  U nited S ta te s  co n su la tes  
in  the same area.^® The Vichy regime was subjected  to  steady German 
p ressu re , and i t  f in a l ly  gave in  to  the German demands„ A ccordingly, 
on Ju ly  1? , General Weygand rece iv ed  an order to  a s s i s t  and tr e a t  in  a 
favorab le  fa sh ion  th ese  German m i s s i o n s
In  la t e  summer, th e  French m ilita r y  lea d ers  in  A frica  attem pted  
to  su b jec t the Germans to  th e  same o b stru c tiv e  t a c t ic s  th a t th ey  had
38p.F .C .A .A . 8 IV, 2ii2°
39 ib id »
^OThe expansion o f  U nited S ta te s  co n su la tes  was done to  provide  
an adequate su p erv isio n  o f  th e  im plem entation o f  the Weygand-Murphy 
accord. This agreement provided fo r  an expansion o f  American trade to  
North A fr ic a . The Americans were v ic e -c o n su ls , and the French allow ed  
them l ib e r t i e s  and r ig h ts  which norm ally were reserved  to  dip lom atic  
m issio n s .
^Weygand, Memo i r e s , I I I ,  J*5>1 °
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employed a g a in st the I t a l ia n s .  General Vogl q u ick ly  reacted  to  th ese  
French a c tio n s  by inform ing General Weygand th a t th e a t t itu d e  o f  the 
French s e r v ic e s  toward the German in sp ec tio n  teams was " in to lera b le ."  
Consequently, he was in s tr u c t in g  the co n tro l commission to wear uniform s, 
arm th em selves, and take " a l l  measures o f  s e c u r ity  which they deemed 
n ecessary  because o f  th e  s i tu a t io n  created  by the a t t itu d e  o f th e French
s e r v ic e s ." ^
The Vichy lo s s  o f  E quatorial A fr ica  to  the Free French, in  ea rly  
191+1, pressured th e A rm istice  Commission in to  a llow in g  th e  French North 
A frican army to  expand to  120,000 men.^3 This in crea se  was accom plished  
on ly  by incorporatin g  th e goums or n a tiv e  troops in to  the ranks« In  
fu rth er  d is c u s s io n s , th e  French in s is te d  th a t the n a tiv e  troops were 
m erely a p o l ic e  fo r c e , and th ere fo re  could not be counted as part o f  
the army. By A p r il, Weygand rece iv ed  perm ission  to  fu rth er  in crease  
th e  s i z e  o f  th e c o lo n ia l  army to  127,000 men, which included  16,000  
goums. ̂
Up through A p r il, a major concern o f  the A rm istice  Commission 
was to  ex tra ct m a ter ie l from the French s to c k -p i le s  fo r  the A frika Korps. 
On A p ril 28, Vogl requested  th a t France d e liv e r  c e r ta in  v e h ic le s  to  the  
fr o n t ie r  o f  T rip o litan a  fo r  u se  by the A frika Korps from French sto ck ­
p i l e s  in  North A f r i c a . ^  The French agreed in  p r in c ip le  and promised to  
d e liv e r  a l im ite d  number o f  v e h ic le s .  However, th ey  were not prepared
^ D.F.C.A.A. .  V, 229.
k3 ib id . ,  I l l ,  382.
^ S ta tem en t by Weygand, France During th e Occupation, I I ,  763-61+.
^ D .F .C .A .A . ,  IV, 335-36.
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to  make any la r g e  commitment fo r  th ey  f e l t  th a t such an a c tio n  involved  
p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s ,  and th ere fo re  was o u tsid e  th e a u th o r ity  o f  the French 
d e le g a tio n .
Through May, many is su e s  in v o lv in g  the French c o lo n ie s  were 
n e g o tia ted , but th ese  d iscu ssio n s  were on a p o l i t i c a l  l e v e l  and th e  
A rm istice Commission was not in v o lv ed . The commission®s quiescence on 
French c o lo n ia l a f f a ir s  was m itig a te d , on June 10 , when i t  rece iv ed  in ­
s tr u c tio n s  to  e x p lo it  th e  o b lig a t io n s  th a t France had made to  a s s i s t  
th e German war e f f o r t  (P a r is  p r o to c o l) . The commission was given the 
a u th o r ity  to  n e g o tia te  in  a l l  fu tu re  German demands, and to  guarantee 
the im plem entation o f  the s e r v ic e s  w ith in  the "general framework" o f  
the P aris p ro to co l. In a d d itio n  to  th ese  new d u t ie s ,  the commission 
was to  continue to  su p erv ise  th e "execution o f  the French o b lig a tio n s  
a r is in g  out o f  the A rm istice T rea ty .1' ^
The A rm istice Commission d id  not have th e s o le  p re ro g a tiv e  in  
su p erv isin g  the P aris  p r o to c o l, but had to  share  th e  honor w ith  th e em­
bassy in  P a r is . The two ag en c ies  t r ie d  to  coord in ate  t h e i r  a c t iv i t y  in  
a s e r ie s  o f  conferen ces a t  P a r is . At th ese  m eetings, an attem pt was 
made to  form ulate a b asic  p o lic y  to  p resen t to  the French in  connection  
w ith  th e execu tion  o f  the P aris  p r o to c o l. Their attem pt f a i l e d  because 
o f  the French in s is ta n c e  th a t  th e ir  com pliance w ith  the m ilita r y  o b lig a ­
t io n s  depended upon the German fu lf i l lm e n t  o f  th e  complementary p r o to c o l,
^ D.Q .F.P. ,  X II, 991-92. The in s tr u c tio n s  fh rth er  s ta te d  th a t  
q u estion s a f f e c t in g  I t a l ia n  in t e r e s t s  were to  be d ire c te d  to  the I ta l ia n  
A rm istice Commission. I f  any French wish d ir e c ted  to  the I ta l ia n s  in ­
volved  a German in t e r e s t  the German A rm istice Commission was to  take  
th e  l ib e r t y  to  apply the appropriate measures to  acquire I t a l ia n  agree­
ment.
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which provided fo r  ex ten siv e  German co n cession s in  the p o l i t i c a l  and 
economic f i e l d s .
Soon a f t e r  the P a r is  m eeting, th e OKW sen t fu rth er  in s tr u c tio n s  
to  th e  A rm istice  Commission. I t  s ta te d  th a t th e  German armed fo r c es  
were not in  a p o s it io n  to  s e iz e  the French bases needed by Germany 
( e s p e c ia l ly  Dakar and B iz e r te ) .  Consequently, th e commission was to  
conduct i t s  n e g o tia t io n s  in  such a manner th a t th e a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  the  
bases to  Germany would be assu red . I t  went on to  say th a t th e  conces­
s io n s  o ffer ed  to  the French were to  provide them w ith  the means to  
defend t h e ir  p o sse s s io n s , and t h is  p o lic y  was to be sp e ed ily  implemented 
to  thwart th e B r it ish  and Free French a c t iv i t y  in  the French empire
At th e same tim e, H it le r  issu ed  d ir e c t iv e  no. 32 , which d e a lt  
w ith  th e  Middle E a st. I t  provided fo r  a f u l l - s c a l e  a tta ck  on the 
B r it ish  in  Egypt in  th e  autumn o f  1 9 1 * 1 . The d ir e c t iv e  showed th a t  
th e prev iou s in s tr u c tio n s  to  th e A rm istice Commission were designed to  
m aintain the s ta tu s  quo in  the M editerranean u n t i l  the Russian campaign 
was concluded.
im m ediately a f t e r  r e c e iv in g  the above in s tr u c t io n s , the commis­
s io n  granted a s e r ie s  o f  important r e le a s e s  to  the French c o lo n ia l  army. 
I t  lib e r a te d  from p rison er-o f-w ar  camps 961 o f f ic e r s  (in c lu d in g  General 
J u in ^ ) ,  3>200 non-commissioned o f f i c e r s ,  and 2 ,686 s p e c ia l i s t s ,  and 
th e se  personnel were to  be sen t d ir e c t ly  to  North A fr ic a . I t  a ls o
^ D .G .F .F . ,  X II, 1033-31*.
l*®Warlimont, In s id e  H it le r 's  Headquarters, 132.
k 9 ju in , Alphonse. Commander o f French fo r c es  in  Morocco from 
August 191*1; com m ander-in-chief o f  French fo r c es  in  North A fr ica  
(November 19l* l).
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authorized  France to  tran sport 8 ,000 personnel from th e m etropolitan  
array to  North A fr ica . F in a lly , t h i s  expansion was accompanied by a
tjO
p rop ortion a l in crea se  in  arms, m unitions, and equipment. At th is
tim e, the French demands fo r  more equipment and personnel in  i t s  empire
eft
were gen era lly  agreed to  by the Germans.
This generous German a tt itu d e  d id  n o t l a s t  lo n g , fo r  th e  Germans 
expected immediate and sp ectacu lar  r e s u lt s  from the French in  the de­
fe n se  o f  th e ir  empire by th e ir  t o t a l  acceptance o f  th e  P a r is  p r o to c o l. 
J u st th e op p o site  occurred, fo r  th e  French p o s it io n  in  S yr ia  soon be­
came u n ten ab le . They hedged and imposed a v a r ie ty  o f  co n d itio n s  in  
t h e ir  com pliance to  th e  P aris  p r o to c o l. F in a lly , th e a t t itu d e  o f  the  
French army commanders in  A fr ica  hindered the a p p lic a tio n  o f  a,broad  
co lla b o r a tio n , and t h i s  l a s t  fa c to r  worried th e  Germans the m ost. As a 
r e s u l t ,  on June 20, the A rm istice Commission sen t a b i t t e r  com plaint to  
th e  French government, which s ta te d  th a t i t s  work in  North A fr ica  was 
being hamstrung by t h i s  French a tt itu d e
By th e  end o f  Ju ly , te n s io n s  began to  mount between Germany and 
France. In the A rm istice Commission, Fogl complained th a t France was 
not complying with th e Paris p r o to c o l, and th a t Fram e was subordinating  
th e  p r a c t ic a l r e a liz a t io n  o f  the agreement to  a v a r ie ty  o f  unnecessary  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s . The German c o n c ilia to r y  a t t itu d e  was a t  an 
end, and from now on i t  was to  have reserv a tio n s  toward any fu tu re  French
foDoF.C.AoAoo IF , W it.
-^■Statement by General R evers. France During th e Occupation, I I ,  
757. Of. Statement by General Weygand, I b id . ,  7&k°
^ C onsu l general C ole a t  A lg iers  to  U .S. S ecretary  o f  S ta te .  
Foreign R elations o f  TJ,s». I 9 k l ,  I I ,  385.
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r eq u e sts . These reserv a tio n s  concerned th e  p o s it io n  o f  the French North 
A friean  array, fo r  i f  France wanted to  b u ild  up t h is  fo rce  i t  had to  re ­
gain  th e confid en ce o f  th e OKW. This cou ld  be done on ly  by complying 
w ith the Paris p ro to co l terms concerned w ith T u n isia , and th e supplying  
o f  Rommel1 s A frika K o rp s .^
The German a tt itu d e  toward France had undergone a d r a s tic  change 
by August. There were no fu rth er  attem pts to  appease th e  French, and ,, 
a l l  g estu res o f  g en ero sity  were dropped. Through August, the A rm istice  
Commission focused  i t s  a tte n t io n  on North A fr ic a , fo r  the s i tu a t io n  o f  
th e French North A frican  army a ls o  d istu rb ed  the Germans. They were 
su sp ic io u s  o f  the s t a b i l i t y  o f  the French tro o p s , and th e commission 
reacted  to  t h i s  ob servation  by strengthen in g the co n tro l commissions 
t h e r e .^
The n e g o tia t io n s , a t  Wiesbaden, concerned w ith  the im plem entation  
o f  the P aris p ro to co l were, fo r  a l l  p r a c t ic a l  purposes, com pletely  su s­
pended u n t i l  th e  end o f  September. On October 7, General F o g l, in  a 
l e t t e r  to  General B e y n e t ,^  expressed th e d e s ir e  to  re-open n e g o tia t io n s  
on m ilita r y  m atters in  the French empire. The French government agreed  
and made the f i r s t  co n cess io n , on October 2k, by tra n sferr in g  twenty  
155mm cannons to  the A frika K o rp s .^
These attem pts to  crea te  a lo c a l  dStente were then expanded to
^ D.FqCqAqA. 9 v s 5_ io  passim .
& I b id . ,  Y, 89.
^ B ey n e t, G eneral. French o f f i c e r .  P resid en t o f  th e  French 
d e le g a tio n  to  th e A rm istice Commission (O ctober 1-December 23 , 19U l)°
oFoCoAJU* V* 201-03 ^tssiTiio
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in clu d e I t a ly ,  and the n e g o tia t io n s  became t r ip a r t i t e .  In  th ese  conver­
sa tio n s  th e Germans m aintained a cau tiou s a t t itu d e  fo r  th ey  assayed  
French in te n tio n s  as "m aintaining an a t t itu d e  o f  w a itin g  which, b a s ic a l ly ,  
i s  not fr ie n d ly  to  th e A xis and are avoid ing tak in g  up any p o s it io n  u n t i l  
th ey  have seen  in  which d ir e c t io n  the balance o f  th e  war i s  f in a l ly  going  
to  t i p . ' 1̂  General Vogl in s is t e d  th a t th e t r ip a r t i t e  n e g o tia t io n s  be 
based on the P aris p r o to c o l, and a l l  p o l i t i c a l  qu estion s be ignored  
This c o o l behavior in d ica ted  th a t the Germans were fa r  from w il l in g  to  
grant any con cession s to  the French u n t i l  th ey  had con crete  evidence  
th a t f a l l  c o lla b o r a tio n  was again  in  fo r c e . This was a co n d it io n  th a t  
could  on ly  be f u l f i l l e d  by the French acceptance in  e n t ir e ty  o f  the P aris  
p r o to c o l.
This German a t t itu d e  was an in d ir e c t  cause o f  th e  d ism issa l o f  
Weygand as commander o f the French North A frican  army. B er lin  had ap­
p lie d  con siderab le  p ressure on Vichy fo r  h is  d is m is s a l  For some months, 
Weygand had been a thorn in  th e s id e  o f  th e  Germans because he had con­
t in u a lly  in s is te d  th a t French-German r e la t io n s  be governed s o le ly  by the  
a rm istice  and he had opposed the P aris p r o to c o l. By November, h is  ta c ­
t i c s  had so exasperated th e  Germans th a t K e ite l  had proposed to  C anaris, 
c h ie f  o f  th e  Abw ehr,^ th a t Weygand be kidnapped and then murdered.^®
^ C on versation  o f  H it le r  and Ciano, October 26. Giano, Diplom atic 
Papers, U57.
ffip.F.C .A .A . .  V, 27h-77  passim .
^T he Abwehr was th e  fo r e ig n  in t e l l ig e n c e  se r v ic e  o f  the OKW. 
Admiral Canarie, through most o f  th e war, headed t h is  German in t e l l ig e n c e  
s e r v ic e .
60Rarl Abshagen, Canaris, P a tr io t  und W eltbuerger, ( S tu ttgartg  
1 9 5 7 ), 293.
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The A rm istice Commission, however, provided th e stim ulus which forced  
th e  Viehy regime to  remove W eygand.^- On November 12 , Vogl in d ica ted  
th a t no fu r th er  con cession s were to  be granted to  the French in  North 
A frica  ■‘i t  th e  bad s p i r i t  {[created by Weygand], was not d isp ersed  by 
appropriate m easures.'1̂
N ev er th e le ss , th e  d ism issa l o f  Weygand, on November 18 , d id  n ot 
improve German-French r e la t io n s*  By t h is  tim e, H it le r  was com pletely  
d is i l lu s io n e d  in  th e  French, fo r  “th ere  are so many Weygands in  France 
th a t any one o f  them could  take th e r o le  o f  the o ld  r e t ir e d  general 
tomorrow."^3 The Germans s e r io u s ly  questioned  the s in c e r ity  o f  the  
French for*
th ey  want to  change th e  cards on the ta b le  and to  l e t  i t  be 
fo r g o tte n  th a t th ey  are a conquered country. This i s  a game 
which th ey  cannot be perm itted to  p la y .61*
IV
By th e beginning o f  191*1, the German economic e x p lo ita t io n  o f oc­
cupied France had c le a r ly  entered  a new phase. The primary o b je c tiv e  
was s t i l l  to  e x tr a c t  raw m a ter ia ls  and f in ish e d  products from Franc®, 
but i t  was now done through regu lar purchases adapted to  the German
^ lfh ere  was a lso  a French p o l i t i c a l  reason fo r  Weygand®s f a l l .  
Barlan worked fo r  h is  d ism is sa l, f o r  a great d ea l o f  r iv a lr y  e x is te d  
between the two men. Weygand was an o b sta c le  to  Darlan!s program o f  
cooperation  w ith  Germany. Weygand was a ls o  a p o te n t ia l  p o l i t i c a l  
opponent to  D arlan.
62B .y 0C.A«A. .  Vs 277.
^ co n v e r sa tio n  H it le r  to  Giano. As quoted in  Langer, Undeclared 
War. 769.
^ C on versation  Ribbentrop to  Giano. Ciano, D iplom atic Papers,
1*62.
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monetary l e v e l .  By the end ©f 191*1, approxim ately 1*8,000 ton s o f  copper, 
9 ,000  tons o f  le a d , and 2 ,000  ton s o f  t in  and oth er non-ferrous m etals  
were tra n sferred  to  Germany.^ The A rm istice  Commission did  not take in  
th is  a c t iv i t y  because i t s  o r ig in a l  p o s it io n  o f  s o le  caretaker o f  th e  
economic terms o f  the a rm istice  was taken over by o th er  German a g e n c ie s . 
The two most important German organ iza tion s which assumed th is  fu n ctio n
were th e S p ec ia l Economic d e le g a tio n , and th e War Economy and Armament
f\£\S ta f f  in  Prance. The la t t e r  agency, by th e middle o f  191*1, c lo s e ly  
supervised  a l l  p la n ts  in  France which were m anufacturing armaments fo r  
Germany.^7
Through th e  w in ter o f  191*1, the A rm istice Commission was preoc­
cupied w ith s e t t in g  up c o n tro ls  over the armament in d u str ie s  in  the fr e e  
zone. At the beginning o f  th e  y ea r , th e  French d e leg a tio n  s e n t  a note  
to  th e  commission com plaining o f  the f r i c t io n  the armament c o n tr o l com­
m ission s caused in  France. S tuelpnagel responded th a t the co n tro l 
commissions were in  the fr e e  zone on th e  b a s is  o f  A r t ic le  6 o f  the
/O
a r m is t ic e . The German p o s it io n  was fu rth er  s o l id i f i e d ,  on March 15 , 
when Stuelpnagel s ta te d  th a t France was to  comply w ith  a l l  measures o f
65Report by m ilita r y  commander, French ad m in istra tiv e  s t a f f ,  
September 10 , I9l*2. H.M.T. .  X III, 795.
66The War Economy and Armament S ta ff  or  Ruestung was a lso  charged  
w ith  co n tro l o f  war in d u s tr ie s . I t  was subordinated to  th e OKW, the  
m ilita r y  commander in  France, and to  the M in ister o f  Armament o f  the  
Reich ( Sp eer).
671 oG£Ao,  V II, 1*82.
68d oF .0 oAqAo<, I I I ,  1*23. He was r e fer r in g  to th a t part o f  A r ti­
c le  6 th a t readsg 8Further manufacturing o f  war m a ter ie l in  occupied  
te r r ito r y  i s  to  be stopped im m ed iate ly .8
co n tro l the commission f e l t  a p p lica b le  to  the terms o f  th e  a r m is tic e ,
"and i t s  c o n s e q u e n c e s . " ^  Soon a f t e r ,  th e  commission made e x te n s iv e  
demands on th e French in d u s tr ie s  fo r  m unitions o f  la r g e  c a l ib e r ,  oth er  
war m a te r ie l, car  p a r ts , chem ical products, and machine t o o l s . ^
The German p o lic y  o f  harnessing  the in d u str ie s  o f  unoccupied  
France were soon channeled in to  one co n sid era tio n —th a t o f  the French
a ir c r a f t  in d u s tr ie s . German orders began to  pour in to  the fr e e  zone
71fo r  a irp la n es  and a irp la n e  p a r ts . 1 On A p ril 22 , the A rm istice  Com­
m ission  concluded an agreement w ith  France which contained a s e r ie s  o f  
d ir e c t iv e s  fo r  the execu tion  o f a German-French program o f  a irp lan e  
co n stru ctio n  by the French a ir c r a f t  in d u stry . The d ir e c t iv e s  s t ip u la te d  
th a t i t  was Germany's in te n tio n  to  p la ce  la rg e  orders in  the French 
a ir c r a f t  in d u stry . A program o f l im ite d  economic c o lla b o r a tio n  was to  
be in i t ia t e d  by which France was to  draw up a program, w ith  German ap­
p rova l, in d ic a tin g  th e m ilita r y  and commercial a ir c r a f t  i t  needed. A 
r a t io  was th en  to  be e s ta b lish e d  in  which fo r  every f iv e  p lan es d e liv ered  
to  Germany, France was allow ed to  keep one. The d ir e c t iv e s  a ls o  allow ed  
German a ir c r a f t  firm s to  communicate d ir e c t ly  w ith  th e ir  French counter­
p arts  . ^
Although th e A rm istice Commission n eg o tia ted  t h is  agreement, i t  
had l i t t l e  co n tro l over the program, fo r  i t  was in i t ia t e d  and put in to
69p .F aG»A.A, 9 IV, 97.
7° lb id . ,  IV, 201.
^ -Foreign R ela tion s o f  U .S. ,  19l*l, I I ,  11*2.
^ D ir e c t iv e s  o f  the m in ister  o f  th e R eieh . D.F.C.A.A. . V, 35>2-5>7
passim .
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op eration  by o th er  German a g e n c ie s . The te c h n ic a l co n tro l o f  th e  program 
was ex erc ised  by th e German D elegation  o f  the Committee o f Industry which 
was subordinated to  th e  German M inistry  o f Armament.
In the agreement o f  A p ril 22, i t  was e s ta b lish e d  th a t th e  French 
a ir c r a f t  production was to  be conducted in  both French zones. Through 
the summer and autumn o f 191*1, innumerable d i f f i c u l t i e s  hindered the  
a p p lic a tio n  o f  t h is  program, and on November 2 , th e  commission h a lted  
a l l  a ir c r a f t  co n stru ctio n  in  the fr e e  zone. The French d e leg a tio n  
q u ick ly  p ro te s ted  th a t th e German a c tio n  was unnecessary fo r  on ly  c i v i ­
l i a n  a ir c r a f t  were being produced in  the fr e e  zone. General Vogl coun­
tered  th a t , according to  A r t ic le  6 o f  the a r m is t ic e , a l l  fa b r ic a t io n  o f  
war m a ter ie l in  the fr e e  zone was to  be p ro h ib ited , and to  him the con­
s tr u c t io n  o f  c iv i l i a n  a ir c r a f t  f e l l  in  t h i s  c a te g o r y .^
The in tra n s ig e n t p o s it io n  o f  th e A rm istice Commission on French 
war in d u s tr ie s  by th e autumn o f  19l*l showed the ev o lu tio n  o f  Germany's 
p o lic y  toward France. The German hopes fo r  economic c o lla b o r a tio n  w ith  
France had su ffered  a premature death , and German su sp ic io n  o f French 
m otives p laced  a heavy s tr a in  on the economic co n ta cts  between th e  two 
s t a t e s ,  a s tr a in  th a t was p a r t ic u la r ly  ev id en t in  th e A rm istice Commis­
s io n .
Through 191*1, the commission took l i t t l e  in t e r e s t  in  th e  economy 
o f  th e  French c o lo n ie s . What in t e r e s t s  Germany d id  have in  th e  area , 
e s p e c ia l ly  th a t  o f  fo r e ig n  trade w ith  the French empire, were handled  
by th e S p ec ia l Economic d e le g a tio n .
^ D.F.C.A.A. .  V, 233»
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% the German-French a r m is t ic e , th e A rm istice  Commission was th e  
s o le  interm ediary between B er lin  and V ichy. This p o s it io n  had ra p id ly  
d e te r io ra ted , e s p e c ia l ly  a t  the p o l i t i c a l  l e v e l .  At th e  beginning o f  
I9l*l> th e  German ambassador in  France, Otto A betz, had assumed a p o s i­
t io n  o f  s in g u la r  importance to  German-French r e la t io n s ,  and i t  was from 
h is  o f f i c e  th a t alm ost a l l  im portant p o l i t i c a l  n e g o tia t io n s  were i n i t i ­
a ted  and ca rr ied  o u t.
The commission d e lib er a te d  on on ly  two problems o f  the occupied  
zone in  191*1. The f i r s t  is s u e  was over A lsace and L orraine, where by 
191*1 th e Germans had come to  regard the provinces as being com pletely  
separated  from France. While th e French were pow erless to  do anything  
about th is  s ta te  o f  a f f a ir s  th ey  s t i l l  ra ised  s h r i l l  p r o te s ts  over cer ­
ta in  German t a c t i c s  th ere . On January 1 2 , the French d e leg a tio n  pro­
t e s t e d  th e German p o lic y  o f  mass exp u lsion  o f  "undesirable elem ents"  
from th ese  p ro v in ces. H encke^ responded th a t th e  A rm istice Commission 
would not r ec e iv e  th e French n o te , and he added th a t the German mass
exp u lsion s were alm ost com pleted and, th e r e fo r e , i t  was com pletely  u se -
75l e s s  fo r  the French to  p e r s i s t  in  such com plaints.
U n til the m iddle o f  Ju ly , Germany con ten ted  i t s e l f  w ith  in d iv i­
dual exp u lsion s from A lsace and L orraine, but a t  th e  end o f  Ju ly , Germany 
began to  e j e c t  persons o f  French descen t in  la r g e  numbers from th e
fyffencke, Andor. S erv ice  cou nselor  w ith rank o f  m in ister*  
rep resen ta tiv e  o f  th e  German fo r e ig n  m in istry  w ith  th e German A rm istice  
Commission (J u ly  19l*0-May 191*1)«
75d.F.C*A.A.. I l l ,  1*05-07 passim.
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provinces * The French sen t a new s e r ie s  o f  p r o te s ts  to  the A rm istice  
Commission, but th e commission sim ply refu sed  to  aceep t them. 76
The o th er  p o l i t i c a l  is su e  in  th e occupied zone which th e  Armis­
t i c e  Commission d e a lt  w ith  in vo lved  th e French p r o te s t  o f  the u se  o f  
French c iv i l ia n s  to  guard th e German l in e s  o f  communication and m ilita r y  
in s t a l la t io n s .  The commission s e t t le d  t h is  is su e  by sim ply re fu s in g  to  
re c e iv e  the French p r o te s t  n o te . I t  regarded th e problem as being  
w ith in  th e  scope o f  the German m ilita r y  commander's ju r is d ic t io n , and 
th ere fo re  th e  French government was to  r e fe r  a l l  correspondence on the  
su b ject to  h i m .
Through 1 9 b l, th e A rm istice Commission took l i t t l e  in t e r e s t  in  
th e  demarcation l in e  d iv id in g  France. I t  refu sed  to  assume any respon­
s i b i l i t y  fo r  i t s  maintenance which was regarded as a p o l i t i c a l  is su e  and 
o u ts id e  the co n tro l o f  the commission.
The commission d e a lt  w ith  on ly  one p o l i t i c a l  is su e  in  the fr e e  
zone and t h i s  cen tered  around the a p p lic a tio n  o f  A r t ic le  19 o f  the arm­
i s t i c e .  This a r t i c l e  s t ip u la te d  th a t Germany could claim  th e  e x tr a d it io n  
o f  a l l  German n a tio n a ls  who were r e s id in g  in  France a t  the con clu sion  ©f 
h i s t i l i t i e s ,  and th e commission did  employ the a r t i c l e  to  c o l le c t  a num­
ber o f  German army d e se r te r s . The French rep resen ta tiv e  o f  fo re ig n  
a f f a ir s  a t  Wiesbaden complained th a t  the German p o in t o f  view  was con­
trary  to  th e " righ ts o f  man," and th ere fo re  cou ld  not be ap p lied  to
^ D.F.C.A.A. . V, 132. The French p e r s is te d  in  such a fa sh io n  
u n t i l  September, 19u2, when General ? o g l was provoked in to  demanding an 
apology from th e  French, and a promise n o t to  r e fe r  to  the su b jee t aga in . 
The French com plied w ith  h is  demand.
77l b i d . . V, 216.
8?
A r tic le  I f .  l i t  German counterpart* W elek ,^  responded that as fa r  a s  
B erlin  was concerned the d e ser ters  were the same as C r im in a ls  ef common 
Uw„'*19
Through 1 9 t l ,  the A rm istice  Commission took l i t t l e  in t e r e s t  in  
th e p o l i t i c a l  a f f a ir s  e f  France* and. eren  when i t  d id  the a c tio n  was 
always and on ly  in  response to  French p r e te s ts  <>
?% elck , Wolfgang. Counselor in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  department o f  'the 
German fo r e ig n  m inistry? a ssig n ed  to  the German A rm istice Commission a t  
Wiesbaden.
79p.go0JLAa. H I, 379.
Chapter V. December 19ltl - December 19h2
By l a t e  1 9 h l, th e Germans had become q u ite  anxious over the s i t u ­
a t io n  in  th e M editerranean, because in  L ibya, Auchinleck^- was lead in g  
th e  B r it is h  Eighth Army in  a su c c e ss fu l campaign a g a in st the A xis.
H it le r  regarded Germany’s p o s it io n  as being so precarious th a t on Decem­
ber 2 he ordered th e  tr a n s fe r  o f  German a ir  fo rce  u n its  from th e  Russian  
fr o n t , where th ey  were d esp era te ly  needed, to  southern I t a ly  and North 
A fr ica . F ie ld  Marshal K esse lr in g  commanded th ese  German u n i t s , but he 
was subordinated to  M u sso lin i and the I t a l ia n  supreme command. K esse l­
r in g  was ordered to  in su re th e  A xis a ir  and sea  supremacy between south­
ern I ta ly  and North A fr iea . This supremacy was to  safeguard the l in e s
o
o f  communication w ith  th e  A xis fo r c es  in  A fr ica .
This German a n x ie ty  was compounded by i t s  fa i lu r e  to  e n l i s t  
French a id  in  North A fr iea . The fa i lu r e  occurred in  a s e r ie s  o f  t r i ­
p a r t it e  m eetings h eld  between the German and I t a l ia n  A rm istice Commis­
s io n s  and a French d e le g a tio n . The Germans attem pted, in  th ese  m eetin gs, 
to  reach s p e c if ic  m ilita r y  agreements by which France was to  provide th e  
Axis in  North A frica  w ith  increased  a id  and support* During the conver­
sa tio n s  , th e  A rm istic e Coramiss ion  t o t a l ly  ignored a l l  o th er  problems and 
q u estion s o f  th e  a r m istic e  and German occu pation .
3-Auchinleck, S ir  Olaude, l8 8 h - . B r it is h  general? commander-in­
c h ie f ,  In d ia  (December 19hO-July 19hl and June 19h3)s appointed eommander- 
in  c h ie f ,  K iddle E ast (J u ly , 19h l)s  rep laced  by Alexander (August, 19h 2).
^ H itle r 's  d ir e c t iv e  no. 3 8 . D .G.F.Po, D, X III , 938-39.
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On Deeember 3> th ese  m ilita r y  con versation s were over-shadowed 
by a m eeting a t  S a in t Flore«fcin=Yergigny between P eta in  and Goering in  
which Goering expressed an u n w illin gn ess to  grant th e French any con ces­
s io n s  u n le ss  the m ilita r y  p ro v is io n s o f  th e Paris p ro to co l were f u l f i l l e d .  
P eta in  responded by p resen tin g  a long l i s t  o f  demands which were alm ost 
id e n t ic a l  to  th e  supplementary a r t i c l e  o f  th e  Paris p r o to c o l. A fter  
in trod ucing th e se  demands, P eta in  chided Goering fo r  the current German 
p o lic y  and warned th a t France would never accept a German D ik ta t. Gear­
in g , thoroughly ir r i ta te d  by th e  m arshal8s p a tro n iz in g  behavior, responded 
"but sa y , . . . who are th e  v ic t o r s ,  you or we?” He fu rth er  s ta te d , “you
are ask ing us fo r  very great co n cess io n s , but in  retu rn , you are o ffe r in g
a b so lu te ly  n o th in g .”^
The in co n c lu siv e  r e s u lt s  o f  th is  m eeting, combined w ith  the medi­
ocre a c t iv i t y  o f  th e  t r ip a r t i t e  co n v ersa tio n s, com pelled the Germans to
make one l a s t  e f fo r t  to  secure m ilita r y  cooperation  w ith  th e  French. The
A rm istice Commission informed the Yichy government th a t Goering was 
w ill in g  to  meet w ith  General Ju in , com m ander-in-ehief o f  th e French North 
A frican army. The French were in stru c ted  to  draw up p lan s fo r  the fu tu re  
defense o f  th e ir  em pire.^ The in s tr u c tio n s  were in d ic a t iv e  th a t Germany 
regarded i t s  awkward p o s it io n  in  A frica  as dangerous enough to  warrant 
fu rth er  d isc u ss io n s  beyond the A rm istice Commission, but the Germans made 
i t  e x p l ic i t  th a t any fu tu re  d isc u ss io n  was to  d ea l on ly  w ith  m ilita r y  
m atters.
3 sx tra c t from proems v e rb a l. D.G.F.P. .  D, X III , 911*-26 passim . 
% b id . ,  B, n i l ,  1000-01.
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From th is  p o in t to  December 23, when Goering and Juin met, a 
s e r ie s  o f  developments occurred which app reciab ly  a f fe c te d  both gen era l 
German-French r e la t io n s  and the fu tu re  o f  the A rm istice Commission. The 
t r ip a r t i t e  n e g o t ia t io n s , in  p rogress s in ce  November 27, came to  a stand­
s t i l l .  The A rm istice Commission’s goa l was to  s e e  th a t the terras o f  the  
P aris p ro to co l were f u l f i l l e d .  This was a co n d itio n  the French were 
only w i l l in g  to  agree to  i f  the supplementary a r t i c l e  was f u l f i l l e d  
f i r s t ,  and throughout the con versation s th e French tr ea ted  the German 
proposals in  a d ila to r y  manner. On December 21, th e French d e leg a tio n  
drew up a memorandum which s ta te d  th a t the n e g o tia t io n s  had passed from 
a te c h n ic a l and m ilita r y  l e v e l  to  a general p o l i t i c a l  p la n e . Further­
more, even i f  the p a r t ie s  s e t t le d  on a workable m ilita r y  agreement, i t  
had to  co n ta in  a c le a r  p o l i t i c a l  se tt le m en t. The French in s is t e d  th a t  
although France was w il l in g  to  co lla b o ra te  w ith  the Reich i t  was never  
to  a llow  i t s e l f  to  become t o t a l ly  subm issive to  the d e s ir e s  o f th e Ger­
man government.
c
The German n e g o tia to r , C olonel Boehme, an gerly  re to rted  th a t the  
French a tt itu d e  was not conducive to  fu rth er  n e g o t ia t io n s . Admiral 
M i e h e l i e r , ^  th e  French n e g o tia to r , responded th a t any fu tu re  conversa­
t io n s  had to  be based on the above French n o te .^
Boehme im m ediately tran sm itted  the French note to  the OKW, which 
in s tru c ted  him to  break o f f  a l l  n e g o t ia t io n s . Furthermore, the A rm istice
^Boehme, lie u te n a n t-c o lo n e l. German army o f f ic e r ;  headquarters 
l ia i s o n  o f  the A rm istice Commission (I9ii0-i*2).
^ M iehelier, Admiral F r itz .  Commander French naval fo r e es  in  Mor­
occo (19UO-!;2 f f . ) ;  p resid en t o f  French d e le g a tio n  ( July-O ctober, 19U1)*
^D.F.C.A.A. , V, 398-^01 passim .
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Commission was ordered to  h a lt  a l l  d isc u ss io n s  a t  Wiesbaden w ith  the
8French government.
At f i r s t  g la n ce , th e suspension  o f  the A rm istice Commission's 
m eetings w ith  the French appeared to  rep resen t a sharp break in  German- 
French r e la t io n s ,  w h ile  in  a c tu a l f a c t ,  the a c tio n  r e su lte d  from a s i t ­
u ation  th a t had e x is te d  fo r  some tim e. Ever s in c e  the summer o f  19l*l, 
when i t  became evident th a t the P a r is  p ro toco l was not going to  be ■*
f u l f i l l e d  by the French, th ere was a steady d e te r io r a t io n  in  r e la t io n s  
o f  th e  two s t a t e s .  By th e  autumn o f  19l*l, th e com m ission's in flu en ce  
in  France had beeome minor as Germany's p r in c ip a l apprehension w ith  
France began to  cen ter  on developments in  Worth A fr ica . As a lread y  
mentioned, Germany was unable to  e x tr a c t  from the French what i t  wanted 
in  A frica  through th e A rm istice Commission. Therefore, on December 23, 
one l a s t  attem pt to  acquire a c t iv e  French m ilita r y  c o lla b o r a tio n  was 
made in  a m eeting between Goering and Juin .
At the m eeting, Goering im m ediately expressed  h is  concern about 
the French d efen ses in  A fr ic a , but i f  France wanted th e n ecessary  means 
o f  d efen se i t  had to comply w ith c e r ta in  German demands. A fter  ex ten ­
s iv e  n e g o tia t io n s , Goering rece ived  Juin®s agreement on two s p e c if ic
p o in ts . The Frence were to  a llo w  th e Germans to  supply th e A frika Karps,
o
s e c r e t ly ,  through B izer te  and the French a ls o  agreed , in  p r in c ip a l, to  
f ig h t  w ith Rommel's fo r e es  i f  he had to  r e tr e a t  in to  T u n isia .
8I b id . , V, 1*01.
^ B izerte  i s  a Tunisian p o r t. I t  has numerous p ort f a c i l i t i e s  and 
i s  lo ca ted  c lo s e  to  th e  I ta l ia n  mainland. I t  was o f  p a r tic u la r  import­
ance to  the Axis fo r  by u sin g  t h is  p ort th ey  f a c i l i t a t e d  the re-su p p ly in g  
o f  th e ir  fo r c e s  in  A fr ic a .
I Qproctes verb al o f  Juin m iss io n . D„F0C.A.A. ,  V, 381-85 passim .
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One oth er event occurred in  December which had a d ir e c t  in flu en ce  
on fu tu re  German-French r e la t io n s .  The United S ta te s  entered the war 
a g a in st the A x is . I t  a cce lera ted  th e s itu a t io n  which had been created  
by the German in vasion  o f R ussia , fo r  Germany stepped up i t s  p o lic y  o f  
e x tra c tin g  a s  much as p o s s ib le  from France fo r  i t s  war e f f o r t .  A fter  
December 23, th e  com m ission's r o le  in  th is  p o lic y  was regu la ted  to  a 
very  modest p o s it io n , and most o f  i t s  fu n ctio n s were taken over by Abetz, 
the German ambassador in  France.
On January 5 , Abetz was r e c a lle d  to  B er lin  to  r ec e iv e  new in s tr u c ­
t io n s  from the Fuehrer. He assumed th e  ro le  p rev io u sly  h eld  by the  
A rm istice Commission in  attem pting to  e s ta b lis h  a broad co lla b o ra tio n  
w ith the French. H it le r  adm itted th a t a r a d ic a l change in  th e  war s i t ­
u a tio n  had occurred, and Germany now needed French a s s is ta n c e  more than  
ever before. He to ld  Abetz th a t in  th e near fu tu re  tw e n ty -fiv e  army 
d iv is io n s  were to  be withdrawn from France fo r  duty in  the e a s t . ^  This 
was to  crea te  a vacuum which the French were h o p efu lly  to  be a b le  to  
f i l l  th em selves. The same s itu a t io n  ap p lied  to  the French empire where
Abetz was to  grant th e French North A frican army the appropriate re -
12le a s e s  to  a s s i s t  th e German war e f f o r t  in  the M editerranean.
A betz, on h is  return to  France, attem pted to  ach ieve  t h is  broad 
co lla b o r a tio n  with France. His e f fo r t s  were a com plete f a i lu r e ,  fo r  the  
French were u n w illin g  to  go beyond what had a lread y  been e s ta b lish e d  by 
the Juin m iss io n . This French a tt itu d e  produced an added s tr a in  on
11-In January o f  19Ul th ere  were 820,000 German troops in  France. 
By March o f  th a t year th e  number had been reduced to  685 ,000.
A betz, P eta in  e t  1'A llem agne, 137-38.
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German-French r e la tio n s ., H it le r  soon came to  b e lie v e  "that France was 
in  no way ready to ,h e lp  us crea te  the new order in  Europe." Because o f  
th e  French a t t i t u d e ,  a l l  fu tu re  req u ests  fo r  con cession s in  th e ir  empire 
were to  be turned down<,̂ 3
At the beginning o f  19i*2, Rommel was a b le  to  s t a l l  th e B r it ish  
o ffe n s iv e  in  L ibya. On January 21, he assumed th e i n i t i a t i v e  and eoum> 
tera tta o k ed , by th e  end o f  February he had pushed the B r it is h  back to  
Tobruk, and on May 26 , he again  resumed th e  o ffe n s iv e  and qu ick ly  cap­
tured Tobruko N ev er th e less , by th e  summer o f  191*2, Rommel8s A frika Korps 
was subjected  to  fo r c es  which i t  was not a b le  to  w ith stan d . B r it ish  
industry and th e  expanding a ss is ta n c e  o f  th e  United S ta te s  meant th a t  
th e  A l l ie s  could in  th e  near fu tu re  su b jec t th e  Axis in  North A fr ica  to  
m assive p ressu re .
The German apprehension over th e ir  in a b i l i t y  to  compete w ith the  
A ll ie s  in  the in d u s tr ia l f i e l d  provided the stim u lus fo r  the resumption 
o f  A rm istice Commission m eetings on July ll*, \9hZ° Germany's p r in c ip a l  
in t e r e s t  in  the commission now was to  acquire gunpowder manufactured in  
th e French fr e e  zone.
Even w ith  such an inherent weakness as i t s  in a b i l i t y  to  m aintain  
an in d u s tr ia l p ro d u ctiv ity  comparable to  the A l l i e s ,  Germany's o v e r a ll  
s tr a te g ic  p o s it io n  in  th e  autumn o f  19h2 appeared to  have reached th e  
p in n acle  o f  su c c e ss . A ll o f  co n tin en ta l w estern Europe w ith  the excep­
t io n  o f  th e Ib erian  pen in su la  and th e  French fr e e  zone was under Axis 
c o n tr o l. The German army was on th e  o u tsk ir ts  o f  Leningrad, and on th e  
banks o f  th e  Don and V olga. The whole o f  th e Balkan p en in su la  was under
^% ©ebbels, G oebells D ia r ie s , 36 -37 .
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Axis c o n tr o l, and f in a l ly ,  Rommel was th reaten in g  to  push the B r it is h  
out o f  the N ile  v a l le y .
I
The A rm istice Commission com pletely  ignored a l l  q u estion s con­
cerning th e French navy through December, 191*1. A fter th e suspension  
o f  the com m ission s m eetings, m atters a f fe c t in g  the French navy were 
cared f o r  by the German "marine" high commission which had been pre­
v io u s ly  a component part o f  the A rm istice Commission,. I t  d e lib era ted  
on such naval to p ic s  as naval war in d u s tr ie s , the d is p o s it io n  o f  French 
naval fo r c e s , and n eg o tia t io n s  over n eu tra l marine tonnage. I t  resid ed  
in  P a r is , and d e a lt  d ir e c t ly  w ith th e French government.
To J u ly , 191*2, th e high com m ission’s primary in t e r e s t  was to  ac­
qu ire n eu tra l tonnage which was in terned  in  French p o r ts . On January 
7, i t  began con versation s w ith  th e  Fremch government on the su b je c t,  
but the Germans had only m arginal su ccess  in  th ese  n e g o tia t io n s  fo r  the  
French were w i l l in g  to  r e le a se  on ly  a sm all number o f  th e n e u tr a l , sh ip s . 
Soon a f t e r ,  th e S p ec ia l Economic d e leg a tio n  assumed th e  r o le  o f  n eg o tia ­
to r  on n eu tra l tonnage.
Other than in  th e above in s ta n ce , th e  A rm istice  Commission took  
l i t t l e  in t e r e s t  in  th e French navy through 191*2. Such problems as the  
supplying o f  the French f l e e t  were handled by oth er German a g en c ie s , 
e s p e c ia lly  the S p ecia l Economic d e le g a tio n . A fter  th e  A l l ie s  landed in  
North A fr ica  on November 7, th e commission again  began to  take an in te r ­
e s t  in  the French f l e e t  but on ly  in  resp ect to  th e  German occupation o f  
the French fr e e  zone.
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Through 19U2, the A rm istice Commission took l i t t l e  in te r e s t  in  
the French a ir  fo r c e .
In m etropolitan  France, th e s iz e  o f  the French a ir  fo r c e  was kept 
a t  a bare minimum. The A rm istice Commission which in i t ia t e d  th is  program 
fo llow ed  a general German p o lic y  o f  s tr ip p in g  the French m etropolitan  
armed fo r c e s  to  what was considered  n ecessary  fo r  d e fen siv e  purposes 
o n ly . The Germans began to  adhere to  t h is  p o lie y  more and more as i t  
became ev id en t th a t France was never going to  co lla b o ra te  w ith Germany 
on a m ilita r y  s e a l s .  The French a tt itu d e  le d  H it le r  to  s ta te  th a t  11 we 
must be c a r e fu l not to  g ive arms to  the peop les o f  the co u n tr ies  we have 
conquered.
In  th e  French empire, Germany fo llow ed  a more le n ie n t  p o lic y  
toward th e French a ir  fo r c e . On February 7, th e commission allow ed  
France to  erea te  a number o f  a n t i-q ir c r a f t  b a t te r ie s  to  be used by th e  
French North A frican army. At t h is  tim e, i t  a ls o  allow ed a group o f  
f ig h te r  p lan es to  be tra n sferred  to  T u n isia , F in a lly , i t  l ib e r a te d  from 
m etropolitan  France s to e k -p i le s  71,000 rounds o f  75®n ammunition fo r
l£f
immediate tr a n s fe r  to  North A fr ica .  ̂ From t h is  p o in t on, noth ing o f  
consequence was d iscu ssed  by th e  commission on the French c o lo n ia l a ir  
fo r c e . Some con versation s were contin ued , but th ey  were conducted ou t­
s id e  th e commission. On September 22, Nida, th e  German general consul 
to  V ichy, in  a m eeting w ith  Laval granted the French th e r ig h t to  form
^ H it l e r ,  H it le r 8s Secret C onversations, 353°
^ D .r .C .A .A .. V, 1*06,
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two f ig h te r  groups fo r  u se  in  the French empire. ■LO This agreement was 
o f  p a r tic u la r  s ig n if ic a n c e  fo r  i t  occurred a t  a tim e when the regu lar  
m eetings o f  th e commission were again  fu n c tio n in g . Furthermore, th e  
d e c is io n  was made by a German c i v i l  agency on a su b ject th a t was pre­
v io u s ly  the s o le  p rerogative  o f  the A rm istice Commission.
I l l
As w ith  th e o th er  French m etropolitan  armed s e r v ic e s , the Armis­
t i c e  Commission took l i t t l e  in t e r e s t  in  th e French m etropolitan  army 
through 191+2. I t  fo llow ed  a p o lic y  o f  l im it in g  t h is  fo rce  to  th e  m ini­
mum considered  adequate by th e  OKW to  p reserve in te r n a l tr a n q u ility  in  
th e French fr e e  zone.
Up to  J u ly , 191+2, th e  A rm istice Commission made repeated  demands
th a t France a s s i s t  the A frika Korps, basing th ese  demands on the P aris
protocolc The Vichy regime continued to  make lim ite d  co n cession s to  the  
Germans w hile e lu d in g  f u l l  com pliance by demanding th a t Germany agree  
to  f u l f i l l  th e supplementary a r t i c l e  o f  the P aris  protocol,,
Through the la t t e r  p art o f  June, th e  Viehy government made a se r ­
ie s  o f  req u ests to  th e  commission fo r  ex ten siv e  reinforcem ents in  North
A fr ica . I t  asked th a t the commission r e le a se  60,000 French troops fo r  
duty th ere  to  counteract the e x is t in g  d e f ic ie n c ie s  in  the French North 
A frican army. The commission responded th a t i t  was w i l l in g  to  grant 
such a con cession  only i f  France provided Germany w ith la rg e  amounts o f  
war m a ter ie l from th e  fr e e  zone. At th is  tim e, th e commission a lso
D.P.G.A.A. „ V, 1+20. Laval had re-en tered  the Vichy government 
on A p ril T&7 19I+2, as  M in ister  o f  Foreign A ffa ir s .
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in d ica ted  i t s  d e s ir e  to  s ig n  a common agreement w ith  France fo r  th e  
r e le a se  o f  gun powder to  Germany.
A fter th e  re-opening o f  n eg o tia t io n s  a t  Wiesbaden, th e commission 
took l i t t l e  in t e r e s t  in  the French North A frican  aray. The French made 
some fe e b le  attem pts to  r ec e iv e  fa r th er  c o n cess io n s , bat th e ir  a c t iv i t y  
was overshadowed by economic qu estion s and then the A llie d  lan d ings in  
North A fr ie a .
By the autumn o f  191*1, the German co n tro l commissions were e sta b ­
l is h e d  throughout the French empire. The commissions c lo s e ly  supervised  
a l l  French troop reinforcem ents a r r iv in g  in  North A fr ica . G enerally , 
th ey  met the French tran sp ort sh ip s as they entered the harbor o f  Casa­
blanca through which most French reinforcem ents had to  p a ss . The French 
troons and th e ir  equipment were then e lo s e ly  in sp ected  by th e co n tro l  
com m ission.X®
I?
Through 191*2, Germany pursued a p o lic y  o f  ex tra c tin g  from France 
as much raw m a ter ia l and f in is h e d  products as p o s s ib le .  In occupied  
France, the German a c t iv i t y  was s im ila r  to  th e plundering o f th e occu­
p ied  zone in  191*0 but the A rm istice Commission d id  not take part in  th is  
a c t iv i t y .
In  th e unoccupied zone, Germany a ls o  attem pted to  gather as much 
m ateria l as p o s s ib le , but i t  d id  so  by tr y in g  to  e s ta b lish  economic
1 7DoF0G0AoA .9 7 , 1*12.
l 8 U. S. Foreign R e la tio n s , I I ,  338-39.
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c o lla b o r a tio n  w ith the Vichy r e g im e .^  Through 191*2, the A rm istice Com­
m ission  d e lib era ted  only on two s p e c if ic  economic q u estion s a f f e c t in g  
the unoccupied zone* They were n eu tra l tonnage and th e manufacturing o f  
gun powder.
In  th e t r ip a r t i t e  n eg o tia t io n s  o f  December, 191*1, the German 
n e g o tia to r , Boehme, f i r s t  brought up th e su b jec t o f  n eu tra l tonnage. He 
wanted an agreement in  which France was to  re lin q u ish  to  Germany and 
I ta ly  c e r ta in  merchant sh ips which had been in terned  in  French p o r ts .I
A te n ta t iv e  con tract was concluded in  which France agreed to  re lin q u ish  
a tonnage o f  1*1*,000 ton s to  Germany, but before the program was expanded 
th e n e g o tia t io n s  were d isru p ted . Therefore Germany had ach ieved  on ly  a 
sm all p art o f  what i t  wanted and consequently was eager to  continue the  
n e g o tia t io n s  over n eu tra l tonnage. On January 7, conversation s on the  
su b jec t were continued by th e German "merchant marine"- high commission, 
a segment o f  the A rm istice Commission, and i t s  p r in c ip a l in te r e s t  was 
to  o b ta in  sh ip s  o f  Greek r e g is t r y .  The French government refu sed  to  re­
le a s e  any o f  th ese  sh ip s to  th e A x is , and t h is  r e fu sa l ended a l l  d isc u s -
20s io n  on th e  su b jec t o f  th e  tr a n s fe r  o f  n eu tra l tonnage.
At th e beginning o f  May 191*2, the Germans expressed a strong d e s ire  
to  acquire gun powder from France. Southern France was w e ll  s itu a te d  fo r  
th e  manufacturing o f  e x p lo s iv e s  fo r  th e  raw m ater ia ls  needed fo r  th e pro­
c e s s  were e ith e r  lo ca ted  in  th e area or could be e a s i ly  tra n sferred  from 
th e  French empire.
^ A b e tz , P eta in  e t  l e s  allem andes, 11*1*.
20D ,F .C .A ,A ., V, 1*03.
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The French government, on May 11 , signed  a general co n tra ct w ith
th e  A rm istice Commission in  which France was to  fa b r ic a te  gun powder in
th e fr e e  zone f o r  German consumption. In  Ju ly , th e  French government
attem pted to  term inate th e  terms o f  th a t co n tra c t, but the A rm istice
Commission m aintained th a t th e q u an tity  o f  gun powder fa b r ica ted  fo r
Germany was in  no way to  be reduced. On August 5 , a fu rth er  agreement
was signed  which was p r im arily  a refinem ent o f  the May 11 c o n tr a c t. I t
contained  a German guarantee to  provide fo r  the n ecessary  " secu r ity 1®
fo r  th e French gun powder in d u s tr ie s . In  return  the French assured  the
21Germans o f  th e maximum production o f  gun powder.
Through 19i*2, the p r in c ip a l German economic in t e r e s t  in  the  
French empire centered  on the supplying o f  th e  German m ilita r y  fo rces  
in  North A fr ic a . To th is  end, in  February th e  A rm istice Commission 
forced  th e French to  r e le a se  adequate tran sp orts to  sh ip  200 tons o f  
su p p lie s  per week to  th e A frika Korps and 500 I ta l ia n  trucks to  T u n is.22
The commission a ls o  pressured France in to  r e le a s in g  c e r ta in  
stock s o f  fu e l  to  th e Axis in  Libya, and by February, th e  f u e l  stock s  
r e lea sed  to  th e A xis to ta le d  1 ,700  tons o f  a v ia tio n  g a so lin e  and 1 ,6 0 0  
tons o f  autom otive g a so lin e . The a v ia tio n  g a so lin e  was taken from 
French m ilita r y  sto ck s in  A lg er ia , and most o f  the autom otive g a so lin e  
came d ir e c t ly  from F rance.2^
The A rm istice Commission a lso  provided fo r  the in sp e c tio n  o f
s l Ib id ., T, ltlli-16.
2 !W h y  t o  U e S o  S o o r o t s i z y  o f   ̂ F s b r u ^ ir y  9 *  R o ls t—
t lo n s  o f  UoSo, 191*2, I I ,  128-29c
23 lb id . ,  191*2, I I ,  131*.
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French North A frican trad e through a port c o n tr o l o f f ic e r  a t  Casablanca, 
and a l l  French merchant v e s s e ls  were c lo s e ly  in sp ected  before being  
allow ed to  lea v e  th ese  A frican  p o rts .
V
Through 191*2, the A rm istice Commission had very  l i t t l e  in flu en ce  
in  French p o l i t i c a l  a f f a ir s .  This co n d itio n  was most evident in  the  
occupied zone, fo r  here the commission had no in flu en ce  a t  a l l .  Further­
more, th e  French government ceased  making p r o te s ts  through the commission 
on Germany's p o l i c ie s  in  the occupied zone. This was most obvious on the  
q u estion  o f  A lsace and L orraine. By 191*2, th e  German m in istry  o f in te r ­
io r  was a c t iv e ly  remaking them in to  German p ro v in ces, and the a c t iv i t y  
was com pletely  ignored by th e  commission.
There was a sharp in crease  in  t e r r o r is t  a c t iv i t y  and a c ts  o f  
sabotage a g a in st the German occupation in  191*2. The French r e s is ta n c e  
g rea tly  perturbed the Germans. In  th e occupied zone, th e German army 
reta in ed  ju r is d ic t io n  over a l l  a tta ck s a g a in st German m ilita r y  person nel, 
and i t  used a heavy hand. These rep ressiv e  t a c t ic s  were in i t ia t e d  by 
th e  m ilita r y  command in  France, and th e  commission d id  not tak e part in  
such a c t iv i t y .
Germany made repeated attem pts to  e x e r c ise  in flu en ce  over French 
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  I t  made demands fo r  th e in sta llm en t and d ism issa l o f  
p o l i t i c a l  personnages in  the Vichy government. In A p r il, Abetz, th e  
German ambassador, pressured the Vichy government to  r e in s ta te  Laval to  
h is  former p o s it io n . Abeta was the p r in c ip a l avenue o f  approach fo r  th e
2l* Ib id ., 191*2, I I ,  339.
Germans In th e  fr e e  son e , and th e A rm istice Commission took very  l i t t l e  
in te r e s t  in  such a c t iv ity ..
¥1
In the f i r s t  o f  November, 19i*2, a strong A ll ie d  maritime fo rce  
swept through th e  G ib ra ltar  S t r a it s  and headed in  th e  general d ir e c t io n  
o f  S ard in ia , On November 6 , Colonel Goerhardt, o f  the A rm istice Commis­
s io n , warned th e  French d e leg a tio n  th a t according to  h is  inform ants th is  
" B ritish ” fo rce  was en terin g  the M editerranean w ith  the in te n tio n  o f  
disembarking on th e  French c o a s t .
By November 8 , th e  Germans concluded th a t the a n tic ip a te d  a tta ck  
was to  come a long the T unisian c o a s t .  The commission demanded to  know 
what measures th e  French were tak ing in  th e l ik e lih o o d  th e  A ll ie d  inva­
s io n  f e l l  in  th is  area . The French d e leg a tio n  gave no respon se.
The A l l ie s  f i r s t  landed a t  A lg iers  and then Oran, The French 
Nprth A frican army was determined to  f ig h t  according to  th e  guide l in e  
th a t they were to  r e s i s t  th e  aggressio n  o f  anyone. But th ey  were uncer­
ta in  o f  F ieh y 's  w ish es, and more im portantly , th ey  did  n o t have the  
means to  put up an e f f e c t iv e  r e s is ta n c e  fo r  th ey  were inadequately armed 
and g r e a t ly  outnumbered. T herefore, t h e ir  r e s is ta n c e  was sh ort l iv e d .
The commission presented  an ultimatum to  the French d e leg a tio n  
on November 9 th a t German a ir  fo rce  u n its  were to  be g iven  the com plete 
u se o f  the French a irb a ses  in  T unisia . The French consented to  th e  
German dem and,^ and in  th e  next two days over 100 Axis p lan es landed
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on the a i r f i e ld  o f  El Aouina, T u n i s i a . ^ 6  >phe German troops w ith  the
p lan es were kept on the f i e l d  fo r  a sh ort time by French army u n it s .
But the lo c a l  French commander, General Barre, rece iv ed  orders on Novem-
ger 13 to  p u ll  h is  troops twenty m iles  in to  the in te r io r  o f T u n isia .
27The Germans then assumed f a l l  c o n tr o l o f  the a i r f i e l d .
On November 11 , the Germans were informed th a t the French North 
A frican army had sign ed  a lo c a l  arm istice  w ith the A l l i e s .  The Armis­
t i c e  Commission made i t  known th a t German-French r e la t io n s  had reached  
a c r i t i c a l  p o in t . The same day, th e German Wehrmacht cro ssed  the de­
m arcation l in e  and began to  occupy southern France. No p r io r  in d ic a tio n  
o f  t h i s  a c t io n  was g iven  to  the French d e le g a tio n  a t Wiesbaden,,
Admiral R&eder and o th er  German naval lea d ers  were opposed to  
operation  "A t t i la ” , because they f e l t  the a e tio n  could  not be e f f e c t iv e ly  
ca rr ied  out and th e  French f l e e t  captured in t a c t ,  fo r  the French were 
ob v iou sly  preparing th e ir  own l!Scapa Flow.*' Beeause o f  th e  German navy's  
o p p o sit io n , op eration  " A tt ila ” was ca rr ied  out alm ost e n t ir e ly  by th e  
German army. The German navy d id  not take p art in  th e  i n i t i a l  s ta g e s  o f  
" A ttila ,"  and as a r e s u lt  the German occupying fo rce  was w ithout th e a id  
o f  navy s p e c ia l i s t s  who might have been ab le  to  reduce the ex ten t o f  
damage th a t  th e French did  perform when they s c u tt le d  th e ir  f l e e t  a t  
T oulon .28
H it le r  sen t a l e t t e r  to  P eta in  exp la in in g  why he had ordered th e  
t o t a l  occupation  o f  France on November 11 . He sa id  th a t Germany must
^Auphan, French Navy, 269.
^ F rance Daring th e O ccupation, I ,  718 
^Auphan, French Navy, 260.
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occupy th e c o a s ta l areas o f  southern France to  p ro tec t Germany8s p o s it io n  
from in v a s io n . He promised P £ta in  th e German occupation  was n o t , in  any 
way, to  in te r fe r e  w ith  th e  French ad m in istra tio n . Furthermore, the ju d i­
c i a l  s ta tu s  o f  the a rm istice  was in  no way a f fe c te d  by the o c c u p a tio n .^
The A rm istice Commission, from November 11 to  1 3 , was preoccupied  
w ith  the German occupation  o f  southern France. The German occupation  
suddenly e lim in ated  sev e r a l s e c t io n s  o f  the commission. I t s  Rnestung 
and p o l i t i c a l  a f f a ir s  s e c t io n s  continued to  fu n c tio n , w h ile  a l l  ques­
t io n s  o f  employing French troops were tr e a ted  d ir e c t ly  through th e  German
30and French army commanders,
On November 16 , Boehme, th e temporary commission chairman, d is ­
cussed  w ith the w estern Wehrmaoht commander th e  fu tu re  l in e s  o f  a u th ority  
in  France between th e commission and th e  German army, At the tim e, the  
OKW was s t i l l  try in g  to  e s ta b lis h  a c o lla b o r a tio n  w ith  th e  French, 
T herefore, th e A rm istice Commission continued to  fu n c tio n  w ith in  th e  
m o d ifica tio n s imposed by th e German occupation o f France.
The l a s t  v e s t ig e  o f French sovere ign ty  disappeared when th e Ger­
mans occupied th e French naval base a t  Toulon, on November 27 , in  an 
u n su ccessfu l bid to  capture the French f l e e t  anchored th er e . ^  The
^ H i t l e r ' s  l e t t e r  to  P e ta in , November 1 1 , Pommages su b is en l e  
France, I ,  336-37 passim .
30
P.F.C .A .A . ,  V, U25°
31J Almost e ig h ty  sh ip s were a t  Toulon and represented  th e b e tter  
h a lf  o f  the French f l e e t .  The f l e e t  was organised  in to  th ree  groups.
The high seas f l e e t ,  commanded by Admiral de Labords, c o n s is te d  o f  1 
b a t t le s h ip , 3 heavy c r u is e r s , 2 l i g h t  c r u is e r s , and 13 d estro y ers .
Next there was th e  Toulon Naval D is t r ic t ,  commanded by Admiral Marquis, 
and i t  had 1 b a t t le sh ip , 2 d e stro y ers , and 10 subm arines. The l a s t  
group c o n s is te d  o f  th ose  sh ip s  which had been decommissioned by the
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French were warned beforehand ©f th e  German a c tio n  and th ere fo re  su ccess­
f u l ly  s c u tt le d  the la r g e s t  p o rtion  o f th e f l e e t .  S ixty-one sh ip s t o t a l ­
l in g  225,000 ton s were sunk or damaged beyond r e p a i r . ^
The Germans then turned th e ir  a tte n t io n  to  the French em pire. On 
December 8 , General Gause, the German commander a t  B iz e r te , presented  
the lo c a l  French commander w ith  an ultim atum . He demanded th a t the  
French im m ediately surrender a l l  s h ip s , f o r t i f i c a t io n s ,  and o th er  m i l i ­
tary  in s t a l la t io n s .  The French commander com plied and relin q u ish ed  a 
few l i g h t  v e s s e ls  and n ine o ld  subm arines.^3
C olonel B assonpierre, o f  th e  A rm istice  Commission, on December 2 , 
announced th a t th e commission and the French d e le g a tio n  were to  be d is ­
so lv ed . A ll m ilita r y  q u estion s were to  be handled by an organ iza tion  
erea ted  fo r  ju s t  such a purpose. This o rg a n iza tio n , th e  A rb e itssta b , 
was under the command o f  General C aldairou.
On December 5 , Germany demanded th a t a l l  French m ilita r y  s e r v ic e s  
be disbanded, and th e  same day the Vichy government began to  comply w ith
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the German demand. F ie ld  M arshall Rundstedt, the German army commander 
in  the w est, supervised  th e  disbanding o f  the French armed fo r c e s ,  but 
he shared t h is  r e s p o n s ib il ity  w ith  the German navy and a ir  fo r c e  western  
commanders. The A rb eitsstab  was now placed  under the au th o r ity  o f
a r m is t ic e . The Germans attack ed  Toulon in  two columns. One column made
i t s  way d ir e c t ly  to  the quay and th e  sh ip s a t  anchor. The oth er column
s itu a te d  i t s e l f  so as to  co n tro l the mouth o f  th e  harbor.
^ B e lo t ,  S tru ggle  fo r  the M editerranean, 193°
^Auphan, French Navy, 268.
3^Rundstedt, Karl R udolf, 1875-1953. German f i e l d  marshalj com­
m an d er-in -ch ief, West (19l*2-ii5).
Rundstedt, and i t  fu n ction ed  as  an advisory  board to  him*
Abets? and th e  German m ilita r y  commander in  France assumed th e  
d u tie s  o f  the A rm istice  Commission’s  " p o l i t ic a l  a f fa ir s "  s e c t io n . The 
m ilita r y  commander's competence was r e s tr ic te d  to  A lsace  and L orrain e, 
to  Worth France, and to  the P a s-d e-C a la is . The c o m is s io n ’s  armament 
s e c t io n  came under th e  a u th o r ity  o f  the Ruestung.3£
On December 2 2 , Germany attem pted to  r e in s ta te  th e o f f ic e s  o f  the  
A rm istice Commission, and i t  was to  continue to  “fu n ctio n  l ik e  in  th e  
p a s to " ^  But t h is  was im p ossib le to  accom plish fo r  th e  com m ission’s 
fu n ctio n s had ceased  to  be o f  any im portance. I t s  primary fu n ctio n  had 
been to  govern and adm in ister the a r m is t ic e , and w ith  the German occu­
p a tio n  o f  southern France th a t  a rm istice  ceased  to  e x i s t .
3& .y.C »A .A . .  V, 1*26-27o
Chapter VI. Conclusion
In June X9l*0, the French government appealed to  Germany fo r  a 
c e s sa t io n  o f h o s t i l i t i e s .  Germany qu ick ly  accep ted , fo r  France was not 
y e t  d efeated; the Wehrmacht had only d efeated  th e French army. The 
French navy, one o f  the most powerful in  the world in  191*0, was s t i l l  
in ta c t  and the French empire was a lso  o u tsid e  th e  grasp o f  Germany. I f  
the war a g a in st France was continued , the remaining French m ilita r y  
fo r c es  were sure to contin ue th e war under B r it ish  d ir e c t io n . Further­
more, German lea d ers  were o p tim is t ic  th a t B r ita in  was soon to  be d efeated  
and the war ended. I f  t h i s  were to  be th e  ca se , th ere  was no reason fo r  
Germany to  conclude e ith e r  a f in a l  peace tr e a ty  or a d e ta ile d  a rm istice  
w ith  France, fo r  F rance's fu tu re  would be decided  in  th e  a n tic ip a te d  
general peace tr e a ty .
The German-French a rm istice  was w r itte n  in  general terms and was 
moderate in  to n e . I t  d id  not mention the French empire. This was a 
ser io u s  om ission  and one th e Germans rep eated ly  attem pted to  r e c t i f y .
The German fa i lu r e  to  implement a workable agreement on the French em­
p ir e  caused a gradual d e te r io r a t io n  in  German-French r e la t io n s  th a t was 
q u ite  pronounced by th e  end o f  191*1.
From 191*0 to  191*2, Germany ex tracted  from France as much as pos­
s ib le  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  i t s  war e f f o r t .  The A rm istice Commission was one 
o f  a number o f  German agen cies  which p a r tic ip a ted  in  t h i s  program. The 
resources o f  the occupied zone were d ir e c t ly  harnessed to  th e German 
war e f f o r t ,  w h ile  in  the fr e e  zone Germany fo llow ed  a more moderate 
p o lic y , attem pting to  e n l i s t  the a c t iv e  c o lla b o r a tio n  o f Vichy France.
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In the French empire* Germany o ften  granted con cession s to  the French 
so th a t th e Vichy regime could  m aintain c o n tr o l o f  i t s  p o ssess io n s  and 
thus a s s i s t  the Axis p o s it io n  in  th e  Mediterranean*
% the German-French a r m is tic e , an A rm istice Commission was c re ­
a ted , and i t  was, o r ig in a l ly ,  to  govern a l l  a sp ects  o f  the arm istice*
This r o le  was soon m odified , and by Ju ly , 191*0, occupied France was 
placed  under the au th o r ity  o f  a German m ilita r y  commander. Soon a f t e r ,  
th e  S p ec ia l Economic d e leg a tio n  was crea ted  and i t  governed most economic 
m atters between Germany and France. By August, th e  com m ission's author­
i t y  was fu rth er  undermined by th e  estab lishm ent o f  th e German embassy 
in  P aris which assumed a l l  r e s p o n s ib il ity  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  in te r a c tio n  
between B er lin  and Vichy.
From July to  December, 19l*0, th e A rm istice Commission made a 
number o f  con cession s to  th e  French navy. Through 191*1 and 191*2, the  
commission g en era lly  refu sed  to  grant any fu rth er  con cession s to  the  
Frency navy, fo r  the Germans f e l t  th a t th e con cession s a lread y  granted  
were adequate enough fo r  the defense o f  the French empire. Throughout 
the p er iod , Germany kept the la r g e s t  portion  o f  the French f l e e t  a t  
Toulon. In t h is  way, i f  Germany overran th e fr e e  zone th e French f l e e t  
could not escap e, and t h is  was ex a c tly  what happened on November 27,
191*2.
The A rm istice Commission trea ted  the French a ir  fo rce  in  much the  
same manner as the French navy. In th e fr e e  zone, th e commission lim ­
it e d  the s iz e  o f  th e French a ir  fo rce  to  what i t  considered  adequate to  
provide fo r  the defense o f  th e  area . From 19l*0 to  191*2, the commission 
reta in ed  s t r i c t  co n tro l over th e  French m etropolitan  a ir  fo r c e . In  the
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French em pire, th e commission allow ed the French a ir  fo rce  a c er ta in  
amount o f  freedom, fo r  i t  appeared much more w i l l in g  to  grant conces­
s io n s  here than in  m etropolitan  France.
The French m etropolitan  arny was lim ite d  to  100,000 men, and i t s  
main fu n ctio n  was to  guarantee th e  dom estic tr a n q u ility  o f  the fr e e  zone. 
The A rm istice Commission a c t iv e ly  in ter fe r ed  in  the co n stru c tio n  and 
a c t iv i t y  o f  the French army through th e  co n tro l commissions i t  sen t in to  
th e  fr e e  zone.
The A rm istice Commission d id  n o t send co n tro l commissions in to  
th e  French empire u n t i l  q u ite  l a t e  in  19h0. I t  d id  so on ly  as a r e s u lt  
o f  I t a l ia n  in a b i l i t y  to  provide th e  n ecessary  su p erv isio n  and co n tro l 
over th e French North A frican  a n y .
The A rm istice Commission granted a v a r ie ty  o f  con cession s to  the  
French North A frican a n y .  The Germans hoped th a t in  t h is  way the French 
would be ab le  to  defend th e ir  own p o sse s s io n s , and thus secure one fla n k  
o f  the Axis p o s it io n  in  A fr ica . This p o lic y , up to  November 19k2, was 
gen era lly  a su ccess .
Germany's o v e r a ll economic p o lic y  toward France was to  ex tra c t  
from i t  as much as p o ss ib le  fo r  the German war e f f o r t ,  and t h is  p o lic y  
assumed various degrees o f  in t e n s it y .  In  the occupied zone, Germany 
fo llo w ed  a p o l ic y  o f  d ir e c t ly  harnessin g  the French economy to  th e  Ger­
man war economy, and by 19U2, Germany had moved la r g e  q u a n tit ie s  o f  raw 
m ateria l and f in ish e d  products to  Germany. Hie A rm istice Commission 
had a very minor r o le  in  t h i s  p o lic y  fo r  the program was p rim arily  
handled by the m ilita r y  commander in  France, th e  Ruestung, and the  
S ep c ia l Economic d e le g a tio n .
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In  unoccupied Prance, th e commission o r ig in a l ly  d ir e c ted  a l l  
German economic in t e r e s t s .  By August 191*0, i t s  powers were l im ite d  to  
only  con sid erin g  th e  French war in d u s tr ie s , which i t  regu lated  on ly  in  
an in d ir e c t  manner. I t  gathered m ateria l from th e  fr e e  zone but on ly  
through normal channels o f  commercial exchange. In the economic agree­
ments concluded by the commission w ith  the Vichy regim e, th e  former 
co n tin u a lly  attem pted to  ach ieve  an a c t iv e  co lla b o r a tio n  with the French, 
and th ese  attem pts u su a lly  met w ith f a i lu r e .
In French p o l i t i c a l  a f f a ir s ,  th e A rm istice Commission had very  
l i t t l e  in f lu e n c e . By August 191*0, most p o l i t i c a l  q u estion s were handled 
e ith e r  by A betz, th e  German ambassador, or th e  German m ilita r y  commander 
in  the occupied zone. Whenever th e  commission d id  d e lib e r a te  on a 
p o l i t i c a l  q u estion  any a c t io n  was always and on ly  in  response to  French 
p r o te s ts .
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APPENDIX A
French fe w  -  1939^
Type In  Under Total
 __________ Commies Ion C onstruction
B a ttle sh ip s T 2 9
A ir cr a ft  C arriers 2 1 3
Cruisers 19 19
D estroyers 71 8 79
Submarines 76 10 86
^Auphan, French l a w .  389
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APPENDIX B
L is t  o f  Members o f  German A rm istice Commission (June 29, 19ij.O)
P resid en t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  General S tu elp n agel
Headquarters L ia iso n  Colonel Boebme
1 . Army Group . . . . . . . . . . . .  L ieutenant-G eneral Mieth
a . S ectio n  operations . . . . . .  Colonel Winter
b. Quarter-m aster general . . . .  Commandant Kossmann
c .  C hief o f  transport . . . . . .  L ieutenant-C olonel T heilacker
d . Transm issions . . .  ....................... L ieutenant-C olonel Negendanck
2 . Navy Group . . . . . . . . . . . .  Captain de V aisseau Wever
3 . A ir  Force Group . . . . . . . . .  L ieutenant-G eneral F o erster
It. Economic and Armament . . . . . .  Colonel Huenermann
5 . P risoners o f  War . . . . . . . . .  Commandant M ieleck i
6 . R epresen tatives o f  Foreign M inistry
a . C ounsellor o f  L egation  . . . .  Hencke
b. Secretary  o f  L egation  . . . . .  T afe l
? . R epresentative o f  Four Year Plan . S ta ffe r
8 . Bureau o f  l ia i s o n  HCtel Rose . . .  Count Spee
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APPMDIX 0
Dates o f entry  o f th e  p resid en ts  o f  th e  German A rm istice Commission
X
and o f the  French delegation *
A. P re s id e n ts  (chairm en) o f th e  German A rm istice Commission
1 . General Stuelpnagel* June 29, 191*0.
2 . General Vogl* February 13 , 191*1 • He was again  p re s id e n t o f  the  
commission on September 8 , 191*1*.
B. P re s id e n ts  o f th e  French d e le g a tio n
1 . General H untsigers June 27 , 19l*0.
2 . General Doyen* September 1 3 , 191*0.
3 . V ice-adm iral M ichelier* (par Interim ) Ju ly  19 , 191*1.
1*. General Beynets October 1 , 19l*l.
5 . General B^rard* February 3 , 19l*3| he l e f t  Wiesbaden July 28,
191*1*.
6 . General Vignol* (par in terim ) Ju ly  29 to  September 9 , 191*1*., th e
date o f  th e  internm ent o f  a l l  personnel o f  the French d elega ­
t io n .
•̂D.F.C.A.A. , V, 1*23.
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